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2A B S T R A C T
Thio thesis is a case study of Federal Nigeria's foreign policy 
for the period 19&0-£6. Concerned with the major factors which deter­
mined that policy, it explores the following questionst Which of the 
two sets of omnibus factors - the economic and the non-economic - had' 
greater relative significance in fashioning Nigeria's relationship with 
the outside world? What was the nature and strength of the main 
non-economic forces? How, why and where did they propel legos' exter­
nal policy? Was the foreign policy of Nigeria's First Republic 
actually a true "reflection •• [of] •• that pattern of peaceful change, 
accomodation and compromise that has characterised Nigerian political 
evolution since the end of the second world war"^ as many Western 
observers were inclined to believe prior to the military overthrow of 
the civilian government in January 1966?
The thesis involves firstly a delineation of the Nigerian govern­
ment's transactions with other states, followed by an analysis of the 
main operative economic and non-economic factors which moulded the 
government's policy* Chapter 1 sets the stage by highlighting the 
degree to which Nigerian economic performance relied on Foreign Trade,
1. Nigeria did not convert to a Republican constitution until exactly 
three years after independence i.e. on October 1, 1963* The term 
"First Republic" is however adopted here, in consonance with 
popular usage, to refer to the whole period of post-independence 
civilian administration - October 1960 to January 1966.
2* J.6. Coleman - The Foreign Policy of Nigeria in J*£* Black and 
K»W* Thompson (eds) Foreign Policies in a World of Change
(New fork 1963) p. 379."
Foreign Aid and Foreign Private Investments, Chapters 2-8 constitute the 
main body of the study, and Chapter 9 concludes the exercise. It is 
argued that although economic considerations were significant, non­
economic factors had greater relative determining influence. Nigeria's 
colonial history, the ideological preferences of the elites, and the 
dominant position of the Muslim North in the Federal Government pro­
pelled the country towards a conservative foreign policy posture in the 
immediate post-independence period. However, the basically unstable 
domestic political situation was a paramount concern throughout and this 
counselled a cautious policy in marked contrast to the government's 
ambitions for leadership in Africa. Eventually these contradictory 
impulses progressively induced policy modifications.
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iI N T R O D U C T I O N
The 1960*0 witnessed s rise in the number of African territories 
which attained political independence. While in 1958, apart from South 
Africa, there existed only eight 'independent and sovereign1 states in 
the continent of Africa, by mid-1963, the nunber had increased to 
thirty-twoI These states had one basic characteristic in commons each 
had an underdeveloped economy heavily reliant on foreign factors for 
advancement. Generally, their pre-independence patterns of interna­
tional trade tended to survive and the new states' principal - sometimes 
even exclusive - customers and suppliers continued to be their old 
colonial overlords and their associates. The receipt of foreign aid 
and foreign private investments also come overwhelmingly from these 
powers. This state of affairs has given rise to the contention that 
economic determinism should be or is the first principle of foreign 
policy of these politically independent but effectively economically 
dependent states.
TWo schools of thought exist in relation to this view. One is 
epitomised in the statement by Chief H.O. Davies, a prominent Nigerian 
lawyer, that "it is necessary (for developing states] to set out national 
economic objectives and then to reconcile foreign policy to them.."1 
It conceives of political independence as inconplete unless it is 
buttressed by a healthy economy. TO hasten the attainment of 'complete* 
independence therefore, the new states should accord economic advantage 
priority treatment in their foreign policies. The second school of 
thought or what might be referred to as the 'communist school' is
1 . H.O. Davies - Nigeria 1 Prospects for Democracy (London 1961) p. 123*
convinced that tht heavy dependence of the new states on the economic 
goodwill of the old colonial powers reduces their Governments to the
status of puppets who In their foreign policies, are cospelled to dance
2to the tunes called lay their economic benefactors.
The Interests and objectives which governments seek to forward 
through International intercourse are legion. Can it validly be claimed 
that of all the manifold motives behind Nigerian foreign policy, that of 
economic advantage assumed a position of primacy in 1960-66? Zt is this 
and allied questions listed in the Abstract that are emamined in this 
thesis.
A study of this nature has to contend with a variety of serious 
problems. The first is definitional. Conscious of the close inter­
relationship between things economic and things supposedly non-eoonomic« 
where does one draw the line between either group of factors? For the 
putpose of this study, economic factors are defined as considerations 
relating to External Trade, Foreign Aid (that is, grants, leans and 
credits on public accounts and technical assistance in the form of 
personnel and equipments flowing from the Governments of relatively 
rich countries to their counterparts in economically lese advanced ones) 
and Foreign Private Investments whose main impacts in an economy are 
traceable to such macroeoonomic variables as national income and 
employment.
The second problem is allocations! • How does one assign rela­
tive importance to two seta of factors whose effects overlap so 
frequently? Thke the relationship between economic growth and domestic 
stability for instance. In the absence of an expanding economy the 
National Income, among other things, is relatively email. Consequently,
11
2. See for instance L.N. Pribtkovekiy - Nigeria in the Struggle for 
Independence (Kobcow 196r). ayAiah tgnalatioK by„ the UgS. 
Department of Cocmerco (Washington 1S»2) p. 29.
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competition among political parties representing various interest 
groupings for control of the government in order to have an effective 
voice in the deployment of the country's meagre resources is intense.
Each tends to perceive the situation as a typical sero sum game and 
is prepared to resort to any means constitutional or otherwise, to 
ensure that it does not emerge as the loser. For the ordinary citizen, 
the government's inability to cater for his basic needs - employment, 
medical care etc. - erodes his allegiance to it. Perpetual tension 
results and instability tends to be rife. Economic growth cannot of 
course guarantee domestic stability. Growth generates a variety of 
tensions such as the great divide between the relatively better off 
and those not so veil off| the breakup of traditional societies{ the 
problems of increasing urbanisation, inflation etc. which are poten­
tially destabilising. However, in an era in which the desire for rising 
living standards is commonplace, economic growth is at least a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition of domestic stability. On the other hand, 
there can be no growth without investment and ceteris paribus, little 
productive investment would be forthcoming unless the investor (partic­
ularly private investor) is assured of reasonable internal stability to 
safeguard his physical assets and the profitability prospects for his 
investments. Now, if a Government adopts a policy geared towards 
attracting foreign investments, what would be its main motivations 
economic growth (economic motive) or domestic stability (non-economic 
motive)? A simple solution is the application of the test of "primary 
impact" that is, the interest which would benefit in the first instance 
as a result of the policy, is regarded as pre-eminent. This solution 
with its inevitable suggestions of arbitrariness, is adopted in this 
thesis.
A third problem relates to the obligations deriving from foreign 
aid receipts. The Nigerian Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tsfawa
iv
Balewa is on record as saying "I do not believe that any kind of aid, 
no matter from whare it comas, is without strings attached to it.*^
Thus, a Government might be induced to embrace a policy on non-econosic 
matters am a result of obligations incurred in the quest for foreign aid. 
lb pinpoint the extent to which this was the case, an unfettered access 
to relevant Government files is a sine qua non. While some Nigerian 
Government papers were made available to the writer, such 'unfettered 
access' was ruled out because the appropriate authorities in Nigeria, 
after due consideration [of the writer's repeated requests for general 
access to relevant Government papers have decided] it would not be pos­
sible to waive the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, 1963**.^
Fourthly, a complex mix of imponderables - subjective, psycho­
logical and sentimental considerations feature in foreign policy 
decision-making. Zartaan has pointed out that "in Africa, in the first 
decade of independence, foreign policy is highly personalised and 
controlled by the Prime Minister or President."^ To assess the motiva­
tions behind Nigeria's foreign policy in their truest perspectives, 
interviews with Alhaji Balewa and Sir Ahmadu Bello would have been 
essential. Although foreign policy was constitutionally an exclusive 
preserve of the Federal Government, Sir Ahmadu, Premier of the Northern 
Region, was the National President of the Northern Peoples Congress -
3. s. a » n .  (coqpl) - Nigeria Speatoi Epoch— Mad, by Sir Atubatar 
Tafewa Balewa between 1957 and 196** (lagos 19b0 p. 161.
This was the explanation advanced by the Nigerian High Commission 
in London in a letter Ref. No. I/C0fV&713 of 13 March 1971 as a 
concluding response to the writer's efforts spread over a whole 
year, to gain general access to pertinent government files.
5. X.N. Zartman -International Halation* In the How Africa 
(New Jersey 1966) p. 53. .......
Vsenior partners in the Federal Coalition Qovarment of Nigeria and 
therefore had a say in overall Federal Goverment policy. Often refer* 
ring in public to Sir Abubakar as his 'lieutenant', Sir Ahmadu was 
politically the moat powerful asm  in Nigeria. Such interviews 
unfortunately were impracticable.
This thesis attests to break ground. A few studies of Nigeria's
foreign policy have of course been published. The chapter by Professor
6 7Coleman nd the book by Claude S. Phillips Jr. are perhaps the best of
these, but neither of thea subjects economic factors to a detailed 
analysis or treats economic and nan-economic forces on a comparative 
basis. Besides, Coleman covered only the first twenty-four months and 
Phillips only the first thirty-six months after the Federation became 
independent. Neither can therefore be regarded as portraying a compre­
hensive analytical assessment of the foreign policy of Nigeria's First 
Republic, as this study atteopts to do.
6. J.S. Coleman op. cit.
7- C.fi. Phillips Jr. - The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy
(Michigan 196*0
8. For one recent treatment of a theme of importance to this thesis
mss R.O. Ekundare, "The Political Econoagr of Private Investments
in Nigeria"
in The Journal of Modern African Studies 10.1 (1972) pp. 37-56.
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C H A P T E R  I
THE RELIANCE C M FOREIGN TRADE, FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENTS 
AND ECONOMIC AID FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA
The importance of external trade, Private Investments and Foreign
Aid in Nigeria'a economic development is partly reflected in their respec-
1tive roles as resource, suppliers to the Government* In Nigeria, the govern­
ment occupies a pivotal position in the development process* It provides 
requisite infrastructure-roads, bridges, telecommunications; undertakes 
Social Investments - housing, hospitals, education - relevant to developmen­
tal needs, and sponsors researches in various fields to enhance national out­
put* Apart from operating several incentive schemes to induce investments in
industry, it participates actively in manufacturing* In 1965* 27* of total
2paid up Capital in manufacturing was Government owned*
The Government's position as the prime mover in the development sphere
the
is underlined by the fact that under/ftigerian National Development Plan
1962-68, total gross public Capital formation was estimated at £N?93*8 million,
that is about 67S& of the aggregate gross ?ixed investments of £W1183*3 million,
1during the Plan (Period* This National Plan was the first of a series of 
three or four expected to launch the Nigerian economy into Self-sftstaining 
growth*
1* Government in this Chapter refers to the four (and after July 1963* five)
governments comprising the Federation of Nigeria viz* The Federal and the 
Regional Governments*
2* Calculated from date published in the Federal Office of Statistics
"Industrial Survey%igerla 196**-65!l (Lagos) 1966* The Survey excluded 
loans and Supplier Credits in its definition of Capital* Since the Govern­
ment frequently resorted to Supplier Credits in financing industrial 
projects as shown laterj Its total stake in the manufacturing Sector ' 
was underestimated*
3* Federal Ministry of Economic Development "Federation of Nigeria,National
Development Plan 1962-1968" (Subsequently referred to as the "National 
Plan") (Lagos 1962) ^*36. See Appendix Table (A.T.)1 
Ibid J>*23
8r O R E I Q H  T R A D E
qoTftrwaent Revenue
External trade went some way towards alleviating the revenue problem 
of the Governaent as indloated in the following table and graph.
9TABLE 1
froa yore^a
rCVtnUt1 **
(Of Millions )
Toor 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1963 1966
(a) Total Government 
Revenue
(b) Total Govt Tax
(e) Inport Duty
(4) Export Tax
(o) Total Revenue
froa Foreign trad#
(e ♦ 4)
(f) Foreign trade 
Revenue aa ft of 
total Government 
.Revenue
(g) Foreign trade 
Revenue ae ft of 
total Tax Revenue
131
94
50
15
65
13?
103
60
13
73
49*6
69.1
53.2
70.8
149
106
59
12
71
154
113
61
14
75
169
129
76
15
91
192
144
85
16
101
183
134
59
14
73
47.6
66*9
48.6
66.3
53.8
70.5
52.6
70.1
39.8
54.4
Source t Cone true ted froa Central Dank of Fqeriq "Economic and 
Financial Review**Lagos Vol. 6 fro. 1 June 1968.
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It appears from tha table that tha foreign trade factor fumiahad between 
39.0& and 53.ft of total government revenue la tha 1960-66 period. la tana 
of total tax revenue, foreign trade’s contribution was ana higher - ranging 
between 5^ f.%- and ?0.&. This was to ho axpoetad. Ia view of the low par 
capita incomes, peraonal income tax yields won inevitably aaall. Tha 
aituatioa was aggravated by deficient tax assessment, collection and general 
adaiaietratioa systems. For instance, tha oaouat of tax payed, hy individuals
of tan dapaadad on whether or not they ware members or aupportera of tha
5 .governing political parties. Boaidoa,Company tax raturaa ware generally
low not only due to tha relative dearth of tha anther of taxable establish­
ments but also because many firms were still enjoying tax holidays under 
various Government gchemea.^
Ia ooatrmat, levies on foreign trade were relatively easily asaoooahle 
and colleotahla. Imports entered the country through a few porta only while 
pebHsly-nm marketing Boards monopolised exportation of moot agricultural 
produets on which export, sales and purchase taxes were imposed. The signi­
ficance of external trad# ia the revenue yielding context was manifest when 
late in 1966, the Federal Government decided "to liberalise the tariff policy 
in order to raise the level of imports and consequently revenue from customs 
duties" . 7
5. G. Oka Orewa - Taxation in Western Nigeria 
(Oxford University Prase 1962) )». 36-39
6. For instance, Shell-B.P. the most important company in Mgeria's 
Petroleum industry, which commenced oil exploration in Nigeria in 1937, 
and exportation of crude oil twenty years later, did not pay tax on . 
profits until 19&t. Even then, it still had substantial unclaimed 
capital allowaacaa to be wrltfrfirjhgalnst future profits. Shell-B.P. 
'The Nigerian Story”/Hareh 1965. h.36Lagos
7. Central Bank of Nigeria * "Annual Report and statement of Accounts 
ftg jfggr •ndad 3 1.12.6^ ,/*>^3
Profits from foreigntrade also contributed indirectly to the Govern­
ment^ treasury by swelling personal incomes thereby enlarging taxable 
capacities. The shortcomings of the taxation systems meant that Govern­
ments' take from this source was not particularly high. A more important 
link between trade and government finance was provided by Marketing Boards.
MARKETING BOARDS
These are statutory monopolies engaged in the marketing of Nigeria's 
main primary exports. World War 2 creations to ensure orderly supply of 
raw materials to the U.K., they subsequently developed ostensibly into 
Buffer Fund Agencies for the stabilisation of producer incomes. They op­
erate by maintaining a spread between export prices and producer prices. 
Surpluses accumulated when export prices are buoyaat should, in theory, be 
used for subsidising producer prices in lean yearns. In practise, the pro­
ducer subsidising role has been subordinated to one of mobilising valuable 
funds for public investment. In the 19^ 7-5*+ export boom period, the Boards 
ran up hefty surpluses to the tune of about £N120 million. The subsequent 
slackening of world prices for agricultural exports reduced the rate of 
surplus accumulation without extinguishing it.
In 1955, a World Bank Mission io Nigeria recommended that apart from 
liquid reserves of £N25 million, the Marketing Boards should lend their
g
surpluses on a long term basis, to the Government for development purposes. 
The recommendation was accepted and henceforth the Boards virtually became 
fiscal arms of the Government. In the Western Region for instance, its
9  _____________
12
8. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development "The Economic 
Development of Nigeria*1 (1955) ^.88.
1953-60 Development Plan expected £N20 million or some 6&5 of the total
capital fund to come from the Regional Marketing Boardfe accumulated
9reserves* Under the National Plan ,the Boards mere expected to Contribute 
a total of 0139*1 millions towards overall government capital programme in 
the Federation* This represented 13*^6 of total public Capital investments
to be financed from domestic sources* The proportion was as high as in
10the Western Region*
DIRECT INVKSTMafTS
Foreign trade has also stimulated direct investments in Nigeria*
During the Colonial era, many of the roads, railway and coomnmicatlor 
channels constructed were aimed at facilitating the easy flow of import and 
export trade* This process has continued after independence with the con­
struction of feeder roads to link rich agricultural areas with railroads 
and ports to ease the movement of export produce* Railway constructions 
like the **00 miles Bornfc* extension completed in 1964 hakebeen a boon to 
exports*
These improvements in transport and communications have gradually en­
hanced development by widening and integrating the domestic market for goods 
and services while rendering the working population relatively more mobile* 
Besides, these investments in transport etc*, like investments flnanoed out 
of export profitd, have been productive of multiplier effects on national
13
9* Government of Western Region of Nigeria "Development of the Western 
Region of Nigeria 1955-1960",
(Sessional Paper No* * 1955) £*14
10* See A.T.2.
income* Lbctenaive leakages into imports and savings have, however, greatly 
reduced the magnitude of the operative multiplicands*
Foreign trade served simultaneously as a aouce of a fair proportion of 
the capital goods required in domestic oapital formation and of the foreign 
exchange required to pay for these goods as shown in tables 2 and 3.
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TABLE 2
Nigeria : Capital Qooda Imports and Gross Capital formation11 1960*1966
Tear 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
(£N Millions)
Gross Capital Formation 129.1 152*5 159.8 177.0 195.0 234*1 2*2.6
(At Current prices)
Capital Goods Import 61*9 63*1 62*6 65.4 71.4 86*5 92.3
Capital Goods Imports
as a proportion of Gross 48*0# 41.# 39.# 37.0* 36.6* 36.4* 38.0*
Capital formation*
Sourcest Federal office of State: "Digest of Statistics" 1965 . x
Central Bank of Nigeria "Sconomio and Fln«"*fl*i (Uaaps),
December 1964 and "Annual Report" 1966-67.
It would appear from the table that the import quotient of capital 
formation declined over the period* However oapital formation in Buildings 
and Civil Engineering which have relatively high domestic contents accounted 
for about 3Of, and 21* respectively of the total in 1960-66*12
11. The accuracy of Capital formation estimates in Nigeria, as in all eco­
nomically developing states, is highly suspect* Official Nigerian 
estimates exclude such items as mud houses and expenditure on personal 
investments (eg* in agriculture) whose valuation cannot be based on 
any objective data. Government and the foreign Sectors which keep ade­
quate records are almost inevitably accorded more than proportionate 
significance* The resulting aggregate figure Should be regaurded as in­
dicating only approximate magnitudes*
12* Calculated from data published^he Federal Office of States "Annual 
Abstract of S tat is" and "Digest of Staf a" 1963-1967
Consequently * in t«ru of directly productive investments, the signif loanee 
of inported capital gooda was much higher than the percentages in the table* 
Inporta have alao provided eaaential rev materiala and intermediate 
gooda needed in manufacturing, transport, mining and constructional acti­
vities. In 1966, raw gaterial inporta constituted 2?*7% of total Nigerian 
imports.1-5
On the other hand, exports have been the chief source of foreign ex­
change for payingJNigeria*a inports* The extent to which export earnings 
have covered commodity inport costs is demonstrated in the following Table*
TABUS 3
Nigeria* Percentage of Commodity Imports financed by Commodity Exporta
15
Tsar 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966(fit Million)
Commodity Imports 215 222 203 207 242 262 238
Cemmodity Exports 165 174 169 189 183 200 191
Exports as a % of 76k 7 * 83* 91* 73* 76* 81*Imports
Sourest Central Bank of Nigeria* "Annual Report and Statement of Accounts" 
1965-1967 *------------------ - ---------------
Note* Until 1964, no separate figures ware given for inporta and exports 
of the petroleum Sector* In the Table figures up to 1963 include, 
and those from 1964 exclude, the petroleum Sector*
It can he seen that the proportion was as high ss 9%  in 1965 and never 
fell below 76** The overall significance of external trade to the Nigeriar 
eoenemy was undefined byogovernment report which emphasised that "the 
implementation of our development programme largely depends on our ability 
to finance the import of the required investment gooda and eseential consumer
goods* This calls for an expansion of our exports in order to acquire the
1Lnecessary foreign exchange"*
15« Calculated from statistics published in Central Bank of Nigeria'Annual 
Reports"* bp dit 1967. See A.T.S. for yearly percentages*
14* Nigeria Federal Ministry of Economic Development - National Development 
Plan Progress Report* 1964* J>*10
A Ja& •• 7- -
16
mm i
Capital Foraatlon
Privately ownad fund* from abroad war* aupplaaantal to doaaatio ra- 
aouroaa la tha oroatioa of groaa addltioaa to tha Nigeria's Capital 
atook*
TABLE
Hlgarlai ^ Foralwv-gtmad Co^oaant of Sroas Capital formation 1961-1966
T »
Hat Inflow of 
Foreign Private 
Capital(>)
Total Qroaa Private 
Saotor
Capital Groaa (1) am % of (2) 
Foraatl&P Fonatloio)
........(a MlUioa) ____
(1) aa * o1
(3)
Year
1961 27.5 132.5 9 U 17.9* 29.6 *
1962 17.7 159.8 95.2 1 1 . 1 * 16. 4 *
1963 37.9 117.0 113.6 15.7 * 33.3*
1966 63.0 195.0 127.0 32.3* * '41.8*
1965 55.2 236.1 150.3 23.6 % 36.1 *
1966 19.6 .242 .6 151.7 20.3* 32.4 *
Noteat Contlnuad on paga 17*
NOTES* (Continued from ^age 16.)
(a) Includes ploughed beck profits. Not all net inflow of private
was
eapital/neoessarily expended on oapital formation. Only direct long tera 
oapital inflow oan reasonably be asaumd to have been so utilised. Unfor­
tunately, official Nigerian statistics do not satisfactorily distinguish 
between short ten and long ten oapital inflows froa abroad. The figures 
are therefore to be regarded as rough guides only.
(b) At current prices
(e) Private doctor Capital fomation figures are an underestlaate as they 
exclude provisions for Coapanies which had not cose under the assessaent 
procedure for Coapany taxation. These would generally be saall coapanies 
but their nuaber would be large enough to falsify the estiaates signifi­
cantly.
Sources* Central Bank of Nigeria* "Eoonomlc and financial Review" Deoeaber
Statistics11
1968. Federal Office of ./ 1 \ M Annual Abstract of State” 1966-68.
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It would appear froa the table that foreign private capital as a pro­
portion of aggregate gross Capital formation was not insignificant. It 
ranged between 11.1# and 32.3£. In terms of private sector gross oapital 
formation, foreign investments accounted for between I^ .^Kctnd Vl.flk.
Foreign private investments relatively clustered around two activities*
' 15Fining and Quarrying| and Manufacturing and Processing • Coincidentally, 
these were two of the fastest growing doctors in the Nigerian economy. Crude 
petroleum production and export was mainly foreign financed. Its output 
roam from 012.8 million in 1959/60 to £H101 million in 1966/67.1&Imduatrlal
15* Control Bank of Nigeria i "Economio Review" opoit 1968. £.13.
Seo A.T.4
16. Federal Office of Stata. ,fDigoat of S^tatistics'1 (La^os) 1968,
output roM at an annual rata of about In tha m m  period* In terms
of CtDF* Manufacturing hoverer comprised only 3? in 1939/80 and *f*3* in
1966/87* Similar figures for Mining vara 1% and 7*2? respectively*1^
Enterprises in mining vara highly capital and still intensive* They
involved tha commitment of huge amounts of capital at high risk vhile tha
18gestation periods vara often vary long* In Manufacturing* foreign enter­
prises dominated the food, leverages and 'tobacco Sectoral and the Chemical
19and Chemical Products Sectors* 7 These Sectors vere also relatively Capital 
and Skill intensive* By importing Capital and Skilled personnel; foreign 
owned enterprises made i significant contributions towards ameliorating 
the technological* skill and capital bottlenecks to economio development 
in Nigeria*
Direot foreign investments had the usual multiplier effects vhoae 
magnitude vaa limited by leakages into imports and savings* Investment 
in any one industry also tendod to stimulat# investments in secondary in­
dustries to meet its input demands and/or to utilise its outputs in further 
production processes* Foreign Investments thus tended to impart dynamic 
developmental impulses whose magnitudes varied with the nature of the
18
17* Federal Offios of Stats - Annual Abstract of Statistics. 1987*
18* For instance, Shsll-B*P* did not expect to break even until 1988 -
30 yeare after it had commenced exploration in Nigeria* Thia* Inspite 
of generous capital allovanoes received from the Oovernment* M.s, 
Robinson "Nigerian Oil:Prospects and Perspectives" 4a the Nigerian 
Journal of Eoononlo and Social stpdism- July 1963* KiST"
19* 7 %  of total paid-up capital in tha former and 92* in the latter 
vere foreign ovmsd* Federal Office of States "Industrial Survey 
19631> (Legos).
industries to which the investments were directed* The strength of these
backward and forward linkage effects in various Sectors 1b depicted in A*T*5*
*The net additions of foreign investments in manufacturing to value 
added in Nigeria however tended to be negative in the 1960-66 period* This 
was mainly due to relatively large payments in the fora of profits and 
dividends accruing to foreign factors on one hand, and to relatively high 
infant industry tariff protection accorded manufacturing industry*
EMPLOPttMT KFTBCTS
Direct foreign investments did not make very appreciable impact on the
20escalating urban unemployment problem in Nigeria* According to the 1965 
Nigerian manpower survey, the two key foreign investment Sectors - Mining 
and Manufacturing accounted for 7*05k and 11*42* respectively of the 569,330 
workers in establishments employing 10 or more persona covered by the sur­
vey* This was infact a reflection of the relative Capital intensity of the 
Sectors*
Indirectly, however, foreign owned enterprises imparted a stimulating
other
influence on the growth of eervice an«ylabour intensive Sectors* Besides, r. 
to mast their requirements of skilled personnel, large foreign owned firms 
liks the United Africa Company, have set up their own training centres* In
addition, they award aeholarmhlpa to Nigerians to study at local^overseas
21institutions* The outcome has been a gradual increase in the availability 
of skilled Nigerians*
19
20* According to the I*L*0* Year Book on Labour Statistics 1966* the
number of registered unemployed persons in Nigeria in 1965 was 20,9*10 
compared to b,868 in i960* This however is a gross underestimate since 
it is widely accepted that less than 1 in 10 unemployed remastered in 
Nigeria*
21* Nigeria Manpower Board - A purvey of Labour flBquirononts* 1965*
• - ' • : . ;-V . • .
QOV'oHWimT RLVE»PE /
Foreign owned enterprisea made sizeable contributions to public finance* 
Government revenue fros Company direct taxation rose from £N*t*7 million in 
i960 to £N8*4 million in 1966 - a rise of 70*8M*22 A large proportion of 
the receipts from manufacturing industry and large firms in the trading Sector 
was from foreign-ownod establishments* The significance of the largely for- 
eign-financed petroleum industry in Government finance has risen phenomenally* 
In 1958-59t Government revenue from the industry was £11*0*8 millions or 0*1#
of total Government revenue* By 1965/6, it had jumped to BN1^*6 millions
2<*
or ' This' was easily the fastest growing source of revenue to the
Government*
Revenue from ttxcise duties increased from £N%6 millions in i960 to 
£N33#7 millions in 1966 an annual increase of 8196* Host of the duty receipts 
derived from sale of Tobacco* Beer, Motor Spirits, Diesel oil, and other 
domestic manufacturers in whose production foreign investments featured peo- 
minently*
BALANCE OF PAYHJJITS
Part of the role played by foreign investments in the Federation's 
balance of payments is depicted in the following table*
20
22* Central Bank of Nigeria "Economic and Financial Review", June 1969
23* Annual Abstract of Statistics (Bp Cit) 1965* For a breakdown of 
the figures See A*T*6*
2hm Economic and Financial Review op dit. June 1968. V
TABLE 5
Niger1st Balance of Payments 1960-65 
(at Million.)
ISSE_____________ BSP— JBfi__1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
21
Trad# Balance -69.7 -64.2 -44.8 -34.8 -60.9 -*1 .7
Long torn Capital 
Inflow (a) ♦19.0 ♦27.3 ♦17.7 +37*9 ♦43.3 ♦49.0
Sub Total -47.9 -36.9 -27.1 ♦ 3.1 -17.6 ♦ 7.3
Direst Investments
Income (b)
- 8.1 — 6.8 -10.9 -17.2 -19.1 -25.1
Hat transfer and 
other payments
♦ 2.5 - 1.8 ♦ 1.4 - 2.5 - 1.0 - 4.7
Errors and Oamlsa­ ♦ 2.5 ♦20.8 ♦ *.2 -10.3 ♦ 9.6 -10.9lons
Grand Total -52.8 -24.4 -JV* -26.5 -33.4
Commercial Banks ♦14.7 - 8.6 ♦ 7.3 - 1.6 ♦19.5 - 9.8
Official j 2§4-.£2*0 JtShl x M . +52*2
Long term Capital 
inflow am propmr- 27.5* *2.5* 59.3* 108.9* 7 1.1* 1 1 7.3*tion of trade 
Balttot
Notoo (a) Figures for long tore Capital inflow include reinvested 
££ profits and so tend to give a Misleading picture* Howe ver,1 since 
l profits earned can either be retained or repatriated, and repatriated 
profits are a debit iten on the Balance of Payments, such retentions 
can justifiably be regarded as a credit iten*
( foO » »(b) Figures for direct investment income which should show only 
repatriated profits infest include that portion of total profits that 
wds re-invest d* There was thus sn overlap between long tern capital figures 
and those for direct investment income*
Bourses Annual Abstract of Stats 1965 and Digest of Statistics 1965*
As tbs table shows, inflow of long tern Capital funds ranged from 
7.9* in 1960 to 11?*% in 1966 of the dofioit on trade account* They 
thus greatly reduced the outflow of official reserves necessary to finance 
the payments deficits*
Direct Investment Income represent the price in terms of foreign 
currency the country had to pey for the benefits* derived from foreign 
private investments. Inspite of the distinctly upward trend, the net 
balance of payments impact of direct long term Investments in Nigeria 
during the 1960-65 period, was positive.
FOREIGN CURRENCY SASKIIKIB
Nigeria earned s significant proportion of its foreign exchange from 
the export of Crude petroleum, ~fin, Casse trite, Cdumbite, Plywood and 
other processed agricultural products, all of which were in various degrees, 
foreign* financed. The most Important was crude petroleum whose net foreign 
exchange earnings2J rose from £N1*».3 millions in 19&5 to Billions in
1966. These amounted to 8.6# and 23.3^ respectively of Nigeria* e total 
merchandise exports (excluding Crude Oil) in both years.
Foreign Capital was also important in financing various import re­
placement manufacturing, like Tobacco, whose Importation dwindled thereby 
saving foreign exchange. The petroleum refinery opened in lets 1965 which 
reduced imports of Oil products from £N17 millions in 19&5 to <N3*5 millions 
in 1966, was foreign-owned.
Many import substitution production however had negative foreign 
exchange effects because of their relatively heavy dependence on imported 
Oapital goods, raw materials and Services. The position was likely to be 
transformed in the longer term as the industrial base expanded and the em­
ployment of foreign factors in Nigerian manufacture correspondingly lessened.
23* Nat foreign exchange earnings Is total export sales less cost of
materials and Services acquired abroad and dividends, interest and 
profits remitted overseas.
26. L.H. Schatel "Petroleum in Nigeria*1. K 162
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It is not without significance that under the 1962-68 National Plan , 
out of an estimated total P^rivate Capital formation of £H389*5 millions, 
£1(200 millions urns expected to come from foreign sources "to sustain the 
required growth rate (j>f the economy} and to finance the required import 
surplus".2^ .
FOHEigN AID
Nigeria's reliance on foreign aid derived from the inadequacy of 
Government receipts from other sources of finance for its investment pro­
gramme. The Governments Chief Sources of investment finance were Becurrent 
budget Surpluses! domestic borrowing, accumulated reserves and foreign 
aid.
RBCURH>HT BUDGET GUKPLDGSS
During 1960-66, the level of recurrent budget Surpluses is shown in 
the third oollumn of the following table.
23
27* "’Nation Development Plan" Op cit (^ .38
Gee page 2*+ for Table 6.
2*
TA3L.S 6
f i^ -oria; Level of Recurrent Budget urpluses 1960-66
Year Government Revenue Recurrent Expenditure Surplus
1960 139.8 99 40
1961 137 106 31
1962 149 121 28
1963 154 124 30
1964 169 143 26
1965 192 162 30
1966 183 175 8
Sources ’’Economic and Financial Review” bp cit June 1969
~ ' " f
It can ba scon that thara mas a downward trend. Tha most striking 
feature is tha rata at which recurrent expenditure incraasad relative to 
revenue. Between 1960-1966, tha former rose from £N99 millions to £H175 
millions or 76.7#\ while tha latter went up from £N139 million to £N183 
million or 31 •
DOMESTIC BORROWING
Interna} loans ware a useful supplement to tha Government's Capital 
Fund. Under tha National Plan, CN75.7 million warn expected from this 
Source - £N4o million of which was to ba in tha form of Central Bank holdings 
of various Government Securities.* By 1964, £N41 million had bean raised in
Internal loans with the Control Bank holding about 0119 Billion of 
Government Development Bonds aftor disposing of 018 sill ion worth. Tho 
Control Bank's holding of such a largo aaount of Government Bonds rostrio- 
tod its ability to contribute to Government development finsnoo without 
daaaglng monetary stability.28Hor»ov»r, to tho extent that private lndi- 
vi duals and bodies susoribod to Government loansv tho already Capital 
deficient private doctor was deprived of funds.
FOREIGN RESERVES
Drawing down of foreign reserves accumulated during the export boon 
periods particularly 19 7^-5^  was s boon to development as long as the 
reserves lasted. By 1962 howevert they were largely drawn downf^ With 
depressed prices for ocsnodity exports in the late 50's and 60's it waa*pos- 
sible to replenish the depleted reserves. > —
FOREIGN AID
A consequence of the Government^ inability to raise adequate Capital 
Bands from the above souroesnas the heightened demand for foreign aid. The 
extent of this need is underlined by the fact that under the National Plan, 
out of a planned total Government Capital Investment of million,^0
01327.1 sill ion or about 50# was expected to consist of foreign <3 id.'*1
25
28. Federal Ministry of Boononic Development "Federal Republic of Nigeria t 
National Development Plan Progress veport" (Lagos) 19^V. jpJ«5
29* National Developncnt Plan" gp Cit fcl7
30. That Is ‘total Government Capital formation of Of693'Ktailllen less
Of 1^9*^ millions to be financed out of Recurrent Expenditures.
See A.T.I
31. National Development Plan Op cit f>.33
as
The urgency is underpinned by the Government*s extensive resort to
Contreotet* finance and Supplier Credits Hbeoause of the delays and diffi-
*52.oulties in arranging orthodox or conventional finance”, although it was 
fully aware that these essentially short term, high interest loans^ had 
damaging budgetary and balance of payments consequences which could 
"seriously prejudice” the future development of the Nigerian economy.
Apart from development finance, foreign old was simultaneously a 
source of urgently needed technical assistance. Between 1962 and 1966,
Nigeria received technical assistance valued at £22 million.^
Thus, to develop economically, Nigeria relied relatively heavily on 
external trade, inflow of private Investments from abroad and an economic 
aid* And the Federal Government was strongly committed to a policy of rapid 
economic development* In his speech from the throne in the Federal Parliament 
in March 1961, the Governor General reiterated the opinion of his Ministers 
that our political independence will have no meaning unless it is firmly
based on a vigorous expanding economy which will ensure * steadily rising
living standards to all our people. Therefore ay Government will continue
to attach first priority to the task of increasing the pace of economic 
tiCYfilojameat of, th is, Country” * - . ^   — --------------------
32* National Plan Progress Report dp tit. f7
33* For details of Contractor financed loans received by Nigeria in
1960*66 including tha loans. See A.T.7
3^» "Progress Report” £*18.
The Permanent Secretary Federal Ministry of Finance, Lagos, Mr* A* Ayida 
has described Contractor Finance, end Supplier Credit and other short 
term indebtedness as "one of the potential sources of complete para­
lysis in the development of the Nigerian economy”. A.A. Ayida - 
Contractor Finance and Supplier Credit in Economic Growth IN The 
Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies (Ibadan) July 1965*
P*gc 175«
33* For the monetary value and sources of technical Assistance received 
by Nigeria 1962*6 See A*T*8
36. Nigeria House of Representative Debates (Lagos) 29th March 1961 
Col. 598 ^
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C H A P T E R  2 
NIQ-.RIA*S AFRICA POLICY
In the sphere of external relatione, the Nigerian Federal Government 
focused much of its attention on the Continent of Afrioa* The Prise 
Minister, Sir Abubakctr "afawa falews insisted in 1962* "We belong to
1Africa and Africa must clain first attention in our external affairs”•
This was perhaps inevitable* Not only is Nigeria geographically located
in the Continent which up to the Biddle 0*s was being swept by the con-
susing passions of nationalise); every sixth African is a Nigerian* The
central thane of the Government's policy towards Africa related to its
approach to Pan Africanism*
i ^  AFRICANISM
Pan Africanism — the concept of African unity, dates back to 1900 when
the .first Pan African Congress sponsored by H.S* williams, a Trinidadian
Lawyer, was held in London* 3orn of hundreds of years of Slavery sucoeeeded
by Colonial subjugation, poverty and technological backwardness which had
given rise to the stereotype of African raoial inferiority. Pan Africanism
aimed at restoring dignity to the African* In the early stages, it found
expression in the slogan "Africa for the Africans" - a desire to rid Africa
2of what was regarded as the humiliating yoke of Colonialism*
1* Abubakar Tafawa Balewa - Nigeria Looks Ahead IN "Foreign Affairs"
(New York Oct* 1962) K136
2* At first, the Pan African movement * . dominated by the Du Bo is' and
the Marcus Gravys who, though of African stock, had never set foot 
on African soil, made relatively modest demands* The manifesto of 
the *fth Pan African Congress held in London in 1923 declared "--We 
ask in all the world that black folks be treated as men* We can see 
no other road to peace and progress-*-" (Reproduced in ColLn Le^um - 
Pan Africanism* A short political guide (London 1965)
(continued on Page 28)
In the 1960va as alien rule receded in Africa, Colonialism, though 
still a pressing and highly emotive issue, was superseded by the need to 
preserve and consolidate the newly won independence of African states and 
to improve their economies* To achieve these objectives, there was % 
general perception of strength in unity. President Nyerere of Tanzania 
reflected popular African thinking when he argued that "for the sake of 
all African States large or small, African unity must come and it must be 
real unity. Our goal must be the United States of Africa. Only this can
really give Africa the future her people deserve after Centuries of economic
uncertainty and sooial oppression-- Only through unity can we be sure that Africa
really governs Africa —  that African resources will be used for the bene­
fit of Africa1*.^
Pan Africanism in tha later stages thus embraced the idea of a United 
States of Africa or a political integration of all independent African 
States. While the goal of a political union was widely acoepted on the 
Continent, there were two schools of thought as to how this goal could best 
be achieved. The two poles were represented by the standpoints of Accra 
and Lagos respectively.
28
2. (continued from page 27)
3y the early 19*K)'s a new era downed with the active participation 
of Africa born Nationalists - the Asikiwaa, the Jomo Kenyattas, the 
Kkrumahs, and a change of mood was evident. The 6th Pan African 
Congress held in Manchester in 19^5 demanded "for black Africa 
autonomy and independence so far and no further than it la possible 
in this one world jot groups and peoples to rule themselves subject 
to inevitable world unity and federation." (Ibid ^ .32)
3* J» Nyerere - A United States of Africa IN Journal of Modern African 
Studies 1963.-*- Ffr 1 & 3*
federalism)
This approach vhose forsmost protagonist was President Hkrumah of 
Ghana strongly advocated the immediate union of African States in the 
form of a Federation. The union was constitutionally to comprise 
an Upper Bouse with two representatives from each State, and a Lower 
House with representation proportional to the population of each member 
State. These central bodies would formulate Common policies relating to 
Defence, Economic Planning, Foreign Policy and Diplomacy to apply to the
AFederation as a whole. It would be essential to set up an executive 
body with effective enforcement powers. The surrender of some sovereignty 
by participating States would be a sine qua nan. In Dr. Hkrumah's blew, 
the sacrifice was worthwhile because There can be no peace or
security in Africa without freedom and political unity. The only answer 
to the several difficulties facing our Continent is actual political 
union of our various {states and territories.If we cannot make an effort 
in this direction we might as well begin to throw up our hands in despair 
and forget about Africa" •
THE LAGOS (OR FPHCTIOBAL Cfr-OFEBATIOHl APPROACH
This approach completely rejected Immediate political integration 
of Independent African States as unrealistic and non viable. Sir Abubakor 
underlined the salient features of the Lagos Approach when he told the 
Addis Ababa African Summit in May 1965" Some of us have suggested that
29
4. X. Hkrumah - "Africa must unite" (London1963) :^£.218-221
5. X. Hkrumah - "I speak of Freedom". 218-222
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African unity should ba achieved by political fusion of tha diffarant 
dtates of Africa^ acme of us faal that unity could ba achieved by taking 
practical stops in eeonomlo, educational, scientific and cultural co-oper­
ation and by trying first to gat Africans to understand thanselrae before 
embarking on tha sore ooaplioated and boots difficult arrangements of poli­
tical union * My Country stands for tha practical approach to tha unity 
of tha African Continent —
Stressing tha fundamental differences between tha two approaches, tha 
Nigerian Foreign Minister Jigs Waohukti told Parliament in September 1961 
’’our Fan Afrioanion is tha pyramid resting on tha broad base* Tha apex is 
ultimately where the ideal of political union ia reached* But there are 
others who want to reverse the pyramid by starting with tha political Union
whioh is the apex, to build tha pyramid and prooaad downwards to tha broad
b7base —  it will oollspec and fall to pieces.
Drawing heavily on Nigerian history, Lagoa was convinced that suc­
cessful political integration had a number of >prerequiei*er
(1) That tha political leaders of the prospective integration 
partners should undergo n long period of fraternising with one another by 
exchanging visits and seating together st frequent intervals to exchange 
views on common problems* This would enable them to understand oas another* 
viewpoints on different issues and facilitate the drawing up of cannon 
plat ferns when fusion la eventually achieved*
6* Federal Ministry of Information - Hr* Prime Minister* A Selection
of #peeohsm made by air Abubakar Tafaun Balova* Prime Minister of 
the Federal Bepubllo of Nigeria* (Lagoa 196fr) Tft>* 9*n»5*
7* larliasontry Debates - House of Representatives ( ubsequently referred
to as H H D) 1 ecioral Qovt Printer, Lagos) 4th August 1961* Col* 2803
(2) That at non-Govcrnaental levels* nationals of tha 
various States should gat to know and understand nach ofcKer wall bafora 
tha integration to avoid Social disharmony la tha Union*
(3) That transport and ooinmioatioaa links batwaan tha States 
oust ba astsbllshad and straagthanad to foe illta to in tars tats Coanroial 
and non fonsnrolal lntaroouraa*
(k) That tha Stataa oust have a long history of Co-operatloa 
In aoonoalo, educational* Seiantlflo and Cultural Aphsres*
Sir Abubakar told tha UN Oanaral Aaaaably la Oatobar 1960 that Afrleaa 
political union will follow aa tha natural oonaaquanoa of Corporation la 
othar fields”*^
Tha Lagoa presorlption for Africa's political integration inplieltly 
aaeunort that as th* banaflts of iator-atate Co-ope ration la 1 ini tad doo* 
polltlaal Sectors baoana evident* tha urge to expand tha araa of oo-oporatloa 
would become irresistible until a political union ultinataly evolved. Co* 
oparatlon in non-politieal a pharos was thus labwed with a cartain iaaanant 
dynaaio that would propal Abates towards tha final goal of polltlaal fusion* 
Thara was however noaprioriraaaon why tha aaauaad dynaaio ahould not 
poter out * ' bafora tha final goal was attaiaad* A* will ba aaoa la tha
naxt Chapter* ana of tha raaaona why Lagoa oonaidarod an lanediate political 
union un viable was tha belief that disparate educational and aoonoalo develop- 
aoatal levels in different parts of tha Union would generate severe tensions 
that would destroy the Union* While oloee inter-state co-operation in eoo- 
nonlc natters could enhance econcotic davalopaant rates for tho ontiro 
Continent* tho diotribution of tho gains would bo uneven* This would bo tho 
esse especially \ uji+k ' ; an effective central Agency to ensure
8* Same Epelle !tNigeria Speaks - Speeches made by Alhaji Abubakar Tafaufa 
Balewa between 1957 and 196V1 (Lagos 196*0 ^*68
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a more balanced distribution. States already relatively better off would 
tend to get relatively larger shares of the benefits. The outcome could be 
threefold* Relatively woree off States nay well see themselves as subsi­
dising their better off counterparts. They uwuyAthen lose enthusiasm ^ or 
the eo-operation eohemee if they uafs. convinced that in absolute terms, 
thslr gains from co-operating closely with fellow African States would be 
the same or even loss then if they maintained close association with non- 
Afrioan powers*
Secondly, the uneven distribution of benefits would bend to exsr- 
oebate the disparate economic development levels and render future politi­
cal union oven loss viable on the badis of the arguments advanced against 
immediate political integration*
Thirdly, to the extent that all African States develop satisfactorily 
through oo-operation among themselves, many, particularly the small ones 
would tend to bo loss attracted towards s political union in which they 
would bo dominated by the bigger States*
Legos was nevertheless persuaded of the wisdom of the (Approach which 
entailed a minimum of upheaviril and ensured that movements in the direction 
of political union would bo gradual, mild and reversible, and set out to 
implement It*
MOVES TO FOSTER CO-OPERATION AMONG AFRICAN STATES
By the Spring of 196% there were two distinct groupings of African
States with opposed foreign policy outlooks* The Brassvilla Group (oom-
9 10prising twelve ex-French African territories) and the Casablanca Group.
9* Camsroons, Chad, Congo (Brasaville), Central African Republic;
Dahomey, Gabon, I very Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and 
Upper Volta* .
10* Comprised Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, The United Arab Hepublio 
and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Repute
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While the former was basically a Status quo group, the latter was revo­
lutionary in its foreign policy orientation*
In furtherance of £ts* crpproach to African unity, Lagos set out to 
bring both groups and 'uncommitted* African States together* It eo-spon- 
sored an African Summit in Monrovia with the Governments of Liberia, Togo,
Ivory Coast, Cameroons, Guinea and Malt* Although invitations were sent to
11all twenty six independent African States, twenty attended while the whole 
Casablanca group stayed away*
Rather than heat the breach between the two groups, the ttemrovia 
Conference saw the formation of a new Status quo group* There were however, 
some positive results* The Conference brought together for the first time 
the majority of English and French Speaking States and Countries situated 
both North and South of the Sahara* It decided, among other things, to set
up Committees of experts to study concrete plans for economic, scientific,
12technical and cultural co-operation* * These Committees were to meet in 
Dakar^ and report to a follow up African Summit in Lagos*
With Lagos playing host, it was mainly responsible for summoning the 
January 19&2 Summit* Invitations were sent to all twenty eight independent 
African States* To entice the Casablanca powers. Sir Abubakar entered into 
correspondence with Nkrumal^ payed an official visit to Guinea in December
1961, and just before the Summit Conference, his government announced the
13abrogation of the Anglo Nigerian Defense Agreement which the Casablanca
11* All Brasaville States plus Ethiopia, Liberia, Lybia, Nigeria, 
Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia*
12* The Tines (London) 12 May 1961*
13* Dealt with in detail in Chapter 4*
Powers, particularly Ghana, had taksn strong exception to* The Provisional 
Government of the Algerian Republic (The 0*P*R*A*) was however not invited 
and this was 'S&l^ ed upon as a last minute excuse for the Casablanca group* s 
non-attendance* Three North African States - Libya, Sudan and Tunisia 
also staydd away for the same reason*
Although hopes of effecting a reconciliation between the Monrovia and
15Casablanca groups were dashed, the twenty States represented adopted the 
Dakar*' recommendations and aocepted in principle, a draft Charter to harmo­
nise and strengthen oo-operRtip«. relationships among them* *
1*t* On the eve of the Conference, with the United Arab Republic^ advance 
party already in Lagos, the Casablanca Charter States* Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Accra issued a communique announcing they would 
not attend because the agenda for the Lagos talks had been drawn up 
"unilaterally and without consultation with the Casablanca Charter 
States, thereby depriving us of the opportunity of making the necess­
ary preparations with all the care and attention demanded by such a 
conference"* Besides, the failure to invite Algeria, a signatory of 
the Casablanca Charter "is of such a character as may undermine the 
struggle of the Algerian people for their survival and independence 
at a crucial Stage in that struggle"
West Africa (London) 27 Jen 1962*
15* All the States which had attended the Monrovia Conference minus
Tunisia, Sudan and Libya plus Tanganyika and Congo (Leofoldville)•
16* The Times (London) 51*1*62*
As will ba seen presently* the Nigerian Government summoned an 
emergency meeting of the Monrovia Atatss* Foreign Ministers to work out 
a common approach to the Lose coup that had resulted in President Olyapio's 
assassination, in January 1963* It was not however until the May 1963 Addis 
nbsba summit that a formal basis for interstate co-operation in Africa was 
at last constructed.
Tbs initiative for suaaoaing the Addis Suaait was largely fiaporer 
Hails Salasaie'a but he had the olose co-operation of 3ir Ababakar. By May 
1963 many of the issues of dlaoord between the Caaablanea and Monovia powers
had resolved theaeelvea. Algeria for inetanoe* had baaoac independent. It
17wen then possible for all independent African States to be represented. The 
Conference decided to establish an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) whoso 
Charter defined its purposes to include the improvement of unity and solidarity 
of the African and Malagaacy States) the co-ordination and intensification 
of their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples 
of Afries* the defense of their Sovereignty and Independence * the eradication 
of all forma of Colonial lam from Afrloa and the promotion of inter-state co­
operation having due regard to the Charter of the UN and the Universal
18Declaration of Human Rights. *
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17. tkcepW ioroceo which objected to Mauritanian-'• presence and Togo 
whose mttendenoe was opposed by Nigeria and Guinea. Both were 
admitted into the OAU in August 1963.
18. "OAU Charter" published in federal Nigeria" (Lagos) Vol. 6 No.5 1963 7-10.
Article 11 1
-1 36 .
19Institutions M t  up under the Charter includes-
Aa Aaaanihly of Beads of states - Tho Juprono argon - to — at 
annually. A Council of (Foreign) Ministers was entrusted with tho 
oxooutlon of Aaaeahly decisions. A Sorotorlot headed by o Soorotory 
Oonorol m o  to toko charge of tho general administration of tho Organl~
ootlon ond to Co-ordlnoto tho activities of tho vario—  Specialised
20go— laelsna« Thooo fTn— 1 oolooo uorot
(1) Tho Kao— 1c ond Soelol Co— loo Ion
(2) Tho Education ond Cultural Co— 1— 1—
(5) Hoolthf Sanitation ond Nutritional Oo— tool on 
(b) Tho Do fone# fTi— rtool on
(3) Tho Scientific, Toohnieol and Research f*o— ioolon *
21Thoir fuaotiono ooro essentially Consultative and advisory 9 A Co— ioolon 
for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration —  aloo not up to daal with 
inter-African disputes.
Tho OAU oaphoaia on fuaetional co-operation Indicated cts preference 
for tho Lagoa (Approach and ita ai— Itanaona rejection of tha Aeera Opproaoh 
to African unity^
19. Ibid Article VII
20. Ibid Article XX
21. For in»t&noe, at ita inaugural — salon, tha Defence Coanittee, tha
firsto? tha tpacialiaad Co— lesions to bo constituted, proelained
that ftta primary raapo— ibility "Shall ba to aat aa —  organ of 
Conaultatiout preparation and m o — ndation for tha Colleetlve and/or 
individual aalf defence of a— her States against any net or threat of 
aggraaaion"
O.A.U. Review Vol.LNo.1 May 1964, K
22. Ibid Article XIX
23. The Cairo OAU Su— it in July 196** foraally rejected tha Aoora Qpproaoh. 
"OAU - First Regular OAU Confaranoa of Haada of State^A.H.Q.A. AUS 
Verbati nan.21 July 196b. P.P. 72*3,5## Alao thonpaan -Ghana1 a 
Foreign Policy 1957-66 (New Jeraay 1969) ^  590-356
Following the creation of tha OAU an African Development Sank with 
a total Capital of #250 million* was set up in late 196** to finance multi­
nation d projects and enhance tater-African trade and Co— mnlcations«
In June, 1965* Lagos sunmomd m  extraordinary OAU Council of Ministers' 
Conference in a bid to stave off the threatened mass boycott of the iainent 
Accra OAU Summit by a group of Francophone states who accused Dr* NiCrumah
2kof subversive interference in their domestic affairs* The States agreed to 
call off their threats if the Ghana Government would send foreign political
refugees away from Accra before the Sumait9 Inspite of this agreement, eight
25Francophone States were not represented at the Accra Summit in October 19&5*
a
CTUCR HLASURLS TO FOSTKR CG-OPr,RATION IK AFRICA
In addition to the role it played in the formation of the OAU, the 
Nigerian Government also encouraged inter-African co-operation and accord 
by other meanS* I«agos operated an Economic did and-technical assistance 
programme for the benefit of other African .States*1 The actual financial 
aid disbursement was small but the technical assistance in the form of 
Scholarshipt’awards and the secondment of Nigerian personnel to African 
Governments was relatively extensive* In 1965 for instance, the Government 
made 500 Scholarship awards tenable in Nigerian educational insitutions to
24* The issue came to a head following an unsuccessful attempt- on the
life of President Hamanl Diori of Niger in April 1965 by a compatriot 
who was a refugee in Ghana*
25* The States were Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, Madagascar, 
Togo and Upper Volta*
daserving Afrioan Students*2^ By 196^* Tha Chief Justice a of Uganda and 
Zanzibar and several Judges, Crown Counoels and Magistrates in some Last 
Afrioan Oountries were Nigerians on Secondment to the respective Govern­
ments* The Lagos Government paid their transport costs and inducement 
allowances*
t-^SUR.^ TO SLCURK GRhATSR XNT^-AFKICAM COMMUNICATIONS
To facilitate inter-African Communications, Nigeria opened telephone 
and Qir transport links with Dahomey, Togo, Congo (Klnsaahe), Liberia, Ghana
and Guinea*
In 1962 Nigeria, Dahomey and Togo agreed to establish joint customs 
posts at their borders* A year later Nigeria and Niger made a similar 
agreement* Such joint customs posts did not affect the rates of customs 
duties oharged by the countries involved* They did however simplify customs 
formalities and facilitated trade*
In June 196** Nigeria and Dahomey agreed to aboliah uiaa formalities*
Similar accords were reached between Nigeria and the "arecroon Republic,
27Niger, Chad, Ivory Coast, Togo and Morocco by the end of the year*
The Lagoa approach to African unity had two corollaries which were
28entrenched in the OAU Charter* The principles of non-interference by one 
State in the domestic affairs of other African States and of respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States*
38
26* Daily Times (Lagos) 9.9*63
27* Africa Confidential. 23rd June 1967* M
28. Article H I  OAU Charter Cp cit
NIGERIA'S MOW-INTSKrKKEMCfc IK THE INTt^ RKAL AFKA1RL OF OTHER STATES
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TiL CONGO CRISIS
Within a week of Independence, in Juno 1960, Congo (Leopoldville) 
had lapaad into chaos and in August ths UN Security Council voted to ssnd 
military assistance to the Central Government. In September, President 
Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba had a serious policy disagreement which 
culminated in each declaring the other deposed. Lumumba was subsequently 
arrested and sent to Katanga where he was murdered in January 1961.
The events so far split Africa down the middle. The Casablanca States 
actively supported Lumumba, withdrew their troops from the UN Congo Comemnd 
in protest after his murder and granted diplomatic recognition to the 
Secessionist Stanleyville regime of Lumumbist Gizenga. The Nigerian
Government openly declared support for neither side in the Kasavubu / Lum-
29umba dispute,' professed to be interested only in seeing the crisis redolvdd 
and left its troops and police contingent in the Congo until the end of the 
UN operations in 196**. It also accorded technical assistance to ths Leo­
poldville Government thus indicating its support for the Kasavubu Govern­
ment.
Meanwhile i UN troops successfully terminated the multiple secessions 
in the Congo. In July 1964, president Kasavubu exercising his constitutional 
powers, installed Moise Tshombe as Prime Minister of the Central Government.
29. During the Lumumba / Kasavubu leadership dispute, 3*1 ewa told a 
Press Conference at £nugu that having studied the Congo Consti­
tution he was quite clear in his mind who was right in the mutual 
dismitjals in the Congo. He would not however reveal who the 
right party was because "Nigeria is only interested in seeing the 
crisis resolved; not in meddling in the Congo's internal affairs".
Daily Times (Lagos) 25.1.61.
This Introduced a new irritating element into African politics* Many 
African Statesmen detested the erstwhile secessionist leader whom they 
held responsible for the entire Congo debacle* To them the eery thought 
of ' sitting around a conference table with him was an anathema* They 
were therefore opposed to Mr* Tshombe attending the I*)#* OAU Assembly
meeting at Cairo and the Cairo Conference of non-aligned States later in
30the same year as a representative of Congo (Leopoldville)* On both
thatinstances Lagos insisted unsuccessfully/as a legally appointed Prime
31Minister of the Congo* Mr* Tshombe had the right to represent his country* 
Tshombe was eventually deposed by President Kasavubu* In November
1963 General Mobutu ousted the Kasavubu regime in a bloodless coup d* etat*
32Within a week Alhaji Balewa sent him a congratulatory cablegram* • Pre­
sently, Balewa told an envoy of the new Government that the change of 
regime was "entirely the internal affair of the Congolese people" and 
Nigeria would not meddle in that? Sir Abubakar may have been encouraged to 
send the cablegram by the fact that within three days of the Coup, a joint 
Session of the Congo National Assembly voted 230 to 0 with two abstentions 
in approval of the military take over'5** that ended the bitter feuds between
President Kasavubu and ex-Prime Minister Tshombe* The two feuding leaders,
35presented with a fait accompli, also announced acceptance of the Coup. ^ 
Yet, if the intention was to remain strictly neutral Lagos could have noted
4o
30* West Africa 4th July 1964
31. Ibid
32. Daily Times (Lagos) 4.12*65
33. Ibid 6.12.65
34* Reported in The Times (London) 29*14*65
35. Ibid 27.11.65 and 29.11.65
the Coup without comment. Even this would have amounted to tacit support 
for General Mobutu since as recently as June 1965 Sir Abubakar had said 
that the OAU Charter abhorred Changes of Governments by military or violent
means and therefore that such actions as the overthrow of Ben Bella's
‘ . ' * * adAlgerian Government by the Army should not be encouraged. The impression
is inescapable that by sending a telegram^Lagos meant to advertise to the
Congolese people and the world at large that the Mobutu regime had powerful
governmental support in Africa and this amounted to interference in Congo's
internal affairs.
THE TOGO AFFAIR
On 1?5th January 1963* an Army Coup overthrew the Government of Togo, 
killing President Olympio in the process. The army then invited M. Grunitzky 
a Togolese political refugee in Dahomey, to head a Provisional Government.
M. Maitaohay, a political refugee in Ghana was also invited home to take a 
seat in the Provisional Cabinet. With Olympiovs Cabinet Ministers imprisoned, 
the new Government suspended the Constitution and abrogated the National 
Assembly and electoral Regulations. >
Tha Nigerian Government immediately announced that Mthe recognition
of the new Togo regime by any foreign country will be regarded as on un-
V?friendly act", emphasised that for purposes of State Security uL regarded 
the Ghana/Togo border as her own and then summoned Foreign Ministers of the 
Monrovia powers to an emergency conference in Lagos to discuss the Togo 
crisis.
The conference decided that recognition of the new government in Lome 
should be withheld until Olympio's assasination investigated and all the
Jf1
36. "West Africa" (London) 26.6.63
37 • "Morning Post" (Lagos) 22.1.63
38. ibid
Army units directly involveddisbanded; imprisoned ex Cabinet Ministers 
W  4m. released and elections tuacviield to restore Constitutionality and the
Hule of Conference also appointed a Commission to investigate the
4oTogo situation*
At the May 1963 Addis Summit, Lagoa successfully objected to Togo's 
participation on the grounds that the Provisional Government had not com­
plied with the conditions laid down at the Lagos emergency Foreign Ministers
41Conference* Not until elections had been held in Togo in May 1963, the 
Constitution restored and Olympio Ministers released from jail did the 
Nigerian Government grant diplomatic recognition to the new Government in 
Lome* ■
DAHOMEY
In October 1963* President Mags's Government in Dahomey was ousted 
by the Army because of alleged corruption and nepotism which had precipi­
tated a general strike and widespread rioting in the country* A civilian
42c/dministration was instituted shortly afterwards. By November 1965, the 
Army had to intervene again because of O  ; serious power struggle between
the President afcd Prime Minister* This time General Soglo dismissed the
43Civilian Government and declared himself head of state*
39. Ibid 26.1.63
40. The Commission comprised Ivory Coast, AKgeria, Upper Volta, Dahomey,
and Niger. The last two however failed to send representatives when
members of the Commission set out for Lome. Though cordially received 
by the Provisional President, the Commission's task was made impossible 
by the President's non-co-operation•
41 There was on}y a single list of Candidates so that the result was a 
foregone conclusion. .
42. Daily Times (Lagos) 28th and 29th October and 4th December 1963*
43. Morning Post (Lagos) 30 November 1965
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The Nigerian Government maintained normal relatione with tha differ­
ent Governments in Dahomey during this period* Tha official attitude in 
Lagos was one of tha almost complete indifference to domestic happenings 
in neighbouring Dahomey especially as these did not appear to threaten 
Nigeria's vital interests*
T;i£ CCWTHASTXWG SHADES OF ^OH-INTSRFEHSIICK"
Two factors were chiefly responsible for Nigeria's contrasting forms 
of non-interference t -
(a) Ghana's suspected complicity in the Togo Coup
(b) The United States apparent endorsesent of the 
Mobutu Coup*
GHANA AND TOGO
Relations between the Nkrumah and Olymplo Governments were never 
really amicable* The major source of discord was ^«n-Ewe sentiments which 
resulted from the fact that Ewe tribemen resided on either side of the Ghana/ 
Togo border* Ghana's Upper Volta Region was the old British Togoland* Both 
Accra and Lems harboured political eefugees from aoeroas the border and each 
was convinced that the^activbly aided and abetted subversion against it. 
President Olympio was particularly concerned that Ghana was intent on gobbling 
up his tiny country*
In October 1959* Dr* Nkrumah had promised that he would "see to it
T* ULthat (Togo) became the Region of Ghana" The 1962 bomb attempt on Nkrumah's
life at Kulungugu and the subsequent series of terrorist bomb explosions in
Ghana were blamed on Ghana refugees resident in Lome supported by the Togo
Government* On December 7* 1962* Accra sent a note to Lome threatening it
would "institute auoh measures as may be found necessary to protect the
*3
^ *  Qhanian niiaea (Accra) 30.10*59*
security and safety of Ghana" unless Lone repatriated the Ghana refugees
whom it accused of plotting against the Nkrumah Government. There was no
positive response from Lome and a few weeks later came the Coup, 
attest.There wan^circumstantial evidence to implicate Accra in the Coup.
The Nigerian Government claimed it had concrete evidence. Other facts 
served to strengthen Lago£' convitions efcen further M. } aiiachy offered a 
abinet . post in the new government was a refugee in Ghana and regarded an 
hkruman's protegee. Moreover Accra speedily recognised the provisional 
Government and reached accord on the exchange of Ambassadorswith Togo for 
the very first time. Accra's dispatch of troops to the Togo border was seen 
as a gesture of support for the new Togo Government.
As argued in the next Chapter there ass patent rivalry between Lagos 
and Accra for the leadership of Africa and the urge to neutralise whatever 
advantages accrued to the other was all in the power game. The turn of 
events were perceived in Lagos as favouring Accra and needed to be countered.
Olympio was a personal friend of Balewa's while the new Togo leaders were 
expected to be pro-Nkrumah. Nigeria's interference was thus designed to 
impress on Loss just who had the most following in Africa and therefore that 
being too pro-Accra by for instance repatriating Ghantan - refugees as de­
manded by Nkrumah, would not be in its best interests.
MOBUTU'S COUP
In sharp contrasty Mobutu's Coup introduced a new Congo Government of 
which Lagoa warmly approved. Sir abubakar'a Government had always been on
V>. W.S. Thompson op cit.
1*6 The Nigerian Foreign Minister told a Press Conference his Government 
had such proof. Daily Times 22.1.63*
very good terns with the Kasavubu Government which was widely accepted as 
the legal Congo Government and had the support of the Western Powers parti­
cularly the United States. The Mobutu Coup promised the £>eace and Order 
which had eluded the Congo under Civilian rule and appeared to have been 
favoured by the United States Government which subsequently provided finan­
cial backing for the ftew Government. This appears to have been a strong 
factor in deciding Lagos to declare open Jupport for General Mobutu and 
Constitutes an aspect of Nigeria's relations with the World Powers discussed 
in Chapter 8.
When the Nigerian Government's indifference to Government Changes in 
Dahomey iS taken into account, it emerges that non interference was adhered 
to by the Lagos Government so long as events in other States were not per­
ceived as affecting Nigeria's vital interests. It explains the fundamental 
differences in the Governments reaction* to Army Coup d'etats in Dahomey, 
Congo and Togo.
RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF OTHER STATES
While Conceeding the basic artificiality of States boundaries inherited 
from Colonialism in Africa, the Lagos Government considered it prudent, in 
the interest of .harmonious relations among Afrioan States, that these bound-
ries be left as they are at present and to discourage any adjustments
47whatever”.
FEN ANDO PO
48This Spanish Laiand colony situated just off the Soutfc Eastern border 
of Nigeria was peopled Substantially by Nigerians who work in the Spanish
45
4SW Nigeria Speaks.d Op Cit P.67
48. Fernando Po is now part of the Independent State of Equatorial Guinea
owned plantations. In July 1963* a Nigerian was shot daad by a Spanish
v • if Qcjuard allegedly on orders froa a plantation owner. Similar incidents 
coupled with frequent Prasa reports of organised naltreatment of Nigerian
porkers in the Island sparked off saves of protest and demands that the
50Balewa Government do a Goa on the island. The Government's response was 
however limited to strong protests to the Spanish Authorities. Thera is 
no evidence of any Contingency plans to take over tha island. On tth Hay 
19659 thm Minister of State in tha Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasled 
that the Nigerian Government M—  is not thinking of acquiring Fernando Po
either by peaceful negotiations or otherwise because it was not in anyway
51interested in an expansionist policy- - ”•
KATANGA
The Nigerian Government strongly disapproved of Katanga's Secession 
from the Congo in July 1960. The Nigerian Foreign Minister asserted *t the 
the UN that "— Any Country that dares to suggest that Katanga will btj any
means be taken out of the Congo is an enemy of Afrloa as far as we are con-
52 1oerned". Nigeria actively supported the UN military operations which
terminated Katanga's self proclaimed (Independence in January 1963*
Daily Tinea (Lagos) 19th July 1963
50. For instance in 1961 Dr. Otogbeye, President of the Nigerian Youth 
Movement called on the Government to take over the Island. Daily 
Express (Lagos) 3 Dec. 1961.
51. H.R.D. t May 1965 Cot-2016
52. UN Review (New York) Nov. 1961. j>.19
MAURITANIA
This desert State gained independence from Franc* la November i960 
bat neighbouring Morocco claia*d that it was historically part of tha
Moroccan Kingdom and could not th*r*for* poaaaaa a Sovereign *xiat*nc*
53independent of Morocco*
The Balewa Administration endorsed Mauritania's Sovereignty, supported
its UN membership application, denounced the Soviet veto of that application 
5bin Dpeeaber 1960, and beoane partners with it in the Monrovia group of 
states and later in the OAU*
As iaplesented, the policy of respect £odr territorial inegrity of other 
States aeant that Lagos would neither welooae encroachment by one African 
St*te < on the territory of another ot» any atteapts by a Constituent fcart
4
of a State unilaterally to declare itself independent and Sovereign*
POLICY TOWARDS COLONIALISM*
The Nigerian Government's depth of feeling against Coloalalisa was 
manifest when the Priae Minister, in hie address to the United States House 
of Representatives in July 1961 declared that HOur own freedom can only
have meaning to the extent that we utilise our efforts and goodwill to(
achieve the earns (independence) for all Africa”#^
In practice, the Lagos brand ofdatf - Colonialism was relatively mode*
rate*
1*7
53* The Eoonomiet (London) 3rd Dec* 1960. f>* 1009
5b* Mauritania waa eventually admitted into the UN in 1962
55. "Nigeria Speaka" 6p Cit f>*103
ALGERIA
By 1960 when Nigeria attained independence, the Algerian utar of
Independence which had been raging for flee years, was approaching its
final stages. Paris and the GPRA were agreed on the principle of self­
. 56determination for Algeria. Differences related to ctse incrementation.
The Nigerian Government was in support of independence for Algeria*
In December 1960, Sir Abubakar conferred in Tunisia with President Bourgiba
and M. Ferhat Abbas, the GPRA leader on the Algerian question. Later in
the month, Nigeria Co-$ponoored a twenty-one nation Draft Resolution in the
Main Political Committee of the UNj Calling for a UN Jhiperviaed referendum
• - 57to determine the wishes of all Algerian!} on the independence issue.
Lagos however only gave moral support to the Algerian^ . Even then,
it would not grant de jure diplomatic recognition to the GPRA inspite of the
fact that the Algerian Nationalists had a Common Muslim religion with a
majority of Northeners and a large minority of Sojrthenera in Nigeria and that
by July 1962 when Algeria became independent, about thirty States, including
moderates like Liberia, had recognised the GPRA. Yet diplomatic recognition
displayed international support for the Rationalist1 cause and tended to put
pressure on France to come to terms with the FLN. As has been seen, the
Balewa Government did not invite Algeria to the Lagos fummit in January 1962
although the Country had been represented at several Summit Conferences like
the 1961 Belgrade Conference of non-aligned States, as a fully fledged State.
*f8
56. In a broadcast on 17th September 1959t General de Gaulle promised 
the AlgerianSr* would decide their own fate through universal adult 
Suffrage and without limits to their freedom of choice. The 
Economist (London) 19th Sept. 1939* ^*901
57* Daily Tinea (Lagos) 12.12.60.
Lagos disclaimed solo responsibility for Algeria's noa-inritition but
it was entirely in lino with tho non-recognition of tho GFHA for which
two sain considerations wore operative*
Firstly, Lagos was apprehensive that the Brasaville States which
thebacked France's insistence that foreign interference in^AlgeriaV’t problem 
was unwarranted, sight decide to quit the Monrovia group if it recognised the 
GPRA* Such an eventuality would seriously undermine the such desired 
rapproaohsent between ex - British and ex - French African 'territories 
without any Compensating assurance it would render the Monrovia flfroup attrac­
tive enough to the Casablanca States*
(2) The Balewa Government was extremely careful to avoid treading on 
France's toes* In January 1961, Nigeria had severed diplomatic relations 
with Francs as part of a Stem response to the French Sahara atomic tests*
It soon became obvious that the lack of diplomatic relations with France was 
hurting the Country and Lagoa was eager to have relations with France noraa- 
lined* In November 1961, Sir Abubakar told Parliament M— Ve want them
(France} to Come (and opefc an embassy in Lagos] so that we can open one in
59Frafcoe too". For reason of national pride however, the Government wanted
France to re-apply for the right to establish an Embassy in Lagos* Paris
6owas in no hurry to gratify the Nigerianft and Lagos clearly had no wish to 
exeroebate relations with Paris any further by recognising the GPRA*
^9
58
58* Foreign Minister Wachuku explained in Parliament in April 1962 that
the Lagos Conference was a continuation of the Monrovia Conference 
which had infect stipulated the States to be invited. H ft D ^pril
* 1962. Col. 1718
59* Federation of Nigeria "House of Representatives Debates” (Lagos)
' ' ■ • - *  ^23.1 1 .6 1.
60. It vaa not until Ootobar 19^5 that Lagoa and Paria reachad agr*aaant
on the resumption of diplomatic relations*
The refusal of the Nigerian Government to recognise the GPBA Contracts 
Strongly with ita act lone in relatione with another Colonial territory ;
T?IE CENTRAL AffRICAN FEDERATION 
This white minority dominated Federation comprised Northern Rhodesia, 
Southern Rhodesia and Nyaeeralund*^1 By 1960 the future of the Federation 
looked extremely dubious in view of the determination of ita Afrioan Nation­
alist leaders to •kill* the Federation and the F©nekton Recommendations in
1960 that its Constituent parts be allowed to Secede after a five year trial
62period of an attenuated Federation*
The Nigerian Governments relations with the Federation was ambivalent*
Lagos exchanged High Commissioners with the Federation which was not an inde­
pendent State* This was out of deference for London's wishes to See the
\ ;• v • '• ' j- V*. . ■. ’ ’ ... ■?’
Federation Survive in one form or another in spite of the Monokton Report*
On the other hand the Nigerian Government gave support to Afrioan leaders in
63thferefforts to achieve independence for the Constituent parts of the Federation*
Hi 1962, Nigeria opened a High Commission Offiee in Nyassaland* The Govern­
ment could not turn its back on the Afrioan leaders and retain credibility 
for its anti-Colonialist stance*
PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES IN AFRICA 
Lisbon had always regarded ite ovdrseas territories, which on the African
61 * Northern Rhodesia is now the independent State of Zambia) Nyassaland 
the Independent State of Malawi*
62* "Report of the Advisory Commission on Review of the Constitution of 
Rhodesia and Nyassaland*** CMND 11A 8 H.M.S.O. (London) October i960
65* Mr* K. Kaunda, African Nationalist leader of Northern Rhodesia told a
New York reception in 1963 that Nigeria was "always willing to help and 
has helped us in so many ways Q n  our struggle for independence]"
Daily Times (Lagos) 51.5.63*
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mainland Compriaed Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique, ae provinces of 
metropolitan Portugal for whom there could be no independence* First in 
Angola (19^1) and Portuguese Guinea 0962) were of Independence erupted which 
elicited heavy handed Military response from Lisbon*
The Nigerian Government rejected the idea of an African territory being 
an integral part of , ^  metropilitan Portugal* Unlike * Militant’ African 
Governments however, Lagos merely desired that Lisbon accept the principle of
Ladependence for the -territories and start working gradually towards their
(Meventual decolonisation* It sought to put pressure on Lisbon by diplomatic 
action at the UN in concert with other AfTo-As Urn States and by attempts to 
ostrmciss Portugal from ths international Community* For instance in July
1963, the Nigerian Minister of Sducatlon moved a motion demanding Portugal* s
S3expulsion from ths International Conference on Public Education at Geneva* 
After the motion had bean passed, the Afro-Aa<iaa delegatee walked out of the 
Conference in protect against the presence of Portugal*a representatives*
rheas tactics have prodiced UN Resolutions condemning 1 Portuguese Colinialiea
66and sacking to ben erne shipments to Portugal* They have also resulted in
51
64* Foreign Minister Vaohuku v at the UN Assembly, Pally Times (Logos)
12 October 19S1*
65* West Africa {London) 7th July I9S3
66* For instance on December 18, 1962, the General Assembly of the UN
adopted a Resolution Condemning Portugal for **0000 extermination of tha 
indigenous population of Angola1* by naans of **Arnm Supplied to Portugal 
by Certain member states” it colled for an end to 4 m s  Supplies to 
Portugal and requested the Secretary General to **take appropriate mea­
sures, including Sanctions to Scours Portuguese Compliance” with General 
Assembly and Security Council Resolutions (General Assembly Resolution 
1819 (XVII) of 18*12*62) A Security Council Rssolustien of July 1963 
urgently celled upon Portugal to recognise ’’the right ef the peoples 
of its territories to Self determination and independence”• All UN 
member states were requested to "refrain forthwith from offering the 
Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue
its repression 4f ths psoples of ths territories under its administration
»nd to taka all measures to prevent ths Sale end Supply of arms and
military equipments to ths Portuguese Government”* The Secretary General 
warn requested "to ensure the implementation of tha Ramolutlan" (UN Doc*
3/5380 o f  31/7-63)
Portugal being expalled froa many an international organisation* Their
effects on Lisbon's resolve and Capacity to maintain cfcs. Colonialist hold
68on the overseas -territories have however been no more than marginal*
Given limited action capability due to rudimentary military, economic 
and technological strength, the Nigerian Government was committed early in 
d* lifetime only to diplomacy as a means of ridding Africa of Colonialism:.
In November 1961, Nigeria introduced a Draft Resolution at the UN General
69Assembly calling for complete decolonisation in Africa by 1970* This 
evoked such consternation among African States insisting on immediate de­
colonisation that the Resolution had to be withdrawn* The formation of the 
OAU in 1963 introduced a new spirit into Lagos' anti-colonialism. Nigeria 
was appointed a member of the OAU's Liberation Committee to distribute funds
and supplies to various Nationalist Movements in various parts of thm Conti-
70nent and for the first time the Government was ready to did embattled 
Nationalists rtiUita^  r as well as morally. Hitherto it had pledged only moral
52
67
67* Portugal was expelled from the UN Economic Commission for Africa
(dune 1963) barred from the International Conference on Public Edu­
cation (May 1965); the International Conference on Xllitracy (May '63) 
the World Health Organisation Committee for Africa and Regional 
(Activities (1966)*
68* The issue of dms Shipments to Portugal affords a good example* Inspite 
of various Security Council Resolutions to the contrary, Portugal's 
NATO partners continued anas supplies* The U*S* policy being typical*
In 1963$ the U.S* stated that its policy was one of "providing no arms 
or military equipment to Portugal for use in (its) -territories”• It 
had therefore "prohibited the direct export of arms and military equip­
ment to Portuguese territories*(UN Doc* S/PU 10^9 31.7*63* ^*22) Arms 
£xportsAmetropolitan Portugal were unaffected*
Mr* Macmillan's embargo on the Sale of (Arms to Portugal in 1961 made 
reservations in reapeat of Portugal's "reasonable military requirements 
as a NATO Clly" (The Economist (London) 8*7»61* ^*119) This reservation 
the Economist was convinced "Opens a gaping hole in the embargo”(Ibid)
69. Daily Times (Lagos) 11.11.61
70* Resolution No* 11 of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, 
Addis Ababa, May 1963* (Colin Legua dp Cit Appendix 25 ^*295)
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Support to African nationalist movements*71
MINORITY RtJLK AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The dnssio exarcpie of Minority rula coupled with racial disorimlna-
irktion^Africa la afforded by tha Rapublic of South Africa* Thera, tha ruling 
Afrikaners, determined to Maintain white supremacy aa a rationalisation for 
the economic exploitation of tha overwhelmingly numerically Superior Africans, 
adopted the policy of Apartheid* This policy finds expression in Laws and
regulations calculated not only to refuse nost Africans the vote but also to
72deny them their basic humanity*
Like most black African States, Nigeria objeoted strenuously to tho 
policy of Apartheid which it perceived as branding the whole African race
with a stamp of racial inferiority. The Country was solidly united in
andcondemnation of racial prejudice against Africans/in demanding Shat the 
Government take effective measuree agalnet the perpetrators of such preju­
dice wherever it existed* Dr* Asikiwa struck a popular bho«fc} when at his
71* In a policy statement on the Angolan war in April 1962, the Foreign 
Minister told Parliament M— As far as military aid (to the Angolans] 
was concerned, that is out of the question** H.R.D. 5*4*62* Col* 912*
72* As President Nyerere of Tansanla put it "To be an African in South
Africa is to beg for permit to live in your own Country - or to leave 
it; to need permission to work in a particular place or in a particu­
lar jobs —  to be subject to arbitary arrest at any particular moment—  
to have permission to be humiliated by any man, woman or child who has 
a white skin just for the reason that he has a white skin— "* J* Nyerere 
"Rhodesia in the Context of Southern Africa" IN Foreign Affairs* April* ' 1966
inauguration an Nigeria*a first native born Governor General he declared 
*•—  We regard all races of the huean family as equals* Under no circum­
stances would we accept the idea that the black race is inferior to any 
other race—  We cannot Concede that it is in our national interest to frat­
ernise with such nations which praotioe race prejudice and we aust not 
acqiesce in such an outrageous insult on the black race* Infact we regard 
it &s a mark of disrespect and an unfriendly act if any country with whoa
73we have friendly relations indulges in race prejudice« in any shape or fora*
Public opinion therefore deaanded strong seasurea against Governtaents like
74those of South Africa* The Nigerian Foreign Minister was fully aware of 
this when he told Parliament in 1961 the Government was determined "to see 
to it that South Africa will either change her policy of apartheid or pull 
out of the Continent** 7^
-The Nigerian Government's choice of anti-apartheid weapons were similar 
to those used against Portuguese Colonialism*
_________________________________________________________T______
73* The dddress was printed in full in Daily Times (Lagos) 17th November 
1960.
74. After the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers* Conference which saw 
Pretoria's withdrawal« Balewa said he had threatened to withdraw 
Nigeria from the Commonwealth if South Africa would not alter its 
apartheid policies because he could not "imagine how I would look 
at ay Countrymen when I came back home" if he had not taken such a 
firm stand* Sunday Times (Lagos) March 19 1961*
75* H.R*D. November 1961*
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Several Resolutionscondemning the South Africa Apartheid policies 
and seeking to impose Sanctions on her have been passed by the UN as a 
result chiefly of concerted Afro-Asian— pressure. In 1961, Sir Abubakar
played an important role in getting Dr. V<a;rvocdt to withdraw his Country's
76application to remain in the Commonwealth after becoming a Republic. *
In June 1963, the Nigerian Minister of Labour led a mass Afro-Asianr. walk­
out on South Africa^ession of the International Labour Organisation Con­
ference in an attempt to effect South Africa's withdrawal from the Organisation.
In May 1961, the Nigerian Government banned all trade with South 
78Africa, expelled the Dutch Reform Church from Nigeria, ceased to accord 
the privileges of Commonwealth Citizenship to wtiite South Afrioans or to 
employ them. Two years later, Lagos banned South Africa's ships and planes 
and any ships and planes on their way to or from the Republic, from using 
Nigerian Ports. The aggregate impact of the above measures on the South 
African Government's racism was however almost imperceptible. There is no 
indication that Pretoria has been induced to mellow its Apartheid policies
76. Reporting to the South African House of Assembly on his return froa 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, in March 1961, Dr.
V<2. rwoerd admitted that one of the reasons why he withdrew his 
Country's application was the threat by Balewa to "— Consider whether 
Nigeria should remain a member of the Commonwealth if South Africa 
remained a member— ". Dr. Verwoerd's speech is reproduced in full in 
N. Mansergh "Docunents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs 1932-62"
PP. 375-389.
97* Employing fimilar tactics the Afro-AsCcui& succeeded in getting South 
Africa expelled from the UN Economic Commission for Africa i • The 
Food and Agricultural Organisation, The World Health Organisation and 
the UN Econ, Social and Cultural Council.
78. The pre - ban volume of trade between Nigeria and South Africa was very 
small. See A.T.9*
although several Countries have imposed at lsast partial embargos on arms 
shipments to ths Republic in response to UN Resolutions. Several others 
like lYanee have ignored such Resolutions* South Africa has in any oase 
built up a massive stockpile of sras and has acquired the Capability to 
manufacture internally, most of the arms it would need for "internal 
Security*' so that it could easily shrug off a complete embargo on arms 
sales by foreign powers*
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79* Janada (Oct 1965); Svitserland (Dec* *63);USA (Dec'63)*The USA
however reserved the right in implementing the ban "to interpret 
this policy in the light of requirements for assuming the main* 
tenanoe of International peace and security" (U*M* Doc* s/p±*1052 
2*8*63* PP 33-35)* The Labour Oovemmeat in the U.K. imposed a 
ban in November 1964. This is now apparently to be lifted within 
certain limits in view of the new Conservative Government* e inter­
pretation of Britain's obligations under the 1955 Simmnstovn 
Agreement*
C H A P T E R  3 
THE MAJOR DLTKRMININQ FACTORS OF NIGERIA*3 AFRICA POLICY
EXTRA- ECONOMIC FACTORS
The rejection of I— diate Political Union of Aftrioan States.
A political union of independent States is a radical and complicated 
endeavour requiring for its creation and Successful operation, the Conmit- 
ment by participants of huge national resources defined in tsras of financs 
and tha attantion of political leaders and various Specialists. For African 
States, the opportunity cost of establishing s Continental union is the lose 
of resources badly needed for immediate economic development!- and the promo­
tion of national political unity. Nigeria had a developing economy and 
lacked domestic political cohesion as well.
NIGERIA*S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION
m m — i
At independence, Nigeria was a federation of three regions - Ths North, 
East and Vest and ths Federal Terriotory of Legos - comprising about 150 
tribes with nearly as many different languages. The Northern Region was bigger
*Iin lend ares and in population than ths rest of ths Country put together.
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1* According to the 1953/3 National Census, ths North had s population 
of 16.8 million Kast 7.2| West 6.1 and Lagos 0.3 million • Ths 
Last, West and Lagos are often referred to as ths Southern wegions.
;ach region consisted of a numerically dominant tribe (tha Hausa^fulanl in 
the North; Ibos in the East and Yorub&s in the West) and a hoat of minority tribes 
generally suspicious of the major one* Relations among the major tribes 
was steeped in mutual mistrust* Each region also had a ruling political 
party in which its main tribe was predominantt The Northern Peoples' Con­
gress (MPC) in the North; National Convention of Nigerian Citisens (NCNC) 
in the East and the Action Group (AQ) in the West* At the Federal level, 
a Coalition Government comprising the NPC (as Senior partner) and the NCNC 
was in power*
Other inter regional differences abounded* While the North was mostly 
of the Moslem faith, the East was Christian and the West, Moslem and Christian*
In addition, a variety of indigenous religions existed all over the country*
Educationally and economically, the Southern Regions were more advanced than
2the North* These differencds generated centrifugal forces which were not 
checked • - by the fact that although Britain had created the Nigerian State, 
official Colonial policy did not appear to have encouraged the development 
of nation wide Nigerian nationalism initially* In 1920, Governor Sir Hugh 
Clifford stated emphatically "It is the Consistent policy of the Government 
of Nigeria to maintain and support the local tribal institutions and indigenous
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2* * For instance, in 1963$ the North had only 10,706 pupils in Primary 
Schools and 9881 in Secondry Schools. Comparative figures for the 
Southern Regions put together were 2 , 85,676 and 201,998 respectively* 
Federal Ministry of Education "Statistics of Education in Nigeria 
1963" (Lagos) 1965 ft* 9-13.
For yearly figures of pupil enrolment in the 1960-66 period See A*T*10
tormm of Qovernnent. Assuming that this Collection of delf~contained and
mutually independent native states —  warm indaad oapabla of being welded
into a Sinrle homogeneous nation —  a daadly blow would tharaby ba a truck
at tha vary root of national self ^ overnnent In Nigeria which aecurea to
anoh Separate (people tha right to naintain ita identity, ita individuality
nand ita nationality”. Contact batwaan Northerners and Southerners at tba 
Social and political spheres was not actively encouraged. Southerners em­
ployed in tha junior ranka of tha Civil Service on baing transferred to tha 
Worth wafa regarded aa 'native strangers' and oonflncd to 'Sabon Garia' 
(Strangers' Town), Although tha Protectorates of Northern sad Southern 
Nigeria ware eaaalgaoatad in 191** it was not until 19*7 that Isadora of bath 
halves net at tha All Nigeria Council for joint deliberations. By that tine 
North and South had begun to draw apart, Tafawa Balewa, a Northern leader 
later to ba Federal Prine Minister, told tha Council in 19*9 hie Compatriots 
deceive thanaalvaa by thinking that Nigeria ia one* This is wrong, I 
an sorry to any that this presence of unity is artificial and it ends out­
side this Chanber —  the Southern tribes who are now pouring Into the North 
—  do not nix with the Northern people end we in the North regard then an
lnvndaro"t
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3* Sir Hugh Clifford MAn Address to the Nigerian Council" 29 Dec, 192% 
Maftauley Papers, Reproduced in J«S, Coleman - Nigeria*Background to 
nationalise (Berkeley 1959) p. 19*.
*• Nigerian Legislative Council Debates,
4th March, V>49. p>.227^
That the Colonial po licy enunciated by S i r  Hugh was la t e r  reversed  
was evident froa Governor Arthur Richards dispatch to the Colonial Secre­
tary in  19V+ in which he stated that M—  the Nigerian problen was to build  
a system which would allow  an organic growth and make the unity o rig in a lly
superimposed from outside into a l iv in g  thing which might progress from
5
varying stages o f adolescence to adult nationhood” .
The problem was however compounded by N ig e r ia 's  con stitution al set up. 
The Federal House o f Representatives had 312 Seats allocated  on a population 
Th© Northern Region had 1?'+ Se a ts; ^he East 7 5 1 West 62 and Lagos 
3 .  ;ith  the North having more than h a lf  the to tal number o f Federal ^ a r i l i a -  
mentry S e a ts , the major p o lit ic a l  party o f the Northern Region -  the Northern 
People's Congress (NFC) only had to hold i t s  home Region to be assured o f 
forming the Federal Government alone or in  C oalition  with a Southern based 
p o lit ic a l  ^ a rty . In view o f the r e la t iv e ly  greater so c ia l cohesiveness of
7
the Muslim North > the id e n tific a tio n  o f the NPC with the Muslim re lig io n ; 
and the patronage and honours which a governing party can d istrib u te  among
i t s  supporters, th is  arrangement v ir tu a lly  assured the NPC o f a place in any
a
future Federal Government, to the u tte r dismay of itd  p o lit ic a l  opponents.
4 '
5* Po l i t i c a l  future of N ig e ria . Governor of N ig e ria 's  dispatch to the
Secretary of State  for the Colonies dated 6th Dec. 19^+« Sesaiqpal 
^aper No. *♦. of 19*»5. E . 1 . ""
6 . The N igeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1960. Supplement to O ffic ia l  
Gazette Extraordinary No. 62 V ol. V 7. 30th Sept. 1960. Part B. Chapter
5  Section 46.
7 .  Amonr other things, the NPC Patron was the Sultan o f Sokoto, the Sarkin  
Muslttmi or re lig io u s head of the Muslims.
8 . Table A .T .1 1  in d icates that the NPC e le c to ria l supremacy in the North 
got in creasin gly overwhelming with time. In the 196^  Federal electio n s  
i t  WQn v ir tu a lly  a l l  the Northern F e a ts . A sim ilar trend i s  observable 
in A .T .12  with regard to the NCNC's fortunes in the E a st.
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It lent credence to the assertion by the NFC National President, Sir Ahmadu
Bello that "the NFC will rule the Federation for a very long tiae to cone"•
This was the eost clearly defined expression of the domination of the Fedsra-
thustion by one Region. There was /superimposed on the bitter intertribal 
suspicions deep inter-party and inter-regional rivalry. Ln trenched regio&rL 
and ethnic particularism gravely damaging to national unity became the norm.
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• THE 1Q8T INDEPENDENCE PERIOD
Independence .-induced euphoria spread « calm through much of the political 
arefor a while. 3y 196? however, t e situation had changed. On Kay 1962, 
the Federal Parliament passed s Government motion proclaiming a state of emer­
gency in the Western Region following fights among members within the western 
House of Assembly. Ths Federal Government thereupon suspended the Government 
and appointed an Administrator for the Region. 10 This was the culmination of a 
serious Schi am within the ruling A.Q. f>arty. At the end of the Pm urgency,
9. Daily Times (Lsgos) 2kth June 196A.
10. The Federal Government acted under powers conferredttby Chapter 5*
Section 65 of the Nigeria (Constitution) op cit. which provides that 
"Parliament may at any time make such laws for Pigeria or any part 
thereof with respect to matters not included in ths Legislative Hats 
as may appear to Parliament to be necessary iv*i expedient for the 
purpose of maintaining or securing peace, oruer and good Government 
during any period of emergency (3.65(D)
"Any provisions of Law enacted in pursuance of this section shall have 
effect only during a period of emergency" (3 65(2))
•Period of emergency' means lateralis any period during which "there 
is in force a resolution passed by esoh louse of larilament declaring 
that a State of public emergency exists". (S 65 (3) (b)
AndCtithe Emergency rovers' Act 1961 which stipulates that in such an 
eventuality ths Governor General could, with the advice of the Cabinet 
of Ministers make regulations which had to be laid before Parliament 
within two months (Federation of Nigeria Official Gandtte, Supplement to 
No. 36 Vol 48 Kay ift. 1962) ”
the Premier of the suspended Government who had broken away from the AG 
to form a new party - the United Peoples Party (UPP) was allowed to head 
a new Coalition Government comprising the UPP and the NCNC* The A.G* was 
thus dislodged from its traditional Seat of |>ower without being actually 
defeated in an election*
Later in the year, twenty one top A.G* leaders including the National 
President, Chief Awolowo, were arrested and gaoled on treasonable felony 
charges* By December 1962, the A.G* whose numerical strength in the Federal 
Parliament had dwindled from 75 to 13 lost its Status of Official Opposition 
due to its sise* Moreover, during the fcmgrgency, constitutional procedures 
for the creation of a new Mid West Region to embrace the minority areas of 
the Western Region, which had hitherto been held up by the A*G's West Regional 
Government's resistance be the aatoeme, were completed*
EFFECTS OF THE A.G. CRISIS ON THE BALANCE OF POWER
The misfortunes of the A.G* introduced an ominous twist into the domestic 
balance of power situation* The old equilibrium was based on the fact that 
each of the major political parties had a secure political base in ome o# the 
Region whose Government it controlled* None owed power in its 'home' Region 
to the benevolence of another party* In the new situation, the West Regional 
Government owed its existence to the Federal Prime Minister and by implication 
to the NPC* The new Mid West Government although NCNC controlled, had to lean 
towards the Federal Government because of its heavy reliance on on Lagos for 
finance during its teething stages. The East Regional NCNC Government thus 
found itself in a minority*
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Previously, a Coalition Government at the Federal level was inevitable 
since no party had a Majority in the Federal Parliament. In the new situ­
ation, a Coalition Government was at the sufferance of the NPC which attained 
absolute Majority through b y-election  successes and Crossings of the floor of 
the House by Members o f the prostrate A.O.
Besides, th# power to deolare a state of emergency in a &»gion and 
suspend its Government evolved as a potentially lethal weapon with which any 
unscrupulous Federal Government could cripple its recalcitrant Regional 
counterpart. In the atmosphere of mutual tribal; party and regional mistrust, 
the Ibos, the NCNC and the kaetera Region felt threatened and the urge to do 
somethinr; grew increasingly overwhelming. The stage was thus set fo r years 
o f Crisis-in-series.
First in this sequence was the 1962/3 population Census, whose results 
precipitated serious national disputes. It had been hoped, particularly by 
tbs Eastern 2legion, that the Census on whose findings the allocation of Federal 
parliamentary Seats would be based, would show that the South was mors popu­
lated than the North and so redress the North/South power balance in favour 
of the latter.^1 The results of the Count were however annulled by the
11. Am Professor Mackintosh put It "most Southern Nigarian politicians 
expected big changes when the [Census] figures came out and clearly, 
many hoped for a result which would end the North*s absolute majority 
in the House (of Representatives] the foundation o f their power at 
the Federal level". A.P. Mackintosh op cit. 5V7.
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Priam Minister because of ths intensity and bitterness of inter-regional 
and inter-party Charge«i of widespread inflation of figures* The results of 
a new Census in 1963 confined Northern numerical superiority and again 
generated trenehant disagreements in the Country* Ths East Regional Govern­
ment seen took the Federal Prime Minister to Court in an ttnsuccessftol bid
12to hare the result set aside* In the end the figures served as the basis 
for the allocation of Seats in relation to the 1964 General elections*1^
The 1964 election Campaigns were bitter and bloody as the NCNC teamed 
up with the A.a, to fight the NPC and its allies for Control of the Federal 
Parliament* As independent National newspaper succinctly described the situ­
ation in an editorial which lamented that "the political front continues to
deteriorate* Tactlessness, hooliganism and organised threat to the unity of
,  'h14the Country appears to have become the order of the day* • so alaraing did
the eituatioh become that the Federal x'resident. Dr* Asikivu during his
Republic Anniversary broadcast to ths nation on 30th September 1964 advieed
that "if they (the politicians} have decided to destroy our national unity,
they should eusnon a round tabls Conference to decide how our national assets
should be divided before they seal their doom by satisfying their lust for
offio* ” . 15
12. Dally Tlnaa 19th Kay 1964 and 30th June 1964.
13* Federal parliamentary Seats for ths 1964 General Election wore allo­
cated among the Regions ss follows; North, 167; East 70\ West 37,
Mid west 14 and Lagoa 4*
14* Daily Times (Legos) 8.4.64.
13* Full text of ths Speech was reproduced in Ibid 1*10*64.
On the ere of fall, tho NCNC and Its allies decided to boycott tho
elections because o f alleged election rigging by the NPC and ita allies*
The party called on the Federal President to Summon a Conference of falltical
17leaders *'to break up the Federation peacefully" . Polling however proceeded 
as planned on 50th December 1964, in nany parts of the Country* The outoome 
was that the NPC and its allies emerged with a majority increased from 42 
to 114* The election crisis assumed new dangerous dimensions when the Fed­
eral President, convinced that the elections had been unsatisfactory, re­
fused to invite Sir Abubakar to form a new Government* The nation tottered 
on the brink as Balewa insisted that constitutionally, the President had no
18powers to act the way he was doing* After five tense days, the situation 
was defused whan Sir Abubrtevagreed to form a "broadly based" National Govern­
ment to include the NCNC*1^
65
16
16* The NCNC Group (The UPGA) presented its grievances in a publication 
entitled "The Blit Fraud" (the United Nigeria Press Ltd*, Lagos, 1964)
17* west Africa (London) 1*1*65*
18* Balewa* s viewpoint waa that only the Electoral Coasdasion had powers 
to oall off the election* Since it had not done so, the elections 
were valid and hie party had won handsomely* Redress for alleged 
irregularities was a matter for the Law Courts* Vast African Pilot 
(Lago) 4th Jan* 1965*
19* The "Broadly baaed Government" which was completed after the mini—  
elections held in March 1965, in those areas where the December 1964 
boycott waa effective^comprised 54 Ministers (32 of Cabinet Rank). 
This was twice the number in the previous Government* All the major 
political parties , except the A*G*, were represented in the Govern­
ment* West Africa (London) 3rd April 1965*
No sooner had the dust of the 196*t e lectio n  c r i s i s  begun to s e tt le  
than a new c r i s i s  broke* The occasion was another e le ctio n , th is  time in  
the Western Region* The fe ro c ity  o f b ittern e ss and alleg a tio n s o f electio n  
m alpractices attained new heights as the old p o lit ic a l  a llia n c e s  fought out 
th e ir  r iv a lr y  in  a sm aller theatre* The anarchic situ atio n  in the Region
. i
long survived the October 1965 pollin g*
The Se rie s o f Crises indicated that the domestic situ atio n  in N igeria  
was basically unstable and that something had to give* On January 16, 1966,
came the bloody answer -  the Army seized power and N ig e r ia 's  First Republic
20passed into h isto ry*
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EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON NIGERIA'S AFRICA POLICY
The Baleva Administration drew two b asic conclusions from the Country's  
domestic experiences in  fashioning i t s  A fric a  policy* F i r s t l y ,  the f lu id it y  
o f the domestic situ atio n  demanded constantly^close attention of the Govern­
ment* I t  could therefore i l l  affo rd  the deviation o f scarce national resources 
to an experiment in  Continental p o lit ic a l  U nity*R efleeting this viewpoint^
S i r  Ahmadu B ello  told  a pressconference in 1960 that the idea o f an Afrioan
21P o lit ic a l  Union was "premature because our homes are not ye t consolidated'!.
20* The January Coup was not the f in a l answer to N ig e r ia 's  p o lit ic a l  in­
s t a b ili t y *  A Second Coup d 'e ta t  occured in Ju ly  1966* in  May 196 7, 
the Eastern Region u n ila te ra lly  secdded from the Federation to form 
the "Independent Republic o f B ia fr a "*  Thia action speedily culminated 
in  a b it t e r ly  contested C iv il  mar which laste d  th irty  months u n til  
the Surrender o f Secessio n ist forces in  January 1970* The o ld  Eastern  
Region was then reintegrated into the Federal Republic now s p li t  into  
twelve Sta te s* The
2 1*  D aily Times (Lagos) 30th Ja n u a ry '60-/proliferation o f Army Coups in
A fric a  in  the 6 0 's  was proof-galofe that several A frican  S ta te s also  
badly needed to consolidate th e ir  own iiomea* In January 1963* Olympio's 
Government in  Togo was overthrown by the Army* In 1965 Army Coups elim­
inated the regimes o f H • BenBeU-q (A lgeria) Kasavubu (Congo Kinsasha) 
and Mr* Aplthy (Fahomey; and in 1966* Daoko (Central A frican  Republic) 
Balewa (N igeria) Yamego (Upper Volta) and Nkrumah (Ghana)
Secondly, that "political union could not of itoalf bring Countrlea together^2" 
Although the different segments constituting Nigeria were politically united 
in 1914 and had experienced half a Century of this Statue under Colonial rule. 
She had found domestic stability so elusive after independence* But, in tevuu 
of ethnic heterogenity, Social, Cultural and Linguistic diversity end dis­
crepancies in educational and economic development levels, Nigeria warn Africa 
in niniature* The internal problemsthat beset the Federation would there­
fore tend to bo magnified in a Continental union particularly since the Cen­
tripetal forces llke^comaan lingua franca,o oonmoa currency end relatively longA
experience of living together characteristic of the Nigerian System would be 
lacking in the Union*
Moreover, fostering a powerful Nigerian nationalism had proved well nigh 
impossible because of deep tribel and other divisions* It would be infinitely 
more difficult to Create Continental nationalism due in part, to greater 
heterogenity and in part to the Counter cuaight of efforts to develop national­
isms at national levels.2^
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22* Alhaji Balewa "Nigeria Speaks" op Clt ^*68.
23. Implicitly Conceding the possible clash between nationalism at State
and Continental levels, President Nysrers has suggested that
tha role of African nationalism is different - or should bo
different from the nations!Inna of the past — ”
"A United gtatss of Africa" op cit*
Lagoa waa consequently convinced that an iaaediate political Union 
of African Statea waa a non-viable propoaition and tha fata of attraptad 
political integration among a few Afrioan Statea tended to vindicate this view­
point* the celebrated Qhana - Quinea - Kali Union firat founded in 195& never
2hreally got off the ground before it waa formally pronounced dead in 1963*
A Mali Federation ooapriaing Hall and Senegal founded in 1939 oollapaed within
25twenty nontha due to fundamental incompatibilities between the Member statea*
If the infant Mortality rate of political uniona ooapriaing two or three 
Statea waa so high, the jsurvlvhl- chanoea for a Continental political union 
would in Lagoa1 thinking be extreaely alia* The Priae Minister told the 
Federal Parliament in 1961 that he had warned a certain w#et Afrioan Leader 
in 1937 that the proposed federation between hie Country and another African 
State would not work* Hla advise was ignored and "the Federation lasted only
a short tiae* Therefore before we [African Statea] federate, it la moat la-
26portent that we understand one another— "•
The Government was in any caae convinced that most African States would 
not voluntarily accede to a Continental ^olitioal Union* Aa Balewa said in 
1961 "— once a Country has its own independence, it would be difficult in
2%« The two founder States of the Union - Ghana and Guinea on Deoeaber 23, 
1938, decided "— to adopt a flag of the Union and to encourage the 
closest contacts between our Governments in order to harmonise the 
policies of our Countries notably with regard to defence, foreign and 
economic policy* Our Second task will be to frame a Constitution giving 
stability to the Union now established"* Thia Constitution never even 
aaw the light of day* (See Toubou Thian - Th» Foreign Policy of Afrioan 
Statea (London 1963) P. 32 )•
23* West Africa (London) 29 August, 1960*
26* Higorla Speaks op Clt (>*81*
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27ay view, for that Country to surrender its Sovereignty"* States struggle
for independence with tho intention,among other things, of being saeters of 
their own destiny* Independence usually cosea with all the paraphanelia of 
statehood* Powerful vested Interests in the continued Sovereign existence 
of the State develop* The attachment to national Sovereignty tends to be
most intense in newly independent States, favouring for the first tine in
28sany a year the exhilarations and problems of self-rule* The majority of
African States attained Independence in the Sixties* In the cireunstanoes 
sany would have to be ooeroed directly by military force or indirectly through 
clandestine subversion into joining an insediate Continental ^ political union 
of Afrioan States* This would heighten internal instability within the 
Onion, if suoessfully launched, and further erode its chances of Survival*
THE PRETKRaiCE TOR IWTKR AFRICAN FOWCTIOHAL OO-OPERATIOK
Functional Co-operation, on the other hand entailed relatively nininal 
oosnitsenta by the participating States*, involved hardly any loss of Sovereignty 
and could consequently be sore easily initiated* The Scope of the co-operation 
Scheme could gradually be expanded as the need arose* Moreover such defi - 
ciences as inadequate inter-African communications which were probable hin­
drances to insediate political unity could be progressively eliminated through
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27* Ibid >>.82
28* President Olyspio of Togo underlined the extreme jealousy with which 
States guard their newly won independence when he remarked that 
"— such a reward [political independence) —  achieved at great sacra- 
fioe —  is not to be lightly cast away4'* S. Olyspio - African 
Problems and the Cold War IK Foreign Affairs* Oct* 1961* ^*51.
Inter-State Co-operation* Lagoa therefore believed that functional co­
operation was an inevitable first step towards any possible Continental 
Union in the "fullness of tine" for it would help to remove "the practical 
barriers [to inter-African intercourse]) and oreate a climate of understanding 
without which no effective political organisation can be established"2^
The Lagos approach to Panafrloanlam thus enabled a cautious Govern­
ment to concentrate on doing its own thing at hone while oo-operating with 
other Governments in limited spheres, to enjoy the benefits of inter-African 
joint action*
RESPECT FOB TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFRICAN STATES*
AFRICAN BOUNDARIES
State boundaries in Africa are Colonial legaoiee»])xawn chiefly to 
suit the administrative convenience of the various Colonial powers, they 
are frequently IrrAtlonal in terms of physical and human geography* It is 
commonplace for members of one ethnic group to bestride one or more state 
boundaries siniltaneously* Yoruba speaking Areas are on either side of the 
Nigeria/Dahomey boundary* Somali Areas are in Somalia, Ethiopia, Northern 
Kenya and Djlbutl* Predictably, tribal irredentian has been a major course of 
endemic disputes which have plagued inter-African relations* The Pan-Somali 
movement has for instance led to serious borddr incidents between the 
Somali Republic, on one hand, and Ethiopia and Kenya on the other*
An ideal solution would be the Political Union of African States whieh 
Lagos has argued was impracticable in the immediate future* Alternatively, 
the boundaries could be redrawn to make them more * natural' • But, if natural
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29* Tafawa Balewa "Nigeria Looks Ahead" in "Foreign Affairs" October 19^2. 
P. 137
in this sense was to be synonymous with ethnic frontier, the resulting 
boundaries might often be so clumsy physieally as to Cause further frontier 
problems.
Moreover, apart from the gigantic upheave1 an exercise in general 
frontier readjustments in Africa would entail some States were bound to be 
net losers of land generally or at least of rich agricultural or mineral 
land* Governments are notoriously reluctant to face such losses* They would 
not therefore voluntarily submit to general boundry redrawing.
The alternative - armed territorial revision would virtually throw the 
entire Continent into a perpetual state of twajl* This according to Nigeria's 
Foreign Minister Would compel Africa to devote all its energies and re­
sources to maintain armies and police forces and little constructive effort would
‘ 30be possible in the sphere of economic and social development*" States
might be drawn to seek greater military assistance from either side in the
Cold oar with the grave risk of imparting Cold Mar policies into the Conti-
31nent* Besides, the ensuing atmosphere of mutual suspicion and antagonism 
would seriously undermine any policy of encouraging inter-African Co-operation. 
Lagos was consequently convinced it was most prudent to let the sleeping dog 
lie by discouraging boundUy alterations by force* Its decision,inspite of
domestic pressure, not to lay a dangerous precedent by a takeover of Fernando
conviction
Po, was in line with thlaifrear of armed territorial irridentism was infact 
only one of r ’ ' _i, the several causes which made African States feel
insecure and induced build up of armaments* Lagos apparently accorded it 
a position of primacy*
30. Joja Wachu&U "Nigeria's Foreign Policy" in "Africa* The Political 
Pattern"* Edited by M* Kaclure and D* Algin. (Toronto 1961) f>*71
31. Ibid
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NIGh'RIA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION
Foreign policy actions and pronouncements had to taka into coneidera- 
tion possible repercussions on doastic p o lit ic a l  situation in Nigeria* Sir
A
32Abubakar oftan emphasised that "hational unity is uppermost in our minds”. 
Policies likely to upset the search for some equilibrium among Nigeria's 
manifold tribes had8tediously to ba avoided.
This relates particularly to tribal irredentism* A policy designed 
to unite within the Federation Sections of Nigerian tribes as the Hausas in 
Niger, forced by irrational boundaries to reside in neighbouring States would 
have exercebated inter-tribal frictions and enoountered bitter resistance from 
those ethnic groups likely to gain little or nothing from the exercise*
Moreover, even within Nigeria the boundary between the North and Western 
Regions splits the Torubas and was therefore irrational* The North Regional 
Government had always resisted proposals to redraw the boundary to unite all 
YorubQe in the Western Region* To support on a Continental Scale what was 
denied at home would have constituted dangerous inconsistency*
Nigeria also could not afford to be seen to support even covertly, 
secession in another African State since such a policy could encourage break­
away sentiments at home*^ The Governments preoccupation with domestic problems
on the Continent psomote 
was in any case so heavy that a policy designed to reduce rancour/and/under-
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32* ftNlgeria Looks Ahead”* Op Cit. J>*131*
33* Threats by one Region to breakaway from the Federation whenever its
leaders felt it was receiving a raw deal was commonplace. However, 
it was not until May 19&7 that actual secession materialised*
!
standing therefore readily recommended itself to it*
COLONIALISM
Nigeria's commitment to "liberate prom Colonial rule] every square 
inch of African territory by 1970'« was based on the postulates, that 
ideallyt decolonisation should be gradualist, not precipitate*
GRADUAL DECOLONISATION
Lagos advocated a gradual phasing out of Colonisation in Africa partly 
due to Nigeria's experience and partly to the conclusions it drew from 
the Congo (Leopoldville) tragedy*
The Nigerian Government regarded the handover of power by the British 
Colonial Administration in Nigeria as methodical and ideal* On Indepen­
dence Day, the Prime Minister extolled "the manner in which successive
British Governments have gradually transferred the burden of responsibility
35to our fthoulders" » Independence was won largely through negotiations 
between Nigerians and the Colonial Authorities* Nigerian leaders were 
made to serve long apprenticeship periods during which they received ex­
tensive 'on the job' training in the art of governing* Indigenous 
Ministers were appointed eight years before independence* Apparently 
convinced,inspite of basic differences in circumstances between Nigeria 
and the U.K., that the Westminster-type parliamentary system would be 
ideal for independent Nigeria, London set up a Federal House of Repre­
sentatives in Lagos in 195** to enable Nigerians familiarise themselves
34* J. Wachuku i "House of Reps Debate?1 Jf.9.61. Cols. 2783-2803
35. "Nigeria Speaks" «p Cit f*60
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with the functioning of the systen*
It supervised two general electiona and even provided an expert 
In f’arlianentary procedure to be Speaker of the Houae and to guide it 
through during ita fomative year a. Consequently, tha tranaition froa 
dependence to independence involved no draatlc visible change* This, to 
the Nigerian Ooveraaent waa'responsible*deooloniaation par excellence* 
Heflecting thia feeling Balewa proudly asserted on Independence Day that 
"history will show that the building of our nation proceeded at the wisest 
pace | it has been thorough and Nigeria now standa wall built upon fira 
foundations"
The Converse -1 irresponsible1 deooloniaation Characterised Belgian 
handover of power to Congo (Leopoldville) in June 1960* The Congolese 
received no groaning for the responsibilities of Lidepondenoe, Consequently, 
within s week of Independence the Country had degenerated into blood 
letting ehaoe* Subsequently, events in Nigeria between January 1966 
and January 1970 were to cast very serious doubts on tha validity Of tha 
Qovermentvs distinction between the practical outooae of 'responsible* 
and 'irresponsible' decolonisation but that waa in the future* For now, 
Lagoa contrasted the independence • induced ehaoe of the Congo with the
36* "Nigeria Spshka" dp Clt f**6o. British Officials in Nigeria ware 
at one with the Nigerian leaders in believing that tha controlled 
deooloniaation of Nigeria waa ideal* Thia waa obvious from the 
renark by Sir Janes Robertson, that the contrast between this 
Long period of apprenticeship in Nigeria and tha hurried Change 
in for exanple the Congo adnlniatration has meant success in one 
case and tragic failure in the other*' Sir Jaaea Robertson 
"Sovereign Nigeria" IN African Affaire April 1961 ^*166
7*
fact that she had felt able "within the first noath of independence,
owing to her stability to send large contingents of her aray and police
37to join the OH in the Congo" and concluded that gradual decolonisation 
■as Ldeal* That was why inspite of its Condensation of Portuguese re- 
presslonist >olicies la Angola, it only wished that Lisbon Concede the 
principle of independence for Angola and start preparing the Colony for 
telf-rule.^ It also partly explains the Government's choice of 1970 
as the terminal date for Cdonialissuin Africa* If it took Nigeria eight 
years to progress fro« the Stage when Ministers were first appointed in 
1952 to fill independence in i960 the Nigerian Foreign Minister explained
that "Black aliens" who had lost their traditions as n result sf deliber-
39ate policy of their Colonial masters needsd sore time • The extra tise 
was arbitrarily put at one year.
By choosing 1970, the Government was infect walking n Biddle course 
between the demands by many African States for an ismcdiatc end to Colo- 
feialisn and the unwillingness of the Colonial powers to sot s firm date* 
Calculation waa that such moderation would win over the support of 
Countries like the United States and the U.K. in the anti'Colonial campaign* 
The Nigerian Foreign Minister assured Parliament in 19&1 that the best 
way to tackle intransigent Colonial powers of Portugal's Calibre waa "to 
go through those who have trodden their paths"**0
3f. Ibid f>*69 
39, See Chapter Two*
59‘ ftfcSj.rTftf"* * ..J»0* Wachuku 1 later added that 1970 was chosen to "give meaning to th# 
present decade which has been referred to as tbs decade of Africa 
"aa it was reasonable that this decade which started with the 
liberation of several African States should cad with the total 
freedom of Africa as a whole"* Federal Nigeria Vol* 3 No* 1 
Jan 1962. p.11
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The assumption that moderation would necessarily induce Western 
powers to side against Portugal appears to have been optimistic*
Relentless pressure on Portugal to give up her African Colonies risked 
incurring her displeasure* There appeared no reason to believe that 
the Western powers would consider such risk acceptable unless they were 
themselves subjected to intensive pressure by world opinion*Nigeria's 
moderation did not appear likely to generate adequate pressure to induce 
the powers to act in a way the Government apparently desired*
There was also no guarantee that once a Colonial power accepted 
the principle of independence it would immediately copy the U.K.'s 
"enlightened Statesmanship" and begin painstakingly to prepare the Colony 
for independence, as Lagos assumed* The reverse could easily be the case* 
If Portugal for instance, grudgingly consented to grant Independence to 
its Colonies, it could choose not to dissipate its relatively meagre 
resources in gradually easing the Colonies "responsibly^ „ towards Inde­
pendence*
LEADERSHIP OF AFRICA
A major Cornerstoro of Nigeria's foreign policy in general and Africa 
policy in particular, was the need to stake a claim to Africa's leader­
ship* By virtue of being by fa r  the most populated Country and potentially 
one of the richest States in Africa, there was a general Consensus in 
Nigeria that she was destined to lead the Continent* Foreign Minister 
JTaja Wachuku once wrote that "As the largest single African Country, we 
have a grave responsibility thrust upon us to safeguard the vital interests
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i , ^ b1of AMeini and peeplee of Afrioan daaeant everywhere.
WHAT AFRICA 'DEMANDUD OF ITS LEADiJR
Tha early Sixties saw Afrioan national Ian at ita apogee as Mvaral 
Afrioan £tataa attained Sovereign Status* For Canturlas Africa had at 
first andurad tha nisery of slavery and latar tha humiliations of colon­
ialism* Both, according to Jaja ' achuku, wars baaod upon tha praaioo that
Africans 1*2vara sons forms of Manthropoid apes" fit only to ba havars of
wood and drawers of vatar* A concomitant of Colonialism mas tha doetrina 
it vhita supremacy often buttrsasad in Colonies by racial diaoriaination 
/ add segregation* With the upsurge of Nationalism, Africa appeared to 
speedy emancipation for tho remaining dependent t e r r it o r ie s  end
k%to require of its leader an uncompromising anti Colonialist stance . 
The Addle Ababa Afrioan Summit of May 1963 re sol red that the big powers 
must choose "between their friendship for tha African peoples and their 
support for the powers (South Afrlea, Portugal, : * . . RhodeeiaJ that
LLoppress Afrioan peoples. Western powers did not appear to be opting for 
friendship for the AfTieen peoples within the context of the Resolution.
Vi* Jaja Waohukwu "Nigeria^ Foreign Policy,, Op Cit*
*2. Ibid p .68
i»5* Thia is reflected in the OAU Charter which lists one of tha purposes 
of the Organisation as being "to terminate ell forms of Colonialism 
from the Continent of Africa" O.A.U. Charter Cp Cit* Article 11 (1)(d)
Mi* "Resolution of the Swaait Conference of Independent Afrioan States"
May 1963 Agenda Item II*
7#
In this rtfurd Britain appeared to afford a good exaaple* She had a 
relatively good Colonial record in Africa, despite blsmishse like Kenya 
and Rhodesia, and recurrently voiced opposition to the inhuman treat­
ment of Africans in Angola, South Africa**? let, at international forums 
particularly the 191 where African States had chosen to do battle with 
Pretoria and Lisbon, London repeatedly retreated behind Article 2(7) 
of the UN Charter which safeguards domestic jurisdiction and frequently 
abstained from voting on UN Resolutions condoning either Governments, 
other western Powers like France often took similar stands. This say 
have been due to their preference for "quist diplomacy** in dealing with 
the South African and Portuguese issues. But pressures privately applied
are never seen to be administered. On the other hand Bmitain was treaty
k7bound by the 1995 Simons town Agreement to sell arms to South Africa*
raneo. continued arms Sales to South AfMon in defiance of DM Resolutions.
hoi extensive
'The najor western Powerj^economic relationships with ths Republic •
QQ* Mr. Hecftillan’a * wind of Change* Speech.
*♦6. ne Economist has argued that M— the tendency (pf Britain} to retreat 
behind Artlole 2(7) of the UN Charter —  amm unfortunately always 
seemed to bo strongest when Colonial questions were at issue.
Britain's posture in ths uJorld has too often been eerred by what 
Hamlet oalled 'Some Craven Scruple of thinking too precisely'M 
"TSis Eoonomiat" (London) 1st July 1963 |>.23*
*»?. See Footnote 7fi of the previous Chapter. .
kSm According to n UN Report, the U.K. owned about #2256 millions or
59.% of all Foreign Investments ia the Republic of 3onth Africa ia 196V 
similar figures for U.3.A. was #505 nillion (11.9k)« France #234 
Million (5*%) Together the three powers owned 76.7# of all Foreign 
Investments in ths Republic (U*N* Doc A/AC 115/L56* 5*3.6^* PP 6 1 7
with regard to trade, the position was as follows*
oowtfawd fro. M l  78
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RKPOHLIC CT acCTH ATBICA IMPORT --D KXP08T TRAPS (KHP
or '19 6 2)
Country % of Iaports by Origin % of Kxports by Deatlnatioi
U.K. 30.2 27.9
U.S.A. 16.5 9.0
France 2.7 3.6
£
r.ourcet 0.N. Doc - IMd 11 ft 1J
The trade algniflcarco-of the Republic to the West was heightened 
by two of the principftt exports items - Gold and Uranium products 
which together accounted for *»2.% of the Republics aggregate 
exports in 1962* (Ibid)
Portugal waa a member of tha North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* Tha 
U.N. Special Committee on tha Tarritorias under Portuguese Administration 
concluded in 1962 that NATO arms shipments to Portugal ’’represents an 
implication in tha suppression of tha movements for freedom in tha Terri­
tories". In *   Rhodesia, London rejected the use of military
force to crush the Smith rebellion although precedents for the use of 
troops to quell rebellions in her Colonies abound* It had thus uninten­
tionally raised the Survival prospects for the rebel regime and the spectre
• 50of another South Afrioa in Africa.
In view of the above* the impression gained ground that the west was
giving succour to 'those powers that oppress the African peoples'* Since
in addition, the Continent had been Colonised only by Western powers,
Africa seemed to want its leader t6 be genuinely non-aligned and to avoid
too close an identification with the West*
Psychologically, Africans seemed to require demonstrable assurances
that 'ttw.ir race was not inferior* Africa therefore appeared to demand that
its loader should have an effective voice in international diplomacy*
Militancy in foreign policy was favoured* Finally Africa appeared to
want its leader always to take the initiative in defence of Africah
interests*
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4*9. U*N* Doc A/AC 109/FU 9811 of 10*8.62. £.21.
50. See Chapter
NIQKRIA'fl POLICY Pi THK LARLT STACKS OF INPKPOIDEWCE,
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Th# Government's foreign policy in the immediate poet independence 
ere did little to further its clsies to Continentel leadership* In 1960 
it did not invite Pekingto the Country's independence celebrations end 
the UN refused to rote in favour of Communist China's adaission into the 
U.N* ^  Later in 1960, the Government ratified the Anglo-Nigerian Defence 
Agreement^ and was promptly warned by a parliamentarian that it was
"inviting a situation whereby Nigeria's voice will be looked upon with
53suspicion in the Comity of Afrioan nations"* In 1961 it introduced 
the 1970-end-to-Colonialis* notion at the U*N* and was informed by its 
own Chief Vhip who was in the Nigerian delegation to the U*N* that year 
that it was rapidly losing prestige at the U*N* and in African Circles due 
to the notion*^
Although the Government exchanged High Co— ine1 oners with the Federa­
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasoaland, it refused to grant diplomatic recog-
55nltion to the Q*P*R*A* x As has been seen, the Government also would only
56premise moral support to Afrioan Freed—  Fighters* In 1962 Balewa 
intimated that a visit to Nigeria by Premier Welensky of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasoaland would not be unwelcome because he was not a racial­
ist and Africans in that federation, unlike those in South Africa, could 
hold political meetings* He was immediately rebuked in a telegraa from 
a Rhodesian Afrioan Party which described his statement as "Shocking,
51* &** Chapter 8 
52* See Chapter 4
53* Chief Olugbade* H*R*D* Noveaher 1960 t>*68* 
5^. Ibid Dec— her 1961* f>.?2
33* «ss Chapter 2
56. See Chapter 2
mndisturbing and unbefitting of an African Prime Piaster".ruHKaffticfe., 
Nigeria's relationship with ths Western powers was close.
hkplbcossicns or niqi^ ia'3 policy
The nost telling ii— ediate outcome of the above policies was that 
Nigeria's Africa leadership aspirations were undermined. In 1962, She 
contested unsuccessfully for Africa's O.N. Security Council Seat. In
to1963, her ef f orts^ have the O.A.U. headquarters sited in Lagos and for a
Nigerian to be its first Secretary General were unavailing. Ths Nigerian
58Government appeared to be regarded with suspicion in Africa. Besides, 
it soon became apparent that President Nkrunah of Ghana, who also as­
pired to lead Africa, saw Nigeria as a serious impediment to the realis­
ation of his ambitions.
NIOKRIA - GHANA RATIONS
Although virtually neighbours and Colonised by Britain, the relation­
ship between Lagos and Accra was often cool during most of ths 1960-66 
period. Both had African leadership ambitions but Nigeria was about five 
times more populated than Ghana and its representatives tended, other 
things being equal, to be a greater focus of attention at international 
Conferences. The Nigerian Government dominated by the Conservative NPC
82.
_ z __________________________
97. Dally Tl— a (Lagoa) 29.8.62
98. Dally Ti^a (Lagoa) 2 2.7 .(A
I
was unlikely to accept Nkrumati* leadership. Worse a till, it was likely 
to serve as the rallying point for Conservative opinion in Africa thus 
confronting militant Nkrumah with a majority of Afrioan States opposed 
to his radical Continental designs* To meet the Nigerian threat, Nkrumah had 
recourse to two Courses of action^ diplomatic isolation and subversion*
In the first two years of Independence, Ghana did not open a 
diplomatic mission in Lagos* In i960 Dr* Nkrumah did not include Nigeria 
in the list of Afrioan States to whom he sent proposals for an African 
Military Cormand because he "holds the view that it is improper for an
Afrioan State to enter into a defence agreement with any other State out-
» 59side the African Continent* Reference here was to the Anglo - Nigerian 
Defence Agreement* A year later, relying on the same Defence Agreement,
Ghana Succeeded in delaying until the last minute, an invitation to Nigeria ~ 
to attend the 1961 Belgrade Conference of non-aligned States* In January 
1962, Lagos waa convinced that Nkrumah had dissuaded the Casablanca 
Charter States from attending the Lagos Summit of African States* Lagos 
felt that Nkrumah*s actions were simultaneously designed to undermine 
Nigeria's position in Africa by showing that its Government was not s 
genuine champion of Africa's interests*
At the 1963/3 Treason Trials in Lagos, the Courts found proven th# 
prosecutions allegation that certain opposition ^ arty leaders bad with at 
least tha Connivance of the Ghana Government, plotted to overthrow the
60Nigerian Government by force* During the 1964 paralysing General Strike 
in Nigeria, Dr* Nkrumah la said to have given financial support to the 
strikers*61*
59* ’The Service' qbadafl) 17.12*60.
60* West Africa (London) 28th Sept. 1963. P.1101-2 and 5th Oct* 1963.
P. 1131*
6 1* This was confirmed by the Ghana Trade Union Congress• ''T.U.C. in
Chains" (Accra 1966)
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Th* Nigerian Government waa in no doubt 1  at all that Aocra
was seriously plotting it* overthrow* In 1962* Foreign Minister 
Waehuku asked Pressmen to **00 to Vinneba and other plae** fin Ghana}
and you will ae* Nigerians who are being trained by Ghana to work against
62°our Government”*
IXK^TIC PHKSSURKS ON THE NIQ;/RIAN GOVL^Mj-JTT
More alarming to Lagos was the faot that the frustrations of pro­
gressive element** particularly in the South who believed that the N*P*C* was 
unfit to rule the Country but were convinced that the Constitutional 
system was heavily loaded In favour of continued N*P*C* rule, began to 
crystalllss Into profound disaffection with th* Government's foreign 
policy.* Specifically the Goveraent'e apparent inability to translate the 
Country*a Afrioan leaderahip potential into reality oaae under heavy fire*
Bslews's foreign policy waa compnded unfavourably with that of Nkruaah 
d then was often thinly disguised t admiration . fo r and envy o f the 
latter* In 1961 the Shadow Foreign Minister, Chief lEnahoro told Parliament 
"then la a lot of trouble going on in Angola, the ; rime Minister will not 
say anything until everyone else takes it up| until Nkrwmah says something 
—  then we follow* Is it not high tise we tried to lead"^* In 
another M*P* lamented that "— wherever you go, you always hftar of 
Ghana* In New York it is Ghana* In London it is Ghana* We too want 
publicity”
62a Federal Nigeria  Vol» 5* Nos. 7 & 8 July/August 1962 |**4 
62* HHD 17.4*61. Col* 1763
63* Ibid 14*4*62* Col* 1690
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The surge of criticleas of Balova's foreign policy coincided with 
the growing strength of a group of Young Radical nationalists comprising 
mainly University Undergraduate, Lecturers, Journalists, Lawyers and 
Trade Union Leaders whose emergence was "a factor which Sir Abubakar
6kas a politician oan hardly afford to ignore" • Militant and vocal, it
was the Student Section of this Group that spearheaded the violent
Nigerian
demonstrations against the Anglo/ Defence Agreement ^and threats against
66the Western bloc over Lumumba's imprisonment and eventual death. Their 
demands in respect of African leadership was that the Government should 
give a positive lead to Africa* Mainly to court the support of this 
group, the A.G's foreign policy underwent a volte face in 19&1*
In June 1961, Chief Avaolowo who is on record as having described
an immediate political union of African States as an "ignis fatuua", in
6°1959; returned from a visit to Nkrumah and promptly announced a complete 
change of mind* He now extolled the virtues of an Immediate political 
union of African States and belaboured the Government for advocating inter­
state functional co-operation*
In September 1961, Chief Enahoro derided the Government for em­
bracing "a Conservative policy which merely advocates functional co­
operation among African States" while "progressive opinion in Africa calls 
out for an organic Union"* The Government's policy he went on was
6km Christian Science Monitor 12. Aug* 1961*
65* Discussed in detail in the Succeeding Chapter*
66. Morning Post (Lagos) 1 Nov* 1961*
67. Daily Service Qfcadan) 12th & 15th Sept 1959
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“effete11, "feebie'^inoreaalngtythe A.G* became tha popular rallying 
point for criticises of tha Government's foreign polity*
Tha violent protaata against tha Aa^Nigwriao Defence Foot waa 
<?xpraa*iva of tha dapth of faaling among ooaa Nigerians about tha Afrlaan 
leadership iaaua* Tha leader of tha University Students who stormed
Parliament in November i960 aaid tha Faat "weakens Nigeria*a olalna to
69tha raapaot of African nations". It also danoaatratad that aaetioaa of f' 
tha publio wart losing patianea and that tha Ooveramsnt had to reappraise 
ita policy relating to Africa and tha uiorld or risk consequences which 
night not ba plaaaant*
Besides, thara waa tha oruaial autual paraonal dlalika batwaan 
Balewa and Kkruaah which waa auah an inportaat factor in Nigeria'a Africa 
policy in general and ita relationship with Ghana in particular*^0 So 
intanaa waa thia antipathy that thara virtually axistad a 'Cold «Cr* 
batwaan Lagoa and Accra for nuoh of 1960-66.
Consequently, tha Balewa Oovarnaant waa induced to bid nore positi­
vely for tht_leaderahip of Africa* This inevitably entailed competition 
with Aaarm*
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68* H*B,P* 4th Sept* 1961* Col* 2807 
69* Tha service (Ibadan) 3*12*60.
?0. Sir Janes Hobart son, Nigeria's Governor General ot Independence,
confirmed thia point qt a personal interview granted tha writer on 
12th Nov. 1971*
HANDraSTATICMS OF A NEW POLICY III AFRICA
The Balewa Government jointly sponsored a series of African Summit
71Conferences which culminated ia the formation of the 0*A*U* Ia 1965*
it took the lniative ia trying to terminate what it claimed was Accra's
interference in Togo, although ia the process it also became guilty of
72interference ia Togo's Internal affaiars* Ia 19&5« Lngos quickly
summoned an emergency Council of the 0*A.U* in an endeavour to avert
a threatened boycott by some Francophone States of the O.A.U* Summit
73in Accra which was then imminent*
On Colonialism, racial discrimination and minority rule in Africa, 
the Government began to take a more militant line* The 1970-end-to-
Coloniallaa U.N. motion was withdrawn* Balewa was partly instrumental in
7^getting South Africa to quit the Commonwealth * Within the 0*A*U*, 
Nigeria played a prominent role in the diplomatic assaults on Lisbon and 
Pretoria and in 19639 She decided to give material as well as moral Support 
to African Freedom Fighters*
MANIFESTATIONS OF THE NEW POLICY IN RELATIONS WITH NOW-AFRICAN STATES 
The U*K,
The Anglo Nigerian Defence Agreement whioh turned out to be such an 
embarrasment, was terminated on the eve of the Lagos AfMoan Summit ia
71* See Chapter 2
72* See Chapter 2
73* See Chapter 2
?4* See Chapter 2 -
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January 1962.^ Nigeria became a Republic In 1963 end strongly disagreed 
with London over its refusal to crush the Smith rebellion by ffcrce* Tbs 
Government however rejected an O.A.U. directive to break diplomatic re* 
latlona with the U.K. over the   Rhodesia affair*^
\
mmmmtmmL*
In 1962, Lagoa rejected association with! E.E.C. under Part IT 
of the 1957 Treaty of Rone because of the supposed neo-Coloniallst over­
tones* She however negotiated an Association (Agreement under Article 258
77of the sane Treaty* .
NON ALIGNMENT
The Government progressively dismantled barriers against contact 
with Communist ^ Countries* In 1965 Nigeria for the first time voted in 
favour of Pokings admission into the U.N*^®
The policy switches were however far from fundamental* The Balewa 
Government retained the tendency to be firmly pro-western^9* By 1966, 
it had failed to win over radical opinion in Africa although its success­
ful contest in 1965 for one of the three U*N* Security Council Seats 
assigned to Africa helped to silence critics*
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73* AagldLNigarifin relations are discussed in Chapter k, 
76* See Chapter
77* See Chapter 6*
78* See Chapter 8
79* See Chapter 5 and 8
80. Kcming Post (Lagos) 3*12*65*
THE BQCWOMIC FAOTOBS IN NIGERIA*S AFRICA POLICY
HIQ'.'JRIA*S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA
Nigeria*o economic relationship with sister Afrioan Statss 
in 1960-66 waa on an extremely puny scale* Tables 7 and 8 depict 
the position with regard to trade*
TABUS 7
Nigeria: Relative dependence on Afrioa an an export warket 1960-66
(JAJS Million)
Taar Exports to Afrioa Aggregate Exports Exports to Africa 
as a % of aggregate 
Exports
1960 8 464 1.7
1961 8 472 1.6
1962 M 11 455 2.4
1963 11 518 2*1
1964 21 590 3.5
1*5 11 733 1.5
1966 13 777 1.6
NOTBi Figures relate to national exports i*e* exports of goods wholly
<  .; or partly produced or manufactured in Nigeria*
Souroest United Nations Eoonomio Connission for Afrioa **Foreign Trade 
Statistics for Afrioa* Series A* Direction of Trade"
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T A B L i^  8
WIQSRiat IMPORTS FROM AFRICA IK TOTAL IMPORTS
Tear lsports Total lsports lsports froa Afries 
___>3.^.0! -Otal imports
1960 7 596 1*2
1961 6 615 0.9
1962 k 562 0.7
1963 3 581 0.8
1964 9 7 11 1.2
1963 9 773 1.2
1966 8 718 1.1
Sources: Si m  as for Table I
It would appear that la 1960-66, Africa absorbed only between
1.% and 3*5/£of Nigeria's total exports* As a Source of tesports, Africa
was even less isportant - accounting for only 0 -  1.2? of Nigeria's
aggregate lsports In the sase period*
The eewl 1 ness of Nigeria's trade with Africa was due In part to the
largely ooapetltlve natures of all African eoonoslos* Africa's exports
eosprlsed sainly agricultural products and Minerals which have* vent for
surplus' qualities* Besides, under Coloniallew, Nigeria (Like other
African States) established strong trade relations with her Metropolitan
o*Centre* These ***** tended to persist after Independence*
81* Nigeria's eeonosic ties with the U*K* are discussed In Chapter 9
Nigeria received virtually bo foreign private investment® sr 
foreign aid from Afriean Sources. Her Oovernsent did however desire 
oloeer econosio relatione with African States* Nigeria signed trade 
agreenents with Kali (0etoberS62)\ United Arab Republic (October*62)\ 
Caneroons (February#63)| Senegal (September*6*0 and Togo (May* 66) ?2 in 
his Budget Speech in Kerch 1962 the Federa l Finance Minister, Chief 
Okotie Eboh declared that the Lagoa Oovemsent "attaches the greatest
lnportaaee to the closest possible econocdc co-operation with other
West
African States and particularly Initially with other/African States*1* 
Ideally the econonio relationship could be within the franowork of an 
African Cpsnrm Market (A*C*M*) which the Prise Minister was convinced, 
"will solve a lot of our [Africa's] headaches"*^
What eoononio benefits could Nigeria expect fron participating in 
an A*C*M*t
NIOxSgA'S POSSIBLE ECONOMIC GAINS FROM A*C*H*
A*_C*M*_ AMD IIQUSTRIALISATIOW IK AFRICA 
The ability to raise area trade and industrial production is,
ia theory ,q general character^ untie of Conson Harksts anong eoononically
89developing Countries* This derives from the assumption that one of
82* See A.T* 13 for the list ef trade Ogrienents entered into by the 
Federal Qoveranent in 1960-66*
83* H,R*P, 29*3*62 Cel* 327*
8A. West Africa (London) 13*9*62* ^.1025
83* See for instances F. Kahnert, P* Richards, S* Stoutjesdijt and
P* Thosepeulos "Eeononlc integration anong Developing Countries” 
(OECD) Paris 1969)) R*H. Green and K.G*0 Kriaha "Fconesic Co-oner- 
ation in Africa* BotroB#ee11 and Prospect" (London 1967)] C* A* Cooper 
and 3.F. Massell "Toward rOi General Theory of Custcns Unions for 
Developing Countries" in journal of felltleal .iooaony Oct*1965
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th« major obstacle to industrialisation in ths developing world is the
minuteness of national markets Measured in terns of effective demand,
per Oapitn income, geographic sise and population* Green Ond Krishna
hare asserted that interest in economic integration among Afrioan States
has been heightened by " — the Consciousness that the relatively Trrl 1
sise of many African Nations, their uneven resource endowments, the small
siae of their markets and distortions in the pattern of economic activity
inherited from Colonial periods seriously inhibit attempts at development
486purely on the national scale*
In Africa, absolute per capita incomes are low while States with 
small populations proliferate* In 1960, of **9 Afrioan states and -fcerri-
tarias, only 3 had populations of 20 million# and over* had populations
87  •less than a million* Consequently, given the many
factors of production, national markets in Afrioa are frequently less than
the technological optima slses necessary to support various industrial
88processes* Resort to export markets in developed Countries is often not
86* Green and Krishna op cit t>*1#
87* Derived from statistics published in the ON Demographic Year Book 19&>*
88* Ths technological optimAnsise of a market is a function of the
economics of scale in the technical sense and or the economics of 
intra-industry specialisation and will therefore vary between 
industries* Consequently as Kahnert and others put it H-e techno­
logically optimal market siae for the economy as a whole is thus 
extremely difficult to define since every further addition to the 
sise of the market facing a given industry might open up furhter
economics in production" (Kahnsrt and other Op Cit JV19) Where factor
efficiency is the aim it has to be noted that "-the technological 
optimum siae of an eoonony is a necessary but not a sufficient con­
dition to ensure the utilisation of the most efficient means of pro­
ductions" T* Scitovsky— "International Trade and Economic integra­
tion as a means of over cosing the disadvantages of a small nation"
IN E*A*Q*gRobinson (ed) "Economic Consequences of the Sise of Nat long 
(London 1963 . 282-290). This is due to the fact that much of the
advantages of 1 *rger markets flow from the effects of Competition *kx 
economic integration among developing countries however, some factr 
efficiency has to be sacrificed since the necessary investments may 
not be forthcoming unless investors are assured of sojvk, degree of 
monopoly powers*
a viable option because of tho level of industrial protectionism promil lag 
la thooo States. Whoro industries oro nevertheless aot up, thoy oro aootly 
of tho impart replacement rnrioty, oad horn to bo relatively heavily tariff 
pro too tod. Their high production coots not only toad to raiao tho doaeatio 
prlco loml with adverse offooto on Conouaptloa, savings and tho availa­
bility of lavestaent funds, but also aay further oircuaoeribo opportunities
for profitable investment* particularly if tho output^ of thooo iadustrlos uwtvl
89utllloablo aa i n puts in other induotrial procosoos.
Assuming that Ooaparatlm Costs are dotorainod aalnly by Scale, aa 
A.C.M. would tend to solm tho prohloa of snail national aarkots. Tho 
oliaination of internal tarrlfa and ether iapeciiaoats to trade and tho erec­
tion of a Coaaon external tariffs against third Countries would afford ex­
panded protected aarkots to industrial processes in tho Continent. This 
Implicitly assumes that intrq-Continontal transport and Coaaunicatioc 
systems are or will bo domloped enough to render national aarkots truely 
integrated.^0
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89. See A. Hirochaan "The Political Economy of Zaport Substitutions 
Industrialisation in Latin America* XU The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics Vol. XXXII No. 1* February 19^8*
90. A general hallmark of economically developing countries is the 
talk of well developed transport and fonaunl cations Systems.
In 1969 for instance Chief Okotle Eboh told Parliament that due 
to Transport difficulties only sons of total Groundnut^ ^ales 
abroad by Nigeria during the 1963/6^ Season waa actually shipped 
(H.R.D. Col. 318)* Stevedoring Contract and labour diaputca
at the dfooka had aggravated the transport problems.
The enlarged Markets would sake possible inter-industry and intra­
industry Specialisation among member States of the A.C.H. in accordance 
with the dictates of comparative advantage* Assuming that unnecessary 
duplication of Investments is avoided - and this would entail planned 
cavestment programmes for the A*C*M* as a whole, firms in member States
would be able to operate on large enough Scales to enjoy economies of Seale
91and reduced production costs where such economies do in fa c t exist* These 
developments would tend progressively to reduce, for the market area as a
whole, the oost of local industry measured in terms of National Income for-
92gone by producing a good locally rather than importing it cheaply*
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91• Economies of Scale may be internal i*e* generated from within the
firm o± external, Mriirlpg from the envirement, location etc* in 
which the firm operates* The importance of the former necessarily 
varies greatly between industries* (See Haldiand Whitcomb "Economics 
of Scale in Industrial Plants<Jonrnal of Political Economy August 
1967 373-85) They are relatively large in Metallurgical
operations* The U*N* Economic Commission for Africa has estimated 
that a 10% Capacity increase in Iron production by the Blast Furnace 
method will require a rise in Capital expenditure of on}y 6%. The 
total Unit Cost of producing Iron will increase by 1 If the 
Scale of operation is reduced from 800,000 tons to 400,000 tons per 
annum*It would decline by 6% for an increase in Scale from 800,000 
tons to 16 millions tons per annum ("The Development of the steel 
Industry in East and Central Africa"* E/ON 14/lfrR/B7* Quoted in 
U.N.E.C.A. "Industrial Development in Africa" (New York 1967)
It is noteworthy that economies of large Scale can be reduced or 
even swamped by diseconomies of large scale cam be redwood «r even 
swamped by djaaeomagrfee of ISmgs aeple operations*
92* Cooper and Massell define the average Cost of Industry as "the
amount by which the average Cost of producing the industry* s out­
put exceeds the price of a comparable imported good*"
(Cooper and Massell <0p Cii pi 464)*
rMortofsr, the pooling of Scare* factor* such a* Capital, and Skilled
. < •
personnel would not only enable member States to utilise their re- 
oourees nora efficiently but would also improve their joint Capacities 
to increase factor supply for instance, through tha coanon finishing of technical 
institutions* National income, Industrial output and ths volume of trade­
able goods within ths Market Area would thus tend to rise* encouraging 
this belief waa inter alia, the fast that after the large Seale dls- 
santling of intra-Area tariffs within the Central American Gtmmon Market^ 
in i960, exports of non-tradltlonal manufactures from member States, rose 
frea $ 12 million in 1960 to W  60 million in 1965, increase of
Intra-Regional exports grew st the Compound rate of 3 ^  in the ease period*
I qeIn the East Afrioan Economic Coanunity ths average rats of growth of
ogCross Bonestic Produst per annus was %  between 1939 and 1966 (rats of
G*B*P* growth in Nigeria over the sase period was 5 p*a*)» Intra-hrea
exports rose by 66^ in 1939-63 while extra - area exporta went up by
97in ths sans period*
95
93* Comprises Costs Rlea, El Salvador, Quatusala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua*
9*u Kahnert, and others op Cit p* 73
95* Consists of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika*
96. F. Kahnert. Ibid
97* Calculated fro* data pohliahad In Ibid ^ .142
NIGERIA*3 POSSIBLE GAINS IN TERMS OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
Although Nigeria waa by far the post populated Afrioan State. , her 
National Income in absolute and per capita terns was small; her transport 
and Connunications systems were in a developing State. As a result, the 
effective Rational market for various production processes was relatively 
small. She was therefore likely to ..gain valuable market expansion through 
A.C.M. membership. The outcome in relation to industrial expansion was 
however unpredictable. ,
Industrial aotivity tends to be strongly attracted iorwards growth 
areas to take advantage of external economies^ Savings in transport costs 
due to nearness to market and input Supply Sources and better ‘communi­
cations and infrastructure• This is the so called "polarisation effect4' 
of economic integration*Nigeria*s (and any other member*s) share of the 
growth in industrial output resulting from the formation of the A.C.M. 
would Append partly on the extent of its industrialisation at the in­
ception of the Common Market. In the Central American Common Market, El 
Salvador, the member with proportionally the largest manufacturing Sector,
has experienced the fastest growth rate in manufacturing^? So also has
99Kenya in the Ernst African Economic Community. The following table gives 
an indication of the level of industrialisation in Nigeria relative to Shat 
of some of the prospective A.C.M. iHembers.
9*
98. Kanhert & others op C it  P .73*
99 . Green and Krishna op C it  p 33
9T
AFRICA! SHARK OF INDUSTRY IN THE NATIONAL INCOME OF 
SELECT COUNTRIES, 1960____________
TABLE 9
Country National XneoaeGf US million^ Bhare of Industry in National
 a m _____________
 fanlffBi., Mining Manufacturing Industry
I orocco
Congo
(Klnaaaha)
Algeria
Egypt
1535
1170
2500
2620
Ex-Fre&cA 2730 
Want Africa
vjv5
a*rmr
Nigeria
1215
2351
9?
183
80
25
30
25
25
275
4o
280
315
335
95
87
6
18
3
1
1
2
1
18
3
11
12
12
8
it
24
19
14
13
13
10
5
NOTESt (1) Ex-French West Africa comprises Dahoney, Guinea, ITory 
Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta.
SOURCES! UN* S*C*A* 1 "Industrial drouth in Africa" £/CN- 14/NR/Y 
Rot* 1 (New York) 1963 T*bl® 3* P.10
Nigeria Federal Office of Stats* "Digest of Statistics" 1986
It appears that in 1960 Nigeria uaa anong the least industrialised 
Independent African States* The Share ef industry in National Xnooae was 
higher in nearby Ghana ( 1 than in Nigeria 190* This was largely due 
to the fact that serious industrialisation efforts in Nigeria started ia 
the 1950's* On this basis alone Nigeria*eas likely to lose industry through 
ths polarisation effect* Nigeria's Status as one of the least industrialised 
African States was however likely to change rapidly particularly in view
9e
of her vast industrial potential which the Finance Minister contended 
"puts her in a special position in her (economic] relationship with 
neighbouring Afrioan Countries and in the progress towards ths establish­
ment of an Afrioan Commons Marked?0 If this potential waa effectively 
utilised Nigeria's ohanoea of besoming one of ths aajor Industrial growth 
poles in A fries would improve*
Even if the polarisation effects of an A*C*M. on Nigeria's indus­
trial expansion turned out to be adverse, there would still be counter 
vailing1 spread effects* Growth areas generate domsndo for saterial inputs 
which oould stimulate Investment in outer areas* Besides, excessive 
industrial concentration in a particular area sooner or later evolves 
diaoomomlea which enforce industrial decentralisation and ths location 
of new enterprises in outer areas* Ths Cpread effeets however operate
slowly and it nay be politically unacceptable for a state to be an 'Outer
101Area' within a Common Market* *
100* H*H*D* 18*3.6*. Col* 375-6
101* In the East African Economic Community (EAEC) for instance, muoh
tension has arisen from Ugandan and Tanaanian dissatisfaction with 
ths increasing centralisation of industry in Kenya* A Centralised 
Planned Investment Allocation Scheme would seem a perfect solution 
to ensure equitable distribution of industry among member States* 
There are however perenial difficulties in reaching agreement among 
independent States on such politically sensitive issues and in 
implementing whatever agreements are concluded* In this Context 
the fates of ths 196*/5 Kampala /Mbale Agreements in ths E*A*E*C* 
and tha 1961 nintegration Schemes" of ths Central Amerissn Canon 
Market are instructive*
Arrangements for payments of compensation by those Member States 
which are net gainers In terms of polarisation effects. Foreign 
Currency earnings. Government Revenue etc*, to net losers are no 
less difficult to negotiate and implement*
AVAILABILITY OF 1WVE3TMOT TOMBS.
Pop»lgn PrlTmt. Iumtnrti 
The enlarged U n t t M B t  opportunities within th* fosson Market <*•*- 
likely in general, given credible political assurances against national- 
iaation without adequate ooapanaation ' ~ \ to inoraaoa aggregate
nat inflow of foreign private Investments into the constituent developing 
states* In the Central Aserioan fe— en Market for instance, foreign direct 
private tnvestaent f although generally constituting a snail proportion of 
total private investment, has increased considerably since 1960*10*Nigeria's 
share of the enlarged inflow into the A*C*M* would be a direct function of 
the nunber of new foreign financed enterprises located in her territory*
To the extent that A*G*M* aaaberehlp would enhance industrial output in 
Nigeria, she was likely to receive a net inflow of foreign private invest- 
nents*
FORKjqW AID,
It is possible that a bigger African grouping would have a stronger 
Aid-bargaining power and succeed in attracting acre did to the Continent 
than was the case when the States acted individually* In general however, 
it would a)--'•ear unlikely that the fomatlon of an A*C*M* would by itoolf, 
radically <s*f feet aid receipte by aenber Staten* In the Central American 
Conran Market, net bilateral aid flows to all aeaber States did net increase 
consistently between 1960-63*10^ It is therefore unlikely that Nigeria's 
aid reeeipte would bo greatly influenced by its accession to the A*C*M*
102* P* Kwahnert t others o$> cit* ^*75 
103* Ibid
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' \ 54'
PRIVATE DOKKSTIC FINANCE ,
I f  as a re su lt o f join in g A*C*M* N ig eria1 b import trade i s  diverted
to r e la t iv e ly  high cost Afrioan sources, dosestio price le v e l ,  re a l
-
consumption and Savings would tend to be adversely a ffe c te d . Conversely, 
trade diversion in  favour o f Nigeria* a exports would ra is e  Lnoose* The 
repercussions on dosestio savings and Consumption would depend on the 
d istrib u tio n  o f  ineose and the propensities to save and spend o f ths 
various ineose recepienta* I f  N ig eria  does gain many new in d u stries, 
she i s  l ik e ly  to be a net exporter within ths A.C.M. and would thus 
probably enjoy an increase in dosestio private savings*
PUBLIC DOMESTIC FINANCE
T a r if f  e lta ln a tio n  on intra-African trade and ths diversion o f  
imports f r os th ird  Countries to partner sources would reduce Nigerian  
Government taoome from Import duties* The change in revenue from t a r i f f s  
would depend on the ra te s o f ths Common internal T a r i f f  o f the A.C*M* 
compared to ths duties previously imposed by N ig eria , and on ths new 
volume o f imports from th ird  Countries* The la t t e r  would be a  function  
o f the magnitude o f trade diversion o f imports from these Countries that 
occurs and w ill  be governed by ths p ries and income e l s s t i c i t l e s  o f  
demand in  N igeria  fo r third  Country Imports a fte r  ths imposition o f ths 
A*C*Mf a Common internal T a r i f f *
With regard to domestic taxation , the lo catio n  o f new in d u stries  
in  N igeria would open new tax revenue sources* Ths general Increase 
in  personal incomes expected from accession to ths A.C.M* would ra ise  
taxable ca p a citie s  and consequently personal income tax y ie ld s  to ths
nr \
C v ill .
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Government,
Much would thus depend on how imports from third Countries^
<^rc*mV» cxrui
industrial^economic a c t iv it ie s  in  general and National Income in  
N igeria respond to the Common Market arrangements,
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EFFECTS
I f  N igeria turns out to be a net exporter within the A,C,M ,, 
her trade balance v is - a - v is  other member States w* Id  be favourable
and vice versa. I f  in producing exports to A frican S ta te s, hor capacity»
to export to third Countries utemreduced, her trade balance v;ith the out­
side world would tend to be unfavourable depending on how imports from 
third Countries affected  by the Federation 's A,C,M, .lumbership. On 
the other hand, i f  net foreign private investment., inflows into N igeria uaoru 
r is e ,  the C apital <a*ccount o f her balance o f payments would tend to be 
p o sitiv e ,
A,C,M, member Statea would have monopoly or near monopoly world 
supply o f some o f N ig e r ia 's  major commodity export item s. They could 
therefore take jo in t action to ra ise  the world market p rices o f the 
commodities and thus improve N ig e r ia 's  terms o f trade. Such monopoly 
power i s  however a necessary but not a su ffic ie n t condition fo r the 
a b il it y  to ra ise  world market p rices o f primary products. Much depends
10*
10 * . In the Centred American Common Market, import duty receip ts
contributed a sm aller percentage of current Government revenue 
in 1965 compared to 1960* In a l l  member S ta te s , except 
Nicaragua, Income Tax accounted fo r a large share of to ta l  
revenue in 19^5 than in 1960, F , Kahnert A Others Op C it £ ,7 5
on wiorld demand and supply conditions* In 1964/5* tha Cocoa Producers
105Alliance whose members account for about 9Cfc of ujorld raw Cocoa
prduetion failed abysmally in its endeavour to Increase world market
106Cocoa prices through organised boycotts* Potential terns of trade
effects of an A.C.M* are therefore unreliable*
Generally therefore it would appear that whether or not the net
economic benefits of A.C.M* membership to Nigeria would be positive
was uncertain* The important point was that the Nigerian Government
was strongly attracted to the idea of an A.C.M. It was convinced an
A*C*M. was exactly what Africa needed. Balewa tol4 the 1963 Addis
Afrioan Summit "If we are able to establish an Afrioan Common Market
we shall overcome many of our difficulties and we shall be in a position
to stand on our ownmrelation to other parts of the uJorld* My fear
107of being economically colonised will disappear"*
Lagos did not however harbour any delusions about the prospects of 
an A*C*M* coming Into being in anything but the long term* Chief Okotie 
Sboh warned, in his 1962 Budget Speech that "it would be idle to under­
estimate the magnitude of the difficulties which must be resolved before 
this . (the formation of an A.C.M*) can come to pass’! Auaong other
things, before an A.C.M. "can become a reality, there must be greater
108industrialisation— — " And greater industrialisation cannot be
102
105* The Cocoa Producers Alliance comprised Ghana, Nigeria, Brasil, 
Ivory Coast and the Cameroons*
106. Federal Minister of Finance H.R.D. 31 March 1965 Col. 314
107* Nigeria Speaks Op Cit f.164
108. H.R.P. 29 March 1962 Col. 527
ita Afrioa policy in 1960-66 had to taka its cooaitaent to tha foftoa-
of preeminence* This is evident from its approach to Pan Africanism* 
An immediate political union of African States would have antailad at 
least tha creation of an equivalent of an A*C*M* Inter-State functional
co-operation on tha other hand might, but need not necessarily lead to
\tha emergence of a Common Market*
tion of an A*C*M* into consideration, it did not accord it a position
CHAPTER k
NIOi-RIA - UNITED KINGDOM RELATIONS AND THE DECISIVE NCR-ECONOMIC
__________________________ factors______________________________
At independence, Lagos was satisfied that her ex-mstropolitan 
power was a ’’real and genuine** friend and Sir Abubakar proclaimed to 
the whole world **We shall nerer forget our old friends”.^  It was thus
to be expected that relations between Lagos and London would be i '' .riateintimate
rnd cordial.
MEMBERSHIP OF THE CONNCW WEALTH 
On the ewe of Independence all three major political parties ia 
Nigeria enthusiastically approved of the Country joining the Co— on-
wealth. According to Olusanyo ’’the desire for association with the
>Co— ionwealth was almost an article of faith with all political parties
2in Nigeria” So seriously did the Government take the issue that the 
Prise Minister's notion seeking authority to request the UK for inde­
pendence on October 1st, i960 and which was unanimously passed by the 
Federal Parliament, simultaneously asked for powers to seek Qnomon- 
wealth membership.^ By seeking membership, Nigeria was of course 
following the footsteps of most ex-British Colonies that had attained 
independence. The Government however perceived in Commonwealth member­
ship, a means of transforming the old Colonial relationship with Britain 
into one of partnership thus creating the opportunities for forging
1. Balswa at the UN General Assembly 'Nigeria Speaks' bp Cit £*.61
2. G.O. Olumanya - Nigeria and the Coeawnwealth IN Africa quarterly
Jan-March 196? P.29&
%  H.R.D. 14 January i960
k. By October i960, only the Anglo Egyptian Sudan, Burma and Britiah
Somolilnnd liad not beoomo Commonwealth members on being granted 
independence by Britain. The Iriah Republic also elected to stay 
outside the Commonwealth in 1922.
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close links between both Countries* On Independence Day, Bales* 
emphasised that Hour future relations with the UK will be sere cordial
than ever bound together as we shall be in the Coenonwealth, by *
5eonson allegiance to Her Majesty, Queen Elisabeth."^
becameJust how cordial ^manifest fro* the Oovernaent's reaction to the 
U*K9s abstention fro* voting on a U.N. Security Council Resolution 
condensing Pretoria for the Sharpville shootings of Maroh 1960* Alhaj*. 
Balewa soothingly explained to the U.K's detractors that the abstention 
had been entirely on a "technical sat ter "relating to the U.K. Charter**
and was no refleetion on London's anti-apartheid stance* In spite of
7the Governsents professed abhorrence of apartheid. It then Introduced 
a notion In the Federal House of Representatives which "resolved to send 
a sessage of goodwill to Mr* Harold Macaillan (U.K. Prise Minister) for 
his tour of South Africa and his statenent against the race probless of 
that Country"*^
Further Indication of the Nigerian Governsents amiability towards 
London was provided by Its signing of the Anglo-Nlgerlan Defence 
Agreesent shortly after Independence*
105
5» "Nigeria Speaks" of> 6it f>*60
6* Reference here was to Article 2(7) of th* UN Charter which
safeguards dosestic jurisdiction*
7* See Chapters 2 and 3
8* H.R.D. 3th April 1960* Mr* MaosllIan's Statenent referred to 
was hie fasous "Wind of Change" Speech delivered In the South 
African Parliasent on 3rd February 19o0
THE ANGLO -  NIGERIAN DiIF£»CS AQRKSH>3TF
On 19th November 1960, the Federal Minister of Defence, Alhaji 
Ribadu moved a motion in the House of Representatives seeking to 
authorise the Government to conclude a Defence Agreement with the 
Government of the U*K. Under Article I of the proposed Agreement, 
both Governments undertook to "afford to the other such assistance 
as nay be necessary for mutual defence", and to "Consult together on
the measures to be taken jointly or separately to ensure the fullest
9co-operation between than for this purpose"* The U*K* Government
warranted to provide assistance for ths training and development of
Nigeria’s Armed Forces* This was to include equipping them with modern
weapons and making available to the Nigerians, places in U.K. Military
10training establishments.
As s quid pro quo, Nigeria was to make available at Kano and Lagos,
olrflelds facilities for the holding of tropicalIsatlaa trials of 61r-
11craft by U.K. forces* Both Governments undertook to accord each 
others military aircraft unrestricted overflying and sir staging 
facilities.12
K3&
9* "Draft Defence Agreement between the Government of the U.K. of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
federation of Nigeria." Sessional laper No* *+•(Lagos) 1Q60.
10* Ibid Article II (1 - 5)
11. Ibid Article lyi
12* Ibid Article III
/
Alhaji Hibodu argued that tha Agreement was aaaantial "to arranga
for tha needs at laaat over tha next few years* of tha Armed forces
(of Nigeria)— " Hie aotloa was paaaad by a larga Majority of 166 to 38
aftar a atomy dabata la which several Parllaaaatariaaa oa aithar alda
of tha Houaa atrongly objaatad to tha propoaad Agreement* ^
Objections to tha propoaad Agra— nt warn thraa folds
(1) That It Invariably committed tha Fadaration to partieipata actively
in hootilitiaa ia which tha U.K. waa involved* This waa daniad by tha
Go— ant. During tha dabata oa tha Ribadu Potion, tha Fadaral Finance
Minister inaiatad that naithar party to tha Ag ra ana nt waa antitlad to
halp from tha othar if it "Coemdtted aggression* If wa ara attacked
1bonly would wa be antitlad to aak tha O.K. to ooaa to our aid*'*
An stated in Article I, tha agreeoent waa for mutual defence* If 
Nigeria* whan attacked* could call on tha U*K* for assistance* there 
appeared to be a strong presumption that tha U.K* had a reciprocal right 
in similar circumstances* Admittedly* the right would seem to exist
13* In Nigeria's Parliamentary history* it waa extremely rare for M*P's 
of tha Governing parties to vote against tha Government however 
atrongly they objected to its policies on apaolfio occasions* In 
tha Da fence Agreement dabata* although several Government back 
benchers had voiced very strong reservations and sometimes out­
right opposition to tha proposals* only one infant voted against 
the Government* Frequently therefore* th# margin of majority 
votes oast ia favour of Government measures did not accurately 
re fleet Parliamentary opinion* 9m them*
1b* H*H*D* April 1 *  1960* Col* 30
only in those circumstances in which the U.K. had not "Committal 
aggression" but it is not always easy to determine which is the aggressor 
nation in a war situation* The final act of declaring war is usually the 
culmination of a mane of actions and re-actions by the States involved 
to usually self fulfilling reel or imagined threats to their furvival*
In the final analysis therefore the dividing line between the aggressor 
and the victim la frequently very fine*
Assuming that the Nigerian and U*K* Governments would b# able to 
deterniae whan the other had 'Committed aggression', while the terms of 
tho Agreement ss Interpreted by the Flnsnee Minister would no longer bind 
the other to render assistance, the Spirit of the Agreement would tend to 
induce continuation of assistance* To deny a State at oar certain mili­
tary facilities it had enjoyed in peacetime without correspondingly 
putting its enemy at a similar absolute disadvantage may be construed by 
that State as an unfriendly act* It would therefore appear that to the 
extent that Nigeria could rely on the U*K*'s assistance in times of war, 
the U*K* could also expect Nigeria's support if she went to war*
(2) That consequently, Nigeria had inherited the U*K*'s international 
prejudices and enmities* Dine# she would bo committed to support the 
U.K.rnilitarilyin peace time and in Oar, Nigeria would, it was argued, 
thereby impugn -d her Sovereignty to that extent and beeome a 'military 
appendage' of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation of which the U.K* 
was a leading member* The Governor General Dr* Aftlfclwe summed up moat 
of the objections to the Agreement when hs mentioned in s speech in 
January 1962 that Critics of the Agreement felt that "it derogates from
ice
ths Sovereignty of Nigeria and leaves an impression that Nigeria is a 
loyal and faithful sympathiser of the N*A*T*0. powers"
(3) That such a commitment to NATO would be incompatible with ths pro­
fessed non-alignment policy of the Government and would undermine its 
prestige particularly in Africa where non-alignment had become ths vogue*
There was little doubt however that Nigeria needed foreign assistance 
in developing its armed forces which st independence were rudimentary* 
Thar# was also no doubt that the U*K* was well placed to provide such 
assistance because of long Colonial history and its first hand ex­
perience and knowledge of Maoris's military needs* Nevertheless, it 
did not appear absolutely nooossary for Nigeria to enter into a formal 
Agreement with ths U*K* in order to enjoy most of ths bsnofits stipulated 
in ths Past* Mere Commonwealth membership would appear to have sufficed* 
Commonwealth members like Ghana and India enjoyed similar advantages 
without a formal Agreement with tho U.K.
The question however was whether the U*K* Author!tee had insisted 
on the Agreement am a price the Nigerian* had to pay for independence* 
Indeed, Chief Awolowo, Federal Opposition Loader who first brought tho 
issue of tha proposed Agreement to light, claimed that this was the case* 
He told a press conference on the eve of the final London Conference on 
Nigeria's Constitution in May i960 that during tha 1958 Resumed Constitu­
tional Conference in London, the Prime Minister and all three Regional
1C 9
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\PreimerSr (which included himself who waa then Premier of the Western
Kegion) were naked to initial the outline of a proposed Defence
Agreement between the U.K. and Independent Nigeria as a condition
16precedent to the granting of independence to Nigeria in i960. He 
claimed that the proposed Agreement granted military bases in Nigeria 
to the U.K. All the other Premiers who had attended the 1958 London 
talks denied that initially the jiraft Agreement was a condition of in­
dependence* No one howeTer denied the initialling and no one advanced 
any reasons why the existence of such a document had not been publicised 
earlier*
The general public was first alerted to the Governments intention 
of signing a defence agreement with the U*K* when Chief Awolowo hinted 
at it in Parliament in April 1960* On April 12th, a Government back­
bencher introduced a private motion seeking to prevent the Government 
from entering into any Military Alliance or Mutual Defence Pact or allow
any foreign Government to establish a military base in Nigeria without
17the prior approval of the House of Representatives* The Government 
accepted the motion and Baleva revealed for the first time that the three 
regional Premiers and himself on one hand and the U*K* Government on the 
other, were convinced that co-operation in the field of defence would be 
mutually advantageous to the U*K* and Nigeria* They had reached
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"Unanimous agreement on the facilities and help which each country
 ^ «j pi
would render to the other after (Nigeria's} Independence" *. A serious
contraversy ensued in which the public voiced disapproval of any Defence
Agreement in general and the installation of foreign military bases in
Nigeria in particular*
At the opening of Hay 1960 London Conference, the British Colonial
Secretary, Hr* Hacleod, emphasised that no strings had been attached to
1oNigeria's independence* But the Manchester Guardian* a British national 
daily Newspaper, said in a front page article on 22nd January 19&2 
"— unfortunately for those whose task it is to ssooth the course of 
relations between Britain and Africa, this — • military deal was made 
part of the price which Nigerians had to pay for their independence in 
i960-— (this fact sas} a public secret in political circles at the time 
(agreement was reached on Nigeria's independence date in 195D”*
It would appear that although the British Goveranent did not exprecsUj 
edjky make initialling the Draft Defence Agreement a eondition of inde­
pendence, the circumstances in which it was put forward gave the im­
pression it was an implied condition and may have induced the Nigerians
*  *  20 to accept*
18* Ibid Col. 339
19* Daily Times (Lagos) 11th Hay i960
- e20* Sir James Robertson who was Nigeria's Governor General at the tine
said he was stunned when the British Defence Minister the Rt* Ion*
Duncan Sandys put forward the proposals for the Defence Agreement 
to the Nigerians at the Constitutional talks* Neither he nor any
other British Officials serving in Nigeria were consulted before
hand* They all felt some consternation because of their convic­
tions that the Nigerians would construe the proposed Agreement as 
a price of independence and this wan likely to harm Anglo-Nlgerlan 
relations. (Personal Interview)*
Yet* if the implications of the Agreement were unacceptable the 
Nigerian leaders could easily have repudiated it after the U.K. had
publicly committed Itself to granting independence to Nigeria in 1960. 
Alternatively* they could have released the details of the Agreement 
and whipped up public opinion in Nigeria against it to the extent that 
London would have had to withdraw it* The deletion of provisions for 
• K. military bases in the proposed Agreement was infact due to Nigerian 
public outcry afainat foreign military bases after Awolowo's disclosure!.
In ths event, no mention waa made of the prospective Agreement 
during the heated 1959 elections Campaigns* It was not until April 1960, 
when Chief Awolowo had become Opposition leader that the cat waa let out 
of the bag. It would therefore appear that the Nigerian leaders (inclu­
ding Awolowo up to early 1960) were entirely aggreable to symbolising 
their warmth towards the U.K. with a formal Defence Agreement which, as 
originally envisaged. Involved granting military bases to the U.K. Mr, 
Kaoleod told the House of Commons that th# Defence Agreement was " A 
complete reflection of the goodwill and mutual trust which exists between 
the two Countries1’2^
21* Sir James also said it waa widely believed among Colonial Officials 
serving in Nigeria that the Nigerians would repudiate the Agreement 
once independence was attained.
22* At the conclusion of the London talks, Colonial Secretary Mr. Macleod, 
informed the House of Commons "it was thought originally a year or 
two ago that it would be appropriate for Nigeria to lease some land 
to this country, on which, if we wanted, we could construct additional 
facilities. We have decided not to ask for that and that was very 
nruch welcomed by ths Nigerian Authorities" rarlismsntary Debates 
(Hansard) London, 19th May 1960. Col. 1b98.
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Parliamentary approval of tha proposad Agreement did not however 
and tha oontroveray. Cppoaitloa ^ artiaa and various pressure groups 
incessantly danounoad it* On November 28, 1960. huadrada of under- 
graduataa froa tha University College, Ibadan, gataoraahad tha Houaaa 
of Parliament in an angry demonstration againat tha Paot and aanhandlad 
aona Ministers* Members of tha Foraign Affairs Committee of tha All 
Nigerian Paoplaa Confaranoa summoned by tha Priaa Minister's Paraonal
*d vicar on African Affairs* Dr* Mbadiwe, in August 1961, unanimously
2bracoaaandad that tha Dafanoa Agraaaant ba raaeindad* Aa waa aaan la 
Chapter 2, Dr* Nkrumahi waa abla to daisy until tha last minute 
Mgaria's invitation to tha 1961, Belgrade Confaranoa of non-dllgned 
States by arguing that tha Dafanoa Agraaaant waa proof that Nigeria' 
was not ganuinley non-aligned* Tha Agraaaant was also making relations 
between Nigeria and tha Casablanoa Charter States difficult thus inhi­
biting Nigeria*s efforts at unifying tha Casablanoa and Monrovia Groups 
of Afrioan States* Eventually on January 2ft, 1962, tha Cabinet Offioa 
in Lagos announced that tha Agraaaant had bean terminated* Essh of tha 
Contracting Governments however agreed to Hafford to tha other at all
times, such assistance and facilities in dafanoa matters as are appro-
25priate between partners in tha Commonwealth*
2b* west Afrioa (London) 26th August 1961* ^*9^7
25. Federal Nigeria (Lagoa) Vol. 5 No. 2* February 1962* 
p.2 3
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Obviously the political emb&rxqss nent had proved too much* It waa 
apparent that the Lagos Government was having second thoughts about the 
Defence Pact as long ago as August 1961 when the Federal Minister of 
State for the Navy Mr* Mbu intimated that "if the Government finds that
it is the wish of the Nigerian people to abrogate the Defence Fact signed
• «26 with Britain, it will consider such a request*
In the aftermath of the Agreement's abrogation*, to give the lie to 
its detraction who accuse it of being too 'pro-British' the Federal Govern­
ment entered into Agreements with Canada (January 19&2)I Ethiopia (Jan 
1961)| India (Dec* 1962) and West Germany (April 1963) for the training 
of personnel for the Nigerian Armed forces*
The agreement with West Germany was particularly significant* tinder 
it the Germans warranted to build an ammunitions factory at Kadpaa, train
pilots for the nascent Nigerian Airforce and supply 36 aircraft woMhh
27some £9 millions, and provide some medium range machine 91ms* As a 
consideration, Nigeria gave the understanding that she had, to quote 
Herr Von Hassen of the west German Government "sympathy towards the 
German Peoples' right to f-determination"* This was by necessary 
implication, an undertaking not to grant diplomatic recognition to the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of East Germany* Besides, the 
Nigerian Government was to meet the whole cost of the Air Force Pilots' 
training programme* The terms were thus considerably less advantageous
26* West Africa (London) August 26, 1961* £.9^7
In a personal letter to the writer dated 10th December 1971, Mr.
Duncan Gandye stated that the Defence Agreement "— was subsequently
revoked at the request of the Nigerian Government who found it 
politically embanking— "
27* The Times (London) 6 Oot* 1965*
28* West Africa (London) 15 June 1963*
than would have baan tha oaea had Britain undertaken tha provision of 
tha dircraft and the training of tho Pilots within or outoida tho 
ambit* of tho Anglo-Nigerlan Dafence Agreement.
Tho tondLnation of tho Dofonoo Agreement oliminated much of tho 
otrooooo and atrains it had impartod into Nigaria-O.K. ralationa at tho 
Sub-official levels. Within a year, a now issue arooo which threatened 
ralationa botwoon tho two Countrioo at tho official level.
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THE SRAHOHO AFTAIB 
On November 27* 1962* Chiof A. Enahoro waa arroatod in London for 
extradition to Nigeria under tho 1881 Fugitive Offender9 a Act* wanted 
in connection with an alleged conspiracy by Opposition Action Group
loaders to stage a Coup d*etat in Nigeria* he had arrived in London two
20days previously apparently convinced ho would ho safe from arrest.
29* Chiof Enahoro stated in his Autobiography "Fugitive offender" 
(Cassell* London 1965) 206-7 that he had asked a friend*
a Hr. Dolan to inquire whether or not ha ran tho risk of being 
arrested If ho case to Britain. Hr. Dolan consulted a firm of 
Solicitors* Messrs. slaughter and May on whose advice he had 
"three separate conversations" with Mr. Hyde* a Senior Home 
Offioe Official. After asking "internal inquiries" Mr. Hyde 
advised Mr. Dolan of the long traditions of political asylum 
in Britain" without specifically mentioning that asylum sight 
not be available to a Commonwealth Citisen".
Ths British Hone iocretary9 s version of the inquiries on ths 
Chiefsbehalf was different. Mr. Brook told Parliament (Hansard 
1*U3»63 J**6o6) that Chief Enahoro9s friend had telephoned the 
Home Offioe and was assured the Chief would not neeeeaarily be 
refused leave to lund merely because he did not have aflfksnpoitf * 
When he sought assurances about freedom from arrest* ths friend 
was asked to eoataot tha Criminal Division of ths Hems Office which 
was competent to give advice on the issue. Neither Chief Enahoro 
nor his friend did so nor did they seek legal advice on the natter 
but merely assumed Enahoro would fcetJteiarg&gted.
Am required under Section!) of the Act a Magistrate'• Court exam­
ined the Case and was satisfied there was a 1'Strong and probable pre­
sumption1' She Chief waa guilty and therefore committed him for flurren-
30der. Thereupon the Chief endeavoured unsuccessfully to have this 
deoiaion set aside by a series of appeals to higher Courts. Re did how­
ever win a pledge from the Lagos Authorities (made through Counsel) that
permission to load in Nigeria would not be refused to any Counsel from
31ISngpLand merely because he was going to represent Eaahoro.
It was than left to the Home Secretary noting under Section 8 of
the Fugitive Offenders Aot 1881, to order the Chiefs extradition to*
Nigeria if he thought it just. At this stage, Parliament and ths press 
took so intense an interest in the affair that extradition waa delayed 
for five months. The Home Secretary, Mr. Brook announced to the House 
of Commons on 1*»th March 19&3« he had decided that Enahoro should be 
sent home.^ It soon became obvious that hie decision was unpopular in 
the House which consequently held about nine full- dressed debates on ths 
issue between 1*tth March and 30th May 19^3.
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30. Rt. Hon. Henry Brook Hansard 1*t.3*63» Col. 15M*
31* The question of entry into Nigeria arose because Mr. Grantiaa, an 
English Lawyer who had gone to Nigeria to defend Chief Awolowo, 
accused of the seme crimes ss Enahoro, had bean refused entry. 
Subsequently, Mr. Dingle Foot, regarded in Lagos ss s bitter critic 
of the Nigorian Government, was refused entry when he went to Nigeria 
to defend Chief Emahoro. His junior Counsel was however granted 
entry and the Government announced that any other British Lawyer 
(apart from Mr. Foot) would be admitted to defend the Chief.
32. Hansard 14.3.63. Col. 1543*
In a bid to indue* Mr* Brook to change hi* mind, son* M.Ps argued 
vehemently that th* chief was a victia of politioal vendetta by th*
Nigerian executive intent on "liquidating M the Opposition A.G. Party 
and was therefore unlikely to receive a fair trial if sent hcne*^
On March 26, the Deputy Opposition leader introduced a new twist 
to the argunent* He pointed out that on* of the charges against Chief 
Saahoro listed in the affidavit lodged on behalf of the Nigerian Govern­
ment at th* extradition prooeedingsv was punishable by death* This 
triggered off a lively oontroveray as to whether or not Cnahoro ran the 
risk of losing his life if sent house* In the end, Prine Minister ! ac- 
millan solemnly prouised the House on 26 March that "the Chief will not 
be returned to Nigeria until there is a definite undertaking froa the 
Nigerian Government that this Charge, if it carries the death penalty, 
is withdrawn and that no charge* that oould carry the death penalty la 
substituted*'*'^
On 9th April, the Attorney General advised the House that the Chargee 
preferred against Chief I&ahoro did not carry the death penalty^* This 
however failed to eil*no* the grave concern expressed in Parliaaentknd‘ in the
33. for instance, Mr* Stonehouse maintained that "— If Knahoro is
returned to Nigeria it is scat unlikely that he will have a fair 
trial* I say this because all the leading politicians of the 
Action Group have been arrested in what ascents to a purge of
the Opposition and so** of the Chargee laid against then have the 
. appearance of be in/- - and I use the Hone Secretary's words without 
apology - "teumpod up— "
Hansard 21 ) arch 196%  ft>* 612-4
y* "parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Coaaene Official Reports
(London) 26*3*63* p.1286*
35. Ibid 9.^*63. >>.1019
• 117
Press that Enahoro was in peril pf losing his life after an unfair 
trial in Nigeria* On 10th Apfcil, Mr* Macmillan informed the House 
that the Nigerian Government* a view was that Capital Sentence did not 
apply to the Charges against Enahoro but it had not given any under­
taking* He was now satisfied that the whole question of ths affidavit 
was irrelevant to the position of whatever the law meant; waa fully 
confident of the good faith of the Lagos Government and ths imparti­
ality of ths Nigerian Courts, and had ftaehdd ths conclusion that Ate
36hero would have to go home and stand trial*
Further Court proceedings and parliamentary and non- {>arllamentary 
pressure (ineluding a petition to ths Queen) designed to effect the 
Chief9* release wars unavailing* Finally,c*i15 May 19&5 - after the 
House of Commons had again adjourned for three hours to discuss Ma 
definite matter of public importance" vis* the Enahoro affair; had divided 
and voted in favour of the Chief being eent home* Chief Enahoro waa at 
last extradited*
NIGERIA9S REACTION
In ths i n i t i a l  stages* the Enahoro a f f a i r  generated l i t t l e  ex­
citement in  N igeria* As i t  dragged on and soma B ritish  M.Ps began 
serio u sly to question ths In te g rity  o f the N igerian executive and 
Ju d ic ia ry  however* tempers among Government supporters became frayed  
while the Opposition p a rtie s and th e ir  supporters were n atu rally  ju b i­
la n t a t the Governments discom fiture* Matters came to a head follow ing
11 8
36* Ib id  10.b.63. 1290 - 1295
Mr. Macmillan1 a March 26 House of Commena ftpeech in which he promised to 
ssok assurances from Lagos that Knahoro would not faeo Capital punish- 
msnt. Mr. Macmillan was infaot reacting to aoute parliamentary pressure, 
almost inevitably however, Lagoa construed his move ss exposing the 
Nigerian Government and Judiciary to public ridicule. The Government- 
Owned Morning Post Newspaper bluntly declared that "the Government and 
people of Nigeria have been humiliated enough. The British taught Nigeria 
that ths Judiciary must be independent yet Mr. Macmillan wants tbs Govern­
ment to interfere with the Judiciary"
Both Chambers of the Nigerian legislative reverberated with angry 
incessant demands from Government M.Pa. that Lagos should send an ulti­
matum to London demanding unreserved apologies and should break off diplo­
matic relations with ths U.K. if none waa forthcoming witAina given tine 
3filimit. The mood in Government circles in Lagos was reflected in ths
purported conviction of Lord Hoad, the U.K. High Commissioner to Lagos,
that Nigeria would withdraw from the Commonwealth unless Lnehoro was re-
30turned without conditions of any kind. On April 29, when ths Enahoro 
affair had attained Crisis proportions ss London appeared to drag ite 
feet over the extradition issue. Sir Abubakar announced to a Cheering
37* Morning Poat (Lagos) 28.3.63.
38. peech by ths Deputy Government Chief Whip, Chief Abbl
H.R.D. 28 March 1963* Col. 31.
39. Dally Express (London) 3«*t»63.
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Federal House that Nigeria was to become a Republic the following
LqOctober*
REPUBLICANISM
The Nigerian Federation had Btrong attachments to the British 
Crown# In 1953 Balewa said 11 We in Nigeria are Second to none of Her 
Majesty* s Subjects in our affectionate loyalty to her person —  there
Jis (in Nigeria) definitely no thought ofv let alone, wish for a Republic" 
On Independence Day, he 'proudly* acclaimed the British Monarch as 
"Queen of Nigeria and head of the Commonwealth"•
Independent Nigeria thus shared with the U*K* a common constitu­
tional Monarch* Admittedly, the Queen's Status in Nigeria was largely 
ceremonial but common allegiance to her was symbolic of the closeness 
between the Federation and the U*K* -
With the passage of time public opinion first in the South, Yeered 
towards republicanism for reasons discussed later in this Chapter* On 
October 1, 19^3% Nigeria became a Republic* The Queen ceased to be its 
head of State but was still affectionately recognised as head of the 
Commonwealth whose membership the new Republic retained. Republicanism 
brought with it the termination of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in London as Nigeria's Final Court of Appeal* This Status now 
vests in the Supreme Court of Nigeria. Receipt of British honours by 
Nigerians was also discontinued*
1 20
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VI* "Nigeria Speaks" op flit ^*19*
H H Q H S I A
On November 1 1 ,  1965* ***• m inority Rhodesia Front Government of 
i Rhodesia u n ila te ra lly  declared the te rr ito ry  independent (UDI). 
I t s  quest fo r le g a l independence had foundered because o f the U .K 's in -  
s i  s is  tence on sa tis fa c to ry  C onstitutional Safeguards fo r unimpeded pro­
gress towards m ajority ru le . In Hay 19&5* the Rhodesia Front Govern­
ment called  a general electio n  seeking a mandate fo r UDI and in  November 
came UDI. The UK Government which had always maintained there was 
absolutely no question o f m ilita ry  intervention in the event o f a UDI, 
promptly denounced the reb ellio n  and imposed a p a rtia l trade embargo and 
other forms o f economic and fin an cial sanctions against the T e rrito ry .
NIGERIA*S ;X)LICY TO ■* ARDS RHODESIA •
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2 , the Nigerian Government 
declared i t s e l f  to be trenchantly opposed to uAiite minority rule in  
A fr ic a . Rhodesia was no exception. The Nigerian Government's po licy in  
relatio n  to the c r i s i s  however reveals an ambivalence already apparent 
from Vts attitu d e towards the Central African Federation discussed in 
Chapter 2 .  On the one hand was the Governments n ecessity to play along 
with i t s  A frican  Counterpart* at international forums, p a rtic u la rly  the 
UN, when Rhodesia was discussed. On the other hand was the desire to 
demonstrate f u ll  confidence in the U.K. Government. When Foreign Minis­
te r  Wachukwu told the U.N. General Assembly in June 1962 that h is
i+2
Government po licy on Rhodesia was "one o f co n cilia tio n  ” he was in f  act
12|
4+2. U.N. Doc. A/PU 1 1 1 2  16th Session o f General Assembly's 112 th  
Meeting 20th June 1962
givin g expression in public to the meeting of minds between Lagos and 
London on many aspects o f the Rhodesia C r is is .
Nigerians endorsement of the U.K.-Rhodesia policy was evident as 
fa r  back as August 1960, when the Federal Minister o f State  for Foreign  
A ffa ir s  Dr. Esin reportedly said , during an o f f i c i a l  fa c t  finding tour 
of the Rhodesian Federation that Dr. Banda would be "fo o lish  to secede
from the Federation when h is people would be b etter o ff  within i t s  frame-
43
work". Intense R a tio n a list protests induced a recantation.
With regard to the 1961 Constitution, Lagos f e l t  i t  provided a 
good enough framework within which the African N atio n alists should work 
fo r m ajority ru le . At the 1964 Commonwealth Prime M in isters’ Conference, 
Balewa came out against immediate A frican  rule on the grounds that the 
Chaos o f the Congo might be repeated i f  power was h a s tily  handed over to■ 1. . •
ill-exp erien ced  A frica n s. At the 1965 Prime M inisters* Conference while 
most Afro~Asians urged the U.K. to introduce a new Southern Rhodesia 
Constitution which would ensure an immediate tran sfer of power to A frican s, 
Balewa said he was fo r independence for Rhodesia only a fte r  the a tta in ­
ment o f m ajority rule but again he stressed the dangers inherent in a
44hasty A frican  takeover. He was also  opposed to any proposals weighted 
too heavily in favour o f eith er r e c ia l  group in the T e rrito ry . Instead  
he advocated a Constitutional Conference at which A frican s and Europeans
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4 3 . Johannesburg S t a r . 4th August i 960
44. D aily Express (Lagos) 2 1 s t  and 22nd June 1965
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Ukwould hamaer out thsir own solutions to ths problems of ths dolony.
When it bsoass clear that Salisbury would not accept ths idea of 
a fully repreoentative Constitutional Conference, Lagoa, unlike most 
other African Governments, endorsed the U.K. proposals for a Royal 
Commission to enquire whether or not the majority of all -t. H Rhodesians
i^Qfavoured Independence under the 1961 Constitution* These proposals were 
at first acceptable to Hr* Smith who later rejected them and opted for
UPI.
Meanwhile at the U*Nj Nigeria in 1962 voted for a Resolution reques­
ting the D*K* to take immediate measures to secure the suspension of the
1961 Constitution and the eanoellation of the elections scheduled under
50it* She also joined forces with A fro-Asian States to put pressure on the 
U*K* over Rhodesia* In April 19&5 for instance, Nigeria was one of 33 
African States which requested a Security Council Meeting on RhodesilP 
and successfully sponsored a Resolution directing that UDI be prevented
at all costs and asking all member States not to recognise UDI if it
52transpired*
That these actions were motivated chiefly by the need to keep in tune 
with African opinion was apparent when the Nigerian Minister of State 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Parliament in response to demands 
by K*Ps that the Government should put pressure on London to suspend the
**8. Federal Nigeria (Lagos) Vol Ji.Noa* 7 & 8 1965
^9* Morning Post (Lagos) ovenber 1, 1965
50* tl*N. Year Book 1962 f>.*23
51. Ibid 1965 {>.119
52 Security Council Resolution 202 1965
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1$61 Constitution on ths eve o f ths May 1965 electio n s in  Rhodesia, 
and render the electio n s void, that ths ouapsnsion o f ths (1^ 6 1)  
Constitution i s  not ths rssp o n s ib ility  o f the Nigerian Government".
The Oovsmnsnt was opposed to minority n ils  in  Rhodesia and had mads 
that c le a r  to ths U.K. Qoverrmant " I  do not think that N igeria w ill
5|
do mors than what she has dons'1*
Lagos was thus not disposed towards sustaining pressure on ths U.K. 
in  ths s p ir it  o f ths United Nations Resolutions i t  had voted fo r . And 
to in dicate that irre sp e ctiv e  o f what might be said at ths U*N. ths 
d esire fcot to hurt London's fe e lin g s was a paramount feature o f ths 
Nigerian p o licy , a Nigerian delegate concluded h is  speech during a U.K. 
Rhodesia debate by e x to llin g  the U.K. Government's Creditable and 
indeed glorious record in the Colonial field?**
I t  was on the issue o f U .K 's response to UDI that Lagoa and London 
parted ways* The Nigerian Government objected stron gly to the use o f  
economic Sanctions alone f i r s t l y  because they were too ponderous a wea­
pon with which to combat a reb ellion * S i r  Abubakar told a Press Confer­
ence the day a ft e r  UDI A reb e llio n  i s  a reb ellio n  and you cannot put 
down a reb e llio n  by Sanctions alone* There i s  no more e ffe c tiv e  remedy 
to reb ellio n  than to crush i t  with (m ilitary) force-. ' ^ Secondly, that 
ftanetlana imposed were not even to ta l*  O il a v it a l  commodity was not 
included in  the embargo u n til a month a fte r  UDI* Moreover, during the
53. H.R.P. 6*5.65.
5*U U.N. Doc. Aq/A/C VSR 1303 of Feb. 1962
55. "Keeping's Contemporary Archsivea Weekly Diary o f Jorld dventa" 
(London) Dec. 18.25.1965. p.21130
l i f e  time o f Balewa and hie Government, sanction* were not mandatory^ 
and no serious attempt was made to plu^flanctiona busting p a rtic u la rly  
v ia  the Republic o f South A fr ic a .
The putntive parting of ways was not however complete* Soon after 
UDI, Balewa declared nWe will back any action taken by Britain"*^ And 
in December 1965, the Government gave ample demonstration that relations 
with London had by no means cooled inspite of disagreement over the use 
of force in Rhodesia* On December 3, 1965* an OAU Emergency Council 
unanimously adopted a Resolution calling on all 36 OAU membersGovern- 
ments to break diplomatic relations with the U*K* if it had not restored 
Constitutionality in Rhodesia by December 15* This Resolution was in
the dpirit of numerous Resolutions on Rhodesia passed by OAU Assembly
58and Council meetings sines 1963 • Although tho Nigerian delegate had 
cast an affirmative vote for the December 3 Resolution, the Balewa 
administration which had covered all diplomatic, economic and financial 
relations with Salisbury^ announced a few days later that the breaking of 
diplomatic relations with the U.K. would9have (unacceptable) far reaching
56* In April 1966, the U*N* Security Council, at the request of the 
U.K. Government made Sanctions against Rhodesia mandatory.
57* wsst Africa (London) 20th Nov* 1965*
58* For instance, the last pre-ODI OAU Summit which met at Accra in
Oct* 1965 passed s Resolution requesting the U.K. to use force 
in the event of UDI to restore Constitutionality! to suspend the 
1961 Constitution, call a Conference to work out a time table for 
:odesia*a :lndepmd£xw./the basis of majority rule. If the U*K. 
did not meet these demands, member Statee vere"toreconsider all 
political, economic, diplomatic, and financial relations with the 
Government of Great Britain and Ireland I? OAU Assembly of Heads of 
Govt. Conference 196£.
OAU Doe A.H.G./Ree* 25 Rev. 1. Addle Ababa.
59 . Daily Times (Lagoa| 19th November, 1965*
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implications" for Nigeria • To save face - tha Priao Minister travailed 
to London on 13th December to pursue his proposals for a Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Conference to discuss Rhodesia in Lagos in January 1966. 
Apparently let off the hook by the acceptance of this plan. Sir Abub&kar 
saw 15th December come and go uneventfully*^1
RLSUMS
It would appear that the Balewa Regime was initially eager to 
fortify ties with the U*K* and to ensure that potential or actual causes 
of misunderstanding were speedily scorched* Presently however Lagos 
began deliberatftb$ to weaken some of the formal ties with London* In 
1962V the Anglo-Nlgerian Defence Agreement was abrogated* Later* the
parity link between the Nigerian pound and the pound Sterling was broken
taand the forasr acquired its own parity expressed in terms of gold* lmgos 
also turned down an offer of (association with the E*L*C* which had re­
sulted from the U*K's negotiations to join the Ceemnmity^* In 1963
60* "Morning Poet” (Lagos) 7*12*65
61* Although Nigeria waa not one of the 10 African  States wh*cK
answered the OAU c e l l ,  5'ie did however participate when 
delegates frora savami A frican  States on 16 December* walked 
out on British irime Minister Wilson at the U*N* General 
Assembly in  protest against ths U*K*s handling o f the Smith 
rebellion*
The Lagos Commonwealth Prime Minsters' Conference on 
January 11 and 12* 1966* produced nothing spectacular except 
Mr* Wilson's celebrated claim that economic factions could 
well end ftsmthamn Rhodesia’e rebellion* "in a ratter of weeks 
rather than months"•
62* See succeeding Chapter*
63* See Chapter 6*
■ > <' ' • - U-' ‘ * '
Nigeria became a Republic. In 1965 Lagoa disagreed sharply with the 
U.K. over the issue of military intervention in “ Rhodesia.
There was thus a progression from the immediate post-independence 
emphasis on 'We shall never forget our old friends* these to fcne of 
gradual disengagement of fornal Anglo-Nigerian ties.
When all is said and done however the relationship between Lagos 
and London in 1960-66 was very close. In July 196*1, 3ir Abubakar told
the Anglo-ttigerian Association in London "— We (Nigerian) cannot help
6kbeing pro-British-M and in December 1965 ignored the OAU directive
to break diplomatic relations with ths U.K.
THE DETLKMINIWq EXTRA - ECONOMIC CCNLlDi£RATIQN3 
NIGERIA'3 COLONIAL VX1\. qSNCE3
Ths post-Lndepsndsnos relationship between Nigeria and the U.K. 
was significantly coloured by Nigeria's Colonial history which had 
two major characteristics 1 (a) l\mdq mental differences in ths Colonial 
experiences of the Northern end Southern Regions, (b) 'Ideal* decolo­
nisation or tho relatively smooth handover of powers by ths Colonial 
Authorities. The latter was dealt with in the previous Chapter.
m s aoUTHUdi regicw s
Early missionary operations had promoted relatively rapid spread 
of education in Southern Nigeria. Thia had encouraged large numbers of 
Southerners to take up appointments in the Colonial Civil Service and
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6*u Daily Times (Lagos) 17.7.6**.
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in foroign~owned and run Commercial enterprises where close oontacts 
between them and Europeans of predominantly British extraction was inevi­
table. The outcome was frequently not particularly edifying* Many 
an educated Southerner found that the average European tended to treat 
him with contempt and discourtesy bordering sometimes on hostility*
As C.R. Buxton observed in 193** "Few white people have a good word to 
say for the educated African —  (His) failings and absurdities are one
65of the stock subjects of conversation among whits people in West Africa" 
M&LMier did officialdom take kindly to the educated Southerners 
who were held responsible for what was to the Colonial Administrator 
Career-damaging local agitations against Colonial rule* Nationalist 
anti Colonial activities were concentrated in Southern Nigeria* This 
was due in part to the relatively rapid spread of education which had 
enabled many Southerners to read foreign literature with definite anti- 
Coloniallst flavour* Besides, young Southerners began travel in large 
numbers to the U*K* in the 1930's and the U*S*A* in the 19*»0's, for 
further studies* While abroad, particularly in the U.S.A., they fre­
quently experienced at first hand ths plight of Negroes and had raos 
consciousness foisted upon then* They were also exposed to strong 
antl-Coloniallst sentiments of such personalities as President Roose­
velt, the incisive nationalist philosophy of man like Marcus Gravy, 
ths Jamaican, and ths inculcation of national consciousness and racial 
pride by the various pan-African Congresses and such organisations as 
ths Council on African Affairs (U*S*A) and ths W#at Afrioan Students 
Union (U*K)• Moreover, having seen the high standards of living abroad.
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65* "Soma African Friends" in th# Spectator (London) 28.12.3**. 
Quoted in J*S* Coleman - Nigeria dp.Cit. ^.1^6
they conceived bright i d « u  fo r th* a tta in — nt o f  sim ilar standard* at  
ho— * They th er*fo r* often returned ho—  determined to r id  th e ir  ho—  
land *f a lie n  rule so —  to  be able to in it ia t e  p o lic ie s  to co rrect the 
economic and technological backwardness o f th e ir  Country*
At ho— , Government re s tra in t  oa wages, p ric e s, and imports and 
ths monopoly o f the purchasing and exporting o f N ig e r ia 's  primary pro­
ducts during World War 2 rendered the people more receptive to national­
i s t  id s— * The Control o f wag* ra te s  h it  the u)ar-expanded wage earning 
force p a rtic u la rly  in  view o f the war-induced in fla tio n * Import Controls 
led  to shortages and inevitable p rice  in crea ses. Since foreign-owned
monopolies or o lig o p o lies dominated la rg e  secto rs o f the economy -
66 67banking, shipping, mining, com— roe and importation; they were accused
o f e x p lo ita tive  p rice  increases while the Govern— nt was charged with
connivance* Government monopolisation o f trade in  A g ricu ltu ra l produce
in  the in tereet o f th* war e f f o r t ,  and the designation, perhaps fo r
adm inistrative convenience, o f la rg e  European f i r —  as i t s  sole buying
agents, e ffe c t iv e ly  exeluded and angered asp irin g indigenous e sterp re-
6 6 . P .T . Bauer -  West A frican  Trade (Cambridge 195*0 ty>* 180-191
67* In 19^9 s ix  f i r —  t The United A fr ic a  Company; John Holt and Co; 
Patterson, Zothsnis & Co* (A ll  B r it is h ) ; Compagnie Franoai—  ds 
L 'A friq u * O ccidental* and the Soolete Commercial* de L'Ouest 
A frle a in  (Trench); and the Union Trading Company (Sw iss) which 
comprised the Association o f West A frican merchants handled 
70$ o f N ig e r ia 's  exports and 66^ o f her inporta*
P.T* Bauer Cit £»£>. 66-7*
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nears who saw this as evidence of Government collusion with foreign
business interests- Control producer prices alienated farmers
who felt they were being exploited by the Colonial Government and
its buying agents. Besides, the Government had to raise taxes* This
was troublescae enough by itself* Sons of the revenue had however to
be expended on the construction of facilities froa which Nigerians were
largely excluded* Here was an aspect of the racial discrimination and
segregation designed to infuse the idea of wJhite superiority - one of
the main pillars of Colonialism which was more common In Southern
Nigeria and which progressively caused more resentment*
The disaffection with the Government heigh tended anti-Colonialiet
and pro-nationalist activities* There wore strikes like ths 19**5 57
day paralysing general strike by $ublle Service employees for higher
68wages and against alleged racial discrimination in pay matters,
9 Go Slows9 like that at tho Lnugu Colliery in November 19^9 demanding
payment of largo wage arrears* The demonstrators were fired upon by
69tho police killing 21 and injuring 51* There wore also virulent 
public attaoka on the Colonial Administration which for instance, led 
to tho banning in 19^5 of two newspapers owned by Nxtsmdl Asikiwe, one 
of the foremoet Nationalist Isadora, and his subsequent allegation of
_ s ____________________________________________________________________________
68. Sss Inquiry into the Coat of living and Control of the Cost of 
Living in the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria* Colonial
No. 204*
69* See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into ths cfiaorders in 
ths aastsrnFrovinoss of Nigeria* *
November 19^9 (Lagos) 1950
an official plot to assassinate him. Militant anti-Colonialist 
organisationssprang up. The Zikist t Movement for instance, formed 
in 19**6, engaged in sabotage and extremist anti-Government action 
and was banned by the Governor in 1950.
THE BUILD-UP OF GOODWILL FOR BRITAIN
The above served to crystallise Southern enstrangement from the 
British. As Nigeria began the definite march towards Independence in 
the late 19**0's however, the Colonial Administrations largely neutra­
lised many of ths Causes of disaffection. Social contact between 
Europeans and Educated Southerners was actively promoted, racial dis­
crimination was officially banned in 19**8 and multi-racial facilities 
were established. An Education Ordinance in 19**8 appropriated twice 
as much funds to education as in 19**5» A Nigerianisation Commission 
(whose members included Nationalist leaders) in 19**8 recommended inter
alia, thBt qualified Nigerians be given priority in recruitments for
70Government post. It£ Report was accepted by the Government.
In the commercial sphere, opportunities for indigenous business­
men expanded with time. At independence therefore, a reserv£>lr of 
goodwill for the U.K. had been built up in the South. But memories 
of old times die hard and below the Burface, there appeared to lurk a 
layer of latent Suspicion which could easily explode into active re­
sentment if ignited. This was particularly the case since there was
131
70. "The Report of the Commission to make Recommendations about 
the recruitment and training of Nigerians for Senior Posts 
in the Government Service of Nigeria" (Lagos) 19^8
132.
virtually no change in Nigerian leadership between the I9**0's and
_ H*.1960*a. In alaoat complete oontreaty f. orth's acquaintance with
Colonialiam left largely happy memories,
THL NORTHERN KCQION
A majority of Northernera are Muslims* The Britiah were therefore 
off to a sparkling start when after the Capture of Kano in 1903* Lord 
Lugard, High Commissioner of the newi$ proclaimed Protectorate of
Northern Nigeria, promised the Government would in no wmy interfere
71with the Mohammedan religion* This found expression in hie exelussion - 
1st policy towards missionaries snd in his 1909 Education Plan, Of great 
import was ths North's belief that the British were "the instruments of
dsetiny snd were fulfilling the will of God" by imposing Colonial rule
72on Northern Nigeria*
Besides, Lord Lugard'e Indirect Rule entailed governing through 
the traditional ruling clasaea - the Vilanin (Tida and retaining their 
goodwill. Moreover, the Colonial Administration Studied Hausa langu­
age and adopted it as the official language of the North* Their respect 
for the traditions and ths leaders of ths North contrasted sharply with 
the attitude of many southern politicians and press who frequently 
rediculed the "feudalistlc” North*
71* K.D. Lugard - Reports from Northern Nigeria 1902. ^*1°^
72* Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello **My Life . The Autobiography of
Sir Ahaadu Bello, the Sardaunq of Sokotpy (Cambridge;19^ 2) K 19
Thor© were also dissimilarities in the experiences of Northern 
and Southern educated elements* Relatively few numerically and mostly 
offsprings of members of the ruling aristocracy, educated Northerners 
were easily absorbed into the Native Administration Systems and were 
therefore spared the contemptuous attitudes of Europeans which their 
Southern Counterparts encountered in public and commercial employments* 
Besides, the educational curricula had sought to reinforce Northern 
traditional Culture*Uiucated Northerners were therefore relatively free 
from the desire to immitate Western Culture which had exposed the edu­
cated Southerners to so much pillory*
The above considerations endeared the British to the Northerners - 
a state of affairs enhanced by the chain of ^victories' scored by the North 
over the South during the Constitutional progress towards independence*
NORTHERN SUCCESSES PRIOR TO INDKPatDB<CE
The North remained largely quiescent during most of the struggle 
to oust the Colonial Administration* ItSj leaders did however partici­
pate fully in all Constitutional discussions with the U*K* Government 
which finally culminated in Federal Kiparia's independence* At these 
talks the North successfully pressed a number of olaimst
(1) That the boundary between the North and the South which gave the 
former more than 501 of the Country's landmass and population and which 
on the Western side split the Yorubd tribe, remain intaot*
(2) That Parliamentary Constituencies and revenue allocation among the 
Regions be on a populations basis* It was thus assured not only of a
majority of seats in tho Federal Legislator© but also, irrespective of
its contributions to the Federation*s income, the lions share of alio-
73cated revenue*
(3) After the 1933 accrinonious "Self-Government in 1936** Legislative
74Council debate, that each Region be autonomous within the Federation
75 'and have its own Civil Service Comnissioa*
(4) That eaoh Region should attain Internal Self government at a time
of its own choice rather than the whole Federation becoming Self-(governing
76simultaneously* The Lantern and Western Regions became Self-Gover­
ning in 1936| the North in 1939*
(3) That the municipality of Lagos with its Apapa docks which are vital
to the North's exports be declared neutral Federal Territory rather than
remain a part of the Western Region as it was at the time of the 1933
77Constitutional Conference*
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73* Actually, it was not until 1963*64 with the introduction of the 
'distributable pool"to be shared in proportion to population 
regional responsibilities and the need for balanced development, 
that payments to the North for the first time, outstripped pay­
ments from the Federal Government to the other Regions - See 
A*T* 14* and especially 0* Teriba '’Nigerian Revenue Allocation 
Lxperience 1952-65” IN The Nigerian Journal of economic and 
Social Studies1 November 1966.
74* The debate in March/April 1933 uas on a motion that "this House 
accepts as a primary political objective ther attainment of Helf 
government for Nigeria in 1936 " tabled by Chief ^nahoro* While 
ths Southerners were in favour. Northerners opposed it* Conse­
quently, Northern leaders were vilified within and outside the 
Council Chamber* They were accused of being 'Imperialist Stooges' 
used by the Colonial power to delay independence for Nigeria* So 
incensed were the Northerners that they came within an ace of 
Secession* See "My Life" cf> Cit |b^>* 114-148* •
75* This was one of the eight points dem anded by the North after the 
•Self Govt* Debate Ibid ^ *144*
76. Ibid
77. Ibid
These were issues of great moment over which the view point of 
the North and the South rarely coincided* That the North got its way 
waa due in part to its powerful bargaining position deriving from its 
numerical Superiority* However* many Northerns could not help but per­
ceive in these 'victories' unmistakable imprints of the U.K^® good 
intentions towards them* Moreover, to cap it all, while a few results 
of the 1959 Federal Parliamentary elections were still due and while 
theorectically, it was still possible for the NCNC with 89 Seats and 
the A.G. with 72 bo form a Coalition Government leaving the NPC with 
142 Seats as 'the Opposition, ths Governor General Sir James Robertson 
called on Sir Abubakar of the NPC, as incumbent Prime Minister and leader 
of the ^arty with the highest number of Seats, to form a Government?^
The North's appreciation of the British waa symbolically expressed/
when NalamKb rahim Jalo Wasiri, a prominent N*P*C* M*P* told parliament 
in i960 For Sixty Tears, Nigeria has been fortunate under British 
rule —  The British have fully demonstrated sincerity and honesty in 
pursuance of their Colonial o^licy*1?^
A solid foundation of goodwill towards the U*K* was thus laid in 
the North during the Colonial era* This was underlined by the firm 
assertion in the N*P*C* 1959 election manifesto that "— over and above 
her membership of the Commonwealth (independent Nigeria) must maintain
78. Two Crucial points helped^ _ _ , A .ths Governor General to make up M 1  mind*
(a) hy this tins it was obvious that no party would emerge with an 
absolute majority* Xh the absence of say positive indications 
that ths BOO and ths AG who had always been bitter opponents 
meant to join forces* hs fait compelled to taka the advice ha had 
sought (and received) from the incumbent Prime Minister end 
invited Balewa to form a Cobaiaanent*
(b) Perhaps more important was the Governor General's concern that
if the NPC were excluded from the federal Government, the Berth would 
Immediately secede and the Federation would then break up*
(Both points wore made by Sir James RebertaoffSn personal interview 
with the writer)
79* H.R.D. 14.1.60. Col. 4?
V S
the closest relationships with tha U.K." Gdven tha N.P.C.'a dominant 
position in tha Federal Coalition Government and its attainment of an 
absolute majority in tha House of Representatives by 1962, there was 
every reason, prisa facie, to expect that the relations between Lagos 
and London would be warm and amicable. But as has been indicated, even 
the South was generally well disposed towards the British at indepen­
dence. ■\
Britain* relative readiness to concede independence without being
farced into it by intense Nationalist pressures on the Indian Scale
and her methodical handover of power was generally well received. Dr
Asikiwa, while Premier of the Eastern Region and leader of the NCNC said
in 1955 "— we deeply appreciate the gesture of enlightened Statesmanship
whereby Britain not only respected our aspirations but also recognised
our inalienable right to Self-determination and has encouraged our growth
81towards an independent national existence" In 1957* Chief Akintola, 
then Deputy leader of the A.O., was convinced Britain had with respect 
to Nigeria, ‘'— succeeded in a large measure to humanise imperialism and 
even if there was anything known as benevolent imperialism, Britain was 
the author of it". 82 
Of high significance was the high degree of Cultural affinity between
Nigeria's ruling hierarchy and the U.K. Nigeria's educational, judicial,
and
parliamentary economic/administrative eyetome were modelled an much aa 
possible on the British systems. Many a Nigerian leader had been to the
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80. N.P.C. election Manifesto in 'Daily Times (Lagoa>£-9.59•
81. Mmaadi Asikiwe -  Z ik . A Selectio n  o f Speeches o f  
(Cambridge University Press 1961) p«l62
82. H.R.D. 26 March 1937
U.K. for Studies etc., while there, they have often consciously or 
oub-consclously inbibed British traditions and behaviour patterns.
Balewa, for instance, returned hone after a spell at ths London Uni­
versity Institute of Education "with new eyes because I have seen
people who lived without fear, who obeyed the lav as pert of their
"83nature, who know individual liberty.
Sir Ahnadu Bello's favourite gene was FIVES and he even invited
aka Fives tean from Eton to play in the North in 1961.
Ths attachment to the British way of lifs was so widespread and 
dsep that as Mr* Oloba of ths Nigerian Morning Post said "we even quota 
British practioe in oondsanmtion of tho excesses of sons of our own
people. Many of us oven believe that anything is wrong which is not
85dons the way ths British would"*
Consequently, Balewa'a dais in that "ws cannot hdp being pro British
u 86was a truisa which explained why*we shall never forget our old friends" 
There were however other factors in the Anglo-Nigerian relationship 
equation.
* T«E PSYCHOLOGY OF IMDKPaiDlWCE.
At independence, a State attains the age of majority and beoooee 
the theoretical equal of all other adult States, including ths old
Colonial progenitor. Ths psychological adjustment to the new situ-
can
ation/fee difficult particularly within ths Immediate 'family'. Parents 
have a knack for paternalism towards even their own grown up offsprings. 
Ths new adult frequently expects it, resents it and often feels obliged
83* /The Prime Minister" West Africa (London) 24 3ept.l96o Re­
produced in Daily Tines (Lagoa) 1.10.60•
84. "My Life" Op dit 29-30
83* A. Oloba " A New Commonwealth*?* IN West Africa (London) 26 June 
1965. >>.701
86. Sir James Robertson confirmed ths impression that ths warmth of 
the Lagos - London relations at between 1960-66 owed much to the
Cultural ties between the two Countries (Personal Interview)
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to tqke demonstrative action to undorlino its adulthood* It however 
tends to remain affectionate towards a well meaning 'parent'*
Nigeria's relationship with the U.K. is explainable, in part, 
within this framework* Lagos believed that the U.K. tended to be 
paternalistic towards her- the KnaVuro affair affording a good example*
Ths genorous/an3r8£ip concern displayed at Westminster ahd Fleet 
Street in ths Enahoro issue may have resulted from Britain's long tra­
ditions of g r a n t i n g t o  "foreign rebels against tyrannical rule"
and the question whether this should be refused to a citisen of the
87Commonweal th" as Nr* Macmillan put it. In Lagos this explanation for 
all the palaver did not cut much ice.
The 1881 Fugitive Offenders Act under whieh Lnahoro's extra<ft<L<bDn 
was sought was according to Sir John Hobson, U.K. Attorney General,
"a multilateral System for the exchange of fugitives from justice through-
88out the whole of what was the Empire and is now the Commonwealth"
Unlike India, Ghana and Cyprus, Nigeria had not unilaterally repealed 
the Act* She and the U*K* therefore had reciprocal rights and obli­
gations under it* So did the U*K* and U*S*A* under various «xtredicti©n 
Treaties but the relative lndifferencd of Westminster and Fleet Street 
to the Soblen Case contrasted strongly to their emotional involvement 
in the Knahoro proceedings*
13B
87. Kanaard bfr Cit 10.*».63. I5.1290
88 .  Ibid 2 1 . 3 . 63 .  {>.666
Dr* Soblen, a U .S. citizen convicted on sp y charges in America, 
jumped bail and fled to Israel. He was immediately apprehended and 
put on an El A1 Airliner bound for New Toxic* En route, he cut his 
wrist and had to be taken to a hospital in London. He was then trans­
ferred to a prison from where he applied for a writ of Habeas Corpus 
pleading to be ftreed either to stay in England or to leave for a Country 
of his choice* The Courts held he was technically still in transit and 
rejected his plea*®^
Thereupon the Hose Offioe served an order on El A1 to fly him to 
New York. El Al, on instructions from the Tel Aviv which had, for dome­
stic political reasons, become unwilling to take responsibility for 
returning Soblen to the U.S., was reluctant to co-operate. Under the 
1870 Extradiction Act, Spying was not an extraditable offence* To get 
around this, the Home Secretary aade an order deporting Soblen
to the U.S* under Article 20 of the Alien’s Order 1953* Hitherto 
deportation orders did not specify the destination of the deportee*
Dr* Soblen therefore -challenged the new order in Court, and lost again*
He was finally removed to New York although C z e c h o s l o v a k i a * * ® ^  offered 
him a visa*
anIn the Soblen Case the refugee had been convicted for/offence 
against a foreign state and under a legal system and laws different 
to those of the U*K* In the Enahoro Case, the alleged offence was 
against the Queen of England, Nigeria’s head of State at the time* The 
treasonable felony laws alleged to have been Contravened were those the 
British Administrators had left in Nigerian Statute books* Trial was
13 9
89* The Economist (London) 11 Aug. 19^2* £*514
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to bo under a  Logoi System bequeathed by the B ritish * Besides, tho 
fu g itiv e  had o rig h t o f qppeal from N igeria to the Ju d ic ia l  Committee 
o f tho P rivy Council in  London* There was indeed a b asic differen ce  
in  la v  between both Cases* Soblen was deported while Snahoro was 
extradited* But the p ra c tic a l consequences were id e n tical -  namely, 
the removal o f the refugee to h is  home Country to answer fo r  h is proven 
or alleged crime*
Dr* Soblen was a  dying man su ffe rin g  from leukemia and had very 
l i t t l e  time to l iv e *  The fa irn e ss o f the t r i a l  he had received in  the
U*S* and the value o f the evidence against him had been challenged*
90The American C iv il  L ib e rtie s  Union had been campaigning fo r a new t r i a l *  
Tet Parliamentary and Press In terest in  the matter was r e la t iv e ly  muted* 
The fa c t  th a t, Soblen had been Convicted o f sp yin g against the U*S« and
had thus apparently endangered the Secu rity o f the Western A llian ce may
have disposed Westminster end F le e t Stre e t to be r e la t iv e ly  le s s  sympa­
th e tic  towards him* Chief Enahero waa in  a t o t a lly  d iffe re n t Category*
But i f  the B ritish  Parliament end Press had, fo r  p o lit ic a l  reasons, payed 
scant attention  to Soblen*a p lig h t, i t  woe proof par excellence that in  
such m atters, p o lit ie s  take precedence over humanitarian considerations*
I t  therefore followed, os fo r  os Logos was concerned, that the demands 
fo r assurances from the Nigerian Government  about Lnmhoro*s fa te  i f  he 
woe sent home, the remarks inside end outside Westminster about N ig e r ia 's  
standards o f J u s t ic e ,  in fa c t the bountiful attention accorded the Lnfchero
90. The Koonaalgt* Ibid*
affair waa motivated not so much by humandarianiam as by political consid­
erations* Lagos was convinced here was a clear attempt by the Colonial 
’Parent* to pass judgement on and to dictate to Nigerie-manifestations of 
paternalism pure and simple. The N*F*C* Chief Whip in the Federal House 
when the Enahoro issue was on the boll angrily reminded Britain that 
»— We are an independent Country—  The days of Colonialism are gone for 
ever"*91
It waa therefore considered necessary to take demonstrative actions 
to underline the Country’s independence and simultaneously bring home to 
London how unwise it would be to take the Federation’s friendship for 
granted* On the other hand, so long as ths Country maintained close formal 
links with the Colonial ’Parent' the psychological feeling that it had 
not really grown up tended to persist* There wes thus an urge to sever 
these formal links to boost genuine consciousness of adulthood*
These, in part, explain the transformation of the Federation into a 
Republic* According to the Federal Finance Minister, Republicanism "more 
than ever puts a finishing touch to our independence* (It) is beyond that
kind of soveriegnty when Nigeria still held the Queen of England as the
* 92Queen of Nigeria* We have advanced from .ioveracgnty to nationahood”*^*
The freeing of the Nigerian pound from . Statutory attachment to the
Pound Sterling, the rejection of Association with the E.E.C* in 19&2 and
the 1963 agreement with West Germany in connection with the Nigerian Air
Force were motivated in part, by these considerations.
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91. H.K.D* 28.3*63*
92* H.R.D. 18*3*63* Col. > 2
These .exhibitions , of independence were by no miens expressive
of anti-British sentiments. Republicanism was a ease in point. As
early as 1960, the Nigerians did not think it was very proper ; for
not
their Governor Oeneral/to bo H oad of State in his own right but to bo 
designated a representative of the Queen. Thie meant, for instance, that
whenever he travelled abroad he did not reeeive the honours duo to a
.
Head of State, whereas ths President of any small country would receive 
full honours. To an Independent State ..aspiring to lead Africa, this 
was unwelcome.
Moreover, the Francophone African States, not being familiar with 
the monarch!al System could not understand how Nigeria's independence 
could bo compatible with her retention of the Head of State of her ex­
Colonial Overlord as her Hoad of State. Many were led to think that
. Q-XNigeria's independence wae de jure’J not defacto. * These were impor­
tant factors inducing Nigeria to demonstrate her lndepenee of Britain.
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93. Sir James Robertson mentioned that Balewa often disousssd these 
points with him while he was still Governor General (Personal
Interview ) •
Zt waa no mors coincidence that ths All Party Constitutional 
Conference on the Republican Constitution held in Legos in July 
1963 insisted that the Republican Constitution moat stipulate 
inter alia, that Nigeria's Overseas representatives are appointed 
by the President and not by the Queen} that the President has 
powers to assent to bills in his own right snd no longer oa behalf 
ot Her*aj«®*y. ropoaals for ths Constitution of ths Federal 
Republic of Nigeria adopted by the All Party Constitutional 
Conference held in Lagos on Julj 25 & 26 1963. Sessional Paper 
No. 3. of 1963 (Lagos)
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ,
A major factor In tho domestic political instability derived 
from the faot that although hard core Nationalists and much of tho 
independence struggle was concentrated in tho South, tho post indepen­
dence political centre of gravity was firmly in the North* This was 
reflected in the South's generally militant outlook and its advocacy 
of a more independent foreign policy while the North and consequently 
ths Nigerian Ooverment was relatively conservative and pro - U*K*
As was soon is Chapter 5* Southern frustrations at tho political 
configuration in Nigeria increasingly found expression in and w» 
aggravated by M s  dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of tho Govern­
ment* Neither was progressive opinion in ths NorthAwith Nigeria's for­
eign policy* Radioal opinion in tho Country generally condemned ths 
Governments foreign policy as looking dynamism and being too pro- 
British* In September 1961 for instance Chief Awolowo charged that 
"Nigeria is a submissive British subaltern or Satellite" and that Sir
Abubakar would never take a stand "until after he has had a chance of
94personal contact with Mr* > acirullaxv or one of fela lieutenants" •
Articulate public opinion fr<nc%u*ntly demanded curtailment of 
ties which tended to suggest that Nigerian foreign policy was subser­
vient to ths U.K's*^*
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94 An address delivered to Nigerian Students in London* 1 rinted 
in full in Daily Express (Lagos) 12, 13, 14 Sopt, 1961*
93* Sec Reports on tho All Nigeria People Ad Conference* 
vest Africa (London) 26*8*61*
. . * ' ^
Besides, with the Opposition Party making huge Capital oat of 
ita charges that tha Lagoa Oovernnent waa a British Stooge, it becoaa 
increasingly urgent for the Ooeernaent to tria soae of ita policies and 
render Itself leas susceptible to aueh attacks* RenulAfcaniBa, rejection 
of OBsociatfCft with the E*S*C* in 1962 and disagreement with London orer 
its refusal to intervene militarily in Rhodesia were partly meant to 
silence domestic critics*
Moreover, although the N*P*C* nay have wanted the ^Closest possible 
relationship* between Nigeria and the U*K* it had progressively to soften 
thia line* By 1962, it had an absolute majority in the Rouse of Repre­
sentatives, With its sense of security helghtended, the N.P.C* became
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sore epeenable to persistent public dcnands for demonstrations o f 
independence In the Qoveranentli relations with ths U.K. and thus to 
lessen - Southern dieenohantnent with the N.P.C. led ioveranent la 
particular and the Nigerian political systen in general*
THE ECONOMIC ELEMENT IN THE NIGhRIA - UNITED KINGDOM RSUTIONS
FOREIGN TRADE .
The extent to which Nigeria depended on the U.K. as a Source 
of Imports and as an export market is demonstrated In the following 
two tables and the accompanying graphs*
TABU 10
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C H A P T B B  5
Nigeria! Significance of the U*K* as a Source of Imports
—  “  1,9 ^ , - ..1,966
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria : "Economic and Financial Review"
Vol. 6. No* 1 June 1968
C f t M C E
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NIGERIA I EXTENT OF RELIANCE ON THE P*K* AS AN EXPORT MARKET
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TABLE 11
23&-zJ35*
(£N Millions)
Tsar
(1)
Exports to U*K*
(2)
Aggregate Exports
(3)
Col* 1 as % Col* 2
1956 85 152 64*4
1957 78 124 62*9
1958 75 133 56.4
1959 82 161 50.9
1960 78 161 48.4
1961 76 170 44*1
1962 70 164 42.6
1963 74 185 40*4
1964 81 210 58.5
1965 101 263 J8.»>
1966 105 279 57.6
Sources: Nigeria Federal Offioe of Statistics : "Annual Abstract
of Statistical 1960 and 1968
1WS
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It would appear that Nigeria's overall trade dependence on the 
U.K. although high, declined consistently over the period 1956-66. The 
U.K. accounted for the Mt.4^ of the Federation's Imports in 1936. In 
1966 the proportion had fallen to 29*9&« Similar figures for exports 
were and 37*& respectively.
This steep f a l l  in N ig e r ia 's  trade dependence on the U.K. i s  a t t r i ­
butable to a v a rie ty  o f fa c to r s . With relatio n  to £sportst
(a) The general dismantling o f r e s tric tio n s  on non-Sterling Area 
lsp o rts  has been o f great s ig n ific a n c e . During and insediatai^after the 
Second *o rld  uiar, N ig e r ia 's  d o lla r  lsp o rts , lik e  those o f other S te rlin g  
Area Countries, were re s tric te d  in  a  bid to conserve the Odd and la rd  
Currency reserves o f the S te rlin g  Area as a whole.1 Such r e s tric tio n s  
scant that N igeria had to look to the U.K. fo r the bulk o f her ls p o r ts .
By 1959 aost of the restrictions had been lifted. Consequently Nigeria's 
lsports from the non-sterling Area Countries have increased while lsports 
froa the Sterling Area have relatively dlnlmstwi
(b) The Nigerian Oovemsents p o licy  o f A c c e le r a tin g  the tempo o f  
in d u strial development in  N igeria by every means and os the widest possible  
se a le "2has found expression in  various measures to encourage Isp o rt Sub­
stitu tio n  manufacturing. Many foreign financed firm s previously engaged 
in  -trading have redeployed th e ir  C ap ital and switched over to lo c a l  
manufacturing? Local manufacturing has in e vitab ly  reduced imports o f
1. H.M.A. Onitlri - Nigeria's international economic relatione.
A. Survey IN NJESS, Nov. 1961. P.161 r
2m Federal Minister of Coseeroe end Industry. H.R.D. 21 Aug. 1962. 
Cd. 25*40
3. See A.T. 15 for extent of Capital redeployment by the United 
Africa Company in INi'ge’nia
Consumers ^ oods. This has bean counter balanced to sons extent, by
kiaoressod inports of Capital ^ oodsv and raw Materials; : lnoe British
5investaenta predominate in Nigeria, Inporta from Britain hare been hit. 
(s) There has also been tho noticeable ohange in ths direction of 
British tirade away fron ths Coansnwsalth and towards ths S.B.C. and 
North Aaerlsa.
On ths export aids.
(a) Ths Ooremnsnts desire to "broaden still further tbs geographic 
distribution of our exports and to guard against excess production 
saturating our existing markets'1^  has led to an intensive search for 
now markets.
(b) Britains relatively slkgglah rate of eoonoaie growth oenparod to 
ths £.K*G. and U.3.A. has nsaat that her iaporting capacity has expanded
t ’•
nnore slowly than those of her sain competitors' Consequently , while 
ths proportion of Nigeria* a exports sold to tho U.K. has fallen, that
g
absorbed by the K.E.C. for instance has risen. This;inepite of tho fast 
that "about three quartern of Iaports fron Nigeria entered ths U.K. duty
in 1962)'9*
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k. See Chapter 1.
%  Use below
6. Federal Minister of Fiance. H.R.D. 29.3.63. Col. 523.
7. So# next Chapter.
8. See A.T. 16
9* R.H. Orson • Conaonwealth Preference U.K. Cuatosa duties and
tariff prefsrenoea on Inporta free the Preference Area IK Board 
of Trade Journal (London) 31 Dm. 1963. p .1556 . Soo A.t T17 for 
Nigeria* rbsnoriitlse enjoying Comeonweal th preferential entry 
into th* U.K.
The general picture portrayed In Table 11 above however con­
ceals variations in individual export Comraodity stakes in the U.K. 
market. In 1963# Groundnuta, Groundnut Oil and Cake) Raw Cocoa beans#
natural rubber and Pain products accounted for some 6 %  of Nigeria's
10aggregate export earnings. The significance of the U.K. Market to the 
export of these Commodities was not uniform.
GROUNDNUTS AND GROUNDNUT OIL 
Nigeria is one of the most important world exporters of Groundnuts 
and Groundnut Oil* She accounted for a third of total world exports of 
those produotsIn1963. Although world production and import availabilities 
of Groundnuts and Groundnut oil wiw expanding for most of the decade 
1936-66# the international demand situation was not particularly bright* 
Firstly# all vegetable Oils and Oilseeds faced stiff competition from 
closely substitutable animal oils - tallow# lard and fish oil - which 
were relatively cheaper and whoee production had expanded rapidly. Second­
ly# within ths Vegetable Oil and Oilseeds Group# Groundnuts and Groundnut 
Oil were at a competitive disadvantage compared to Soya beans and Aoya 
bean oil and 3unflower Seed and Sunflower Seed Oil which were relatively 
much cheaper; and whose subsidised production had expanded rapidly in 
industrialised countries* Moreover# the growing switch to compound feeds 
in Western Europe - ths largest market for vegetable oils and oilseeds# 
induced a preference far Soyabeans which have high cake contents - 82 to 
8*&# relative to groundnuts with cake content of 44 to 46# in addition#
1'51
10* See A.T. 18
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aa ladleatad in Chapter S-fc* , exporta of Orouadmta and Groundnut Oil 
into tha BtS«C« amber Stataa from non-Assoc la tad 3 tataa warm subject 
to tariff and non-tariff barrlare.
Nigeria*a Groundnuta and Orounut Oil antarad tha U.K. duty froa 
while aimilar ahlpaanta fronnoa-Comaonwaalth aouroaa vara aubjectad to 
KJN and 159S tariff margina reapeetiraly. Tablaa 12 and 13 and tha 
accompanying Figm 6 and 5 danomatrata tha affaet of thaaa Commwaalth 
prafaranoaa on tha federal Republic^ axporta to tha U.K.
TABLE 12 •
RIGKBIA - U.K. GROUNDNUTS* TSADK 1956-1966
CoXum (1 (2) (3) (6) (5) (6)
Taar OKU Total 
Iiporta
. UK*o Import! 
from tha 
Commonwealtl
UK*a Impodta 
fTcg Nigeria
Nigeria
total
Kxporta
Col.3 aa 
% of Col 
1
Col.3 aa 
% of ColM-
IB* 319 297 272 668 85*2 60.7
1957 228 203 168 302 73.6 55.7
1958 209 196 176 513 86.6 36.3
1959 231 213 190 697 82.2 28.6
1980 127 115 83 332 66.8 25.6
1961 159 163 112 696 70.6 22.6
1962 208 m 166 530 70.1 27.5
1963 191 172 161 616 73.8 22.9
1966 163 122 90 566 62«0 16.*
1963 88 67 66 512 52.2 8.9
1966 75 56 36 573 68.0 6.2
Notet (a) Shall ad nuta equivalent weight derived from tinahallad nuta 
weights on tha baala that tha fomer aquale 7 of tha latter. 
Samroamt Columna 1 . 4  from Commonwealth Eaoaomlo Committee;»Vegetable 
oOs and Oil Saedm" 196% and 1968.

Column 5 ia the above table and comparisons of the "total U.K. imports" 
and "U.K. iaporta froa Nigeria" Loci in Fig* shows that the trend of 
Nigeria* a share of the U.K. Market waa downward* Froa a very high 
85*3 in 1956* it had fallen to kBtf by 1966* This was due in part to 
increased diversification of Nigeria*a export markets, and to increased 
doaeatio gaoundnuta crashing which Halted Qroundnuta export availabilities 
while slmutaneoualy enhancing the volume of Groundnut Oil ahipaenta*
More iaportant as an index of the significance of ths UK to Nigeria's 
international Qroundnuta trade is Coluan 6 and a comparison of the 
'Total Nigerian Exports" locus and the "Nigerian Exports to U.K." loo us 
in Fig* k9 It is immediately apparent that Nigeria's Groundnftts exports 
to the U*K* as a proportion of the total overseas sales diminished 
steeply from 6o.^t in 1956 to 6*2£ ten years lateri By 1966 the U*K* 
had ceased to be the most important Rational market for Nigeria's Ground­
nuts* In that year, Nigeria sold 7 million worth of Groundnuts to 
the U*K, £N11 million to France and £N6*9 million to West Germany 
While relatively successful market diversification by Nigeria was partly 
responsible, perhaps more iaportant was the fact that ths U.K's demand 
M r  Groundnuts had fallen from 319,000 shelled tons equivalent in 1956 
to only 75,000 tons ia 1966, as Soya beans. Soya bean oil and Groundnut 
Oil were In creasin gly substituted fo r imports o f Groundnuts.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth preferen tial Margin on Ground­
nut imports into the U.K. was a boon to Commonwealth Groundnut exporters 
o f whom N igeria was the most important. This i s  borne, out by the fa c t
1^4
11* N igeria Federal O ffice  of S t a t i s t ic s  "Annual Abstract of 
S t a t i s t ic s  1968" *>.79
that the U.K. consistently drew over 80P of its total iaports (except in 
1965 and 1966 when the proper tionsvacs, ?2£ and 76? respectively) froa 
Commonwealth sources.
Thus the U.K. Groundnuts Maziest retained some importance as Nigeria's 
only preference market although its significance to the Federation dimin­
ished relatively and absolutely in 1956-66 as Nigeria's trade particularly 
with the E.S.C. Countries (whose Common External Tariff on Groundnuts 
adopted in 1968 was sero) rose.
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TABLE 15
NIGERIA - U.K. TRADE IN GROUNDNUT OIL 1956-66 
  (Thousand Tons)
coi(i) I (2) .. (3) (4) I (5) (6)
Tear UK's total 
Imports
T
UK's Total 
Imports 
the Common* 
wealth
UK's Im­
ports 
from 
Nigeria
Nigeria's
Grand
Total
Exports
Col. 3 
as % of 
Col. 1
Col. 3 
as % of 
Col. 4
1956 19.1 10.6 10.4 35.1 54.4 29.6
1957 23.7 21.1 21.0 38.6 88.6 54.4
1958 27.7 25.9 25.7 39.6 92.7 64.8
1959 47.9 45.2 42.8 47.8 89.3 89.5
1960 45.0 43.0 40.5 46.6 90.0 86.9
1961 35.6 3 1 .2 31.2 43.2 87.6 69.0
1962 39.0 38.6 36.1 62.9 92.6 57.3
1963 42.9 41.9 39.1 69.4 91.1 56.3
1964 52.9 52.0 43.3 79.7 91.3 54.3
1965 68.4 60.2 60.8 90.8 88.8 66.9
1966 101.6 101.2 82.6 103.8 81.2 79.5
Sources t Cols. 1 - 4  from Commonwealth Economic Committee
"Vegetable Oil and Oilseeds" 1964 and 1968
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It appears from Column 5 of the above table and a comparison of 
the "Total U.K. Imports" and the "U.K. Imports from Nigeria" Loci in 
Fig. 5 that Nigeria's share of the U.K. market in Groundnut Oil was 
very high. Apart from 1956, it ranged consistently between 8l£and 92* • 
Exports to the U.K. as a proportion of total Nigerian exports of Ground­
nut Oil mss also appreciably high. It rose from 29*& in 195bio a 
peak of 89.91 in 1959* urns down to 54.3? in 1964 • . before climbing 
to 79.3* in 1966.
Unlike the case of Groundnuts, the U.K. market for Groundnut Oil, 
had an upward trend. U.K. imports rose from 19,100 tons in 1956 to 
101,600 tons in 1966. While some market diversification had taken place, 
Nigeria relied appreciably on the U.K. Groundnut Oil market where her 
shipments enjoyed a Commonwealth tariff preference of 19£ while in the 
E.E.C. Rational markets they encountered tariff banders ranging from 
%  to 20£. The E.E.C.'a Common External Tariff rate on Groundnut Oil 
fully adopted in 1968 ranged from 10^  to 20^ , staggered according to
quality and degree of processing. As Column 6 and the "Nigeria's .w
Loci o f F ig  5
Total Exports" and U.K.* imports from NigeriaVclearly demonstrates, ths 
U.K. remained .the most important single market for Nigeria's Groundnut
oil.
PALM KERNELS AND PALM OIL
Nigeria was ths world's largest producer and exporter of Palm 
Kernels and Second only to the Congo (Kinsasha) in Palm Oil. Exports of both 
products from Nigeria amounted to £50.1 million or 16.5* of the Country's 
aggregate export Income in 1963* They ranked third in the Country's 
agricultural exports' League. The Federation's good production potential 
for either products has been enhanced by the adoption of high yielding,
1#
dwarfed end eaey-to-harvest Tenera Palm and better harvestlag and nut- 
cranking techniques* Unfortunately, the low producer prices paid to 
farmers by the Palm Produce Marking Boards have been a serious disin­
centive to greater production while rapidly increasing domestic con­
sumption of Palm Oil has further reddced export availabilities in Nigeria* 
Political troubles in the Congo (Klnaaaha) have also adversely affected 
World supply*
World demand on the other hand, has been on the slide since the late 
fifties* Palm Oil and Kernels are used in the manufacture of Soap* The 
widespread substitution of Synthetic detergents for Soap has therefore 
undermined derived denard for Palm produce* Besides, Palm Oils and Ker- 
nsla have not been able to compete with relatively cheaper substitutes 
like Soya beans and ths Marins Oils in Soap and cooking fats production • 
Nigeria's trade with the U*K* in these items is portrayed in Tables 14 
and 15 and ths accompanying Figs 6 and 7*
1^8
15?
Niq^XA - U.K. r-ALM kehnsls* t r a d e  1956 - 1966
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TABLE 14
Col (1) W (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tsar OK's Total 
Inports
UK’s Is- 
ports 
fros ths 
re— es wealth
UK* a Is- 
ports (a) 
fros 
Higeria
Nigeria's 
Total Ex- 
ports(a)
Col 3 as 
% of Col 
1
Col 3 as 
% of Col 
4
1956 502 302 254 451 84.1 56.0
1957 328 328 279 406 90.5 68.7
1958 273 273 223 441 81.6 30.5
1999 234 234 193 430 82,4 44.8
i960 238 237 191 418 80.5 45.6
1961 228 225 173 411 76.8 42.0
1962 210 209 154 36? 73.7 41.9
1963 207 20? 169 398 81.6 42.4
1966 191 191 162 394 84.8 41.1
1965 204 204 176 416 86.2 42.3
196# 166 166 140 394 84.3 35.5
Hotel (a) Until Septesber 1960, figures Include Bhipsents tram 
Wsst Caneroons (ex British Southern Caneroons)
So— s Colusns 1 - 4 tram Cos— alth Ucononic Cossittee
"Vegetable Oils and Oilseeds"
1962, and 1964, and 1968
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It appears frost Column 5 and froa tha •Total U.K. Imports9 and 
•U.K. Imports front Nigeria9 Loci that Nigeria9a share of the U.K.
Market waa very high* It waa constantly above 80^ accept for two 
years 1961 and 1962 when the respective figures were 76.8^ and 73*^ • 
The importance of the U.K. Market to Nigeria as seen la Column 6 how­
ever was persistently diminishing. Exports to the U.K. as a percentage 
of total Nigerian exports fell from a peak of 68.^in 1957 to 35«5>[in 
1966. The Chief explanation for this downward trend was the Increasing 
contraction of the U.K9a demand for Palm Kernels. Total imports into 
the U.K. fell from a peak of 328,000 tons in 1938 to 166,000 -fcona in 
1966. Although Nigeria9 s export volume waa lower in 1966 than in 1957, 
she had been compelled to eeek new export market in view of the diminu­
tion of the U.K. one. The U.K. however remained the most important 
national Market for Nigeria9s Palm Kernels which enjoyed a 10, Common­
wealth preference margin there. The significance of this preference 
warn underlined by the fact that the U.K9a Palm Kernel Imports were ex- 
olusftvely from Ceemonweelth Sources. Apart from Finland with s W  
tariff virtually all other Industrialised Countries admitted, hmi Palm 
Kernels duty free.
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TABLE 15
NXOiSRXA . U.K. TRAPS IN PALM OIL 1956-1964
1*62
( 000 * m )
Col (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yaaur Total UK OK'a Ib- OK'a to- Nigeria's Col 3 ss Col 3 so
Xaports porta 
froa tha 
COSMA— 
wwlth .
ports 
fros (s) 
Nigeria
Total Ex­
ports (a)
% of Cel 
1
% of Col 
4
1956 202,6 202.6 17 1 ,8 185.2 84.9 92.7
1957 190.2 190.2 161.5 166.5 84.8 96.9
1958 182.3 182.2 162.7 170.5 78.2 83.6
1959 195.6 193.6 161.5 183.5 83.4 87.9
1960 176 .1 176.1 136.3 183.4 78.2 74.3
1961 160.9 158.6 123.6 164.6 76.7 74.4
1962 1 1 1 . 1 108.8 76.8 118.7 69.2 64.6
1965 1 1 1 .9 111.3 69.1 125.7 61.7 54.9
1966 116 .0 116.0 64.9 134.2 56.8 48.3
1965 1 1 5 .5 1 1 5 .2 63.1 150.0 54.7 42.0
1966 167.9 167.7 87.2 143.2 58.9 60.8
Notti (a) Includes figures for w#*torn Caneroons (foroerly British 
South Caaeroeno) until Septf60.
Sources* "Vegetable Oils snd Oil Seeds" ©p ©it 
1962, 1964 and 1968.

Column 5 of th* Table and th* "Total U.K. Iaporta** and **U.K.
Iaporta Area Nigeria'* Loci ia Fig 7 ahow that Nigeria9* ahar* of th*
U.K. Fain Oil oaxkat waa high bat had a downward trend in 1956-1966.
Nigeria9* export* to th* U.K. aa a percentage of total export* ana aa
high aa 96.9K ia 1958 but declined to 6 #  ia 1965* Too factor* were
chiefly responsible. Th* U.K. market contracted continuously all
through th* period.
Secondly, Nigeria1 a export* to Europe • particularly the
Netherlaada expanded at about thla tin* thue reducing her reliane* oa
the U.K. However. while Nigeria9* Palm Oil export* ware aubjeet to trad*
12barrier* ia other iatematloaal market*, they enjoyed a valuable W  
Commonwealth preferenee ia the U.K. which by 1966 retained it* poeitloss 
aa the foremost rtational Market for Nigeria9* Pain Oil.
saBBj-J w a
Nigeria was second only to Ghana la world production and export 
of raw Cocoa baane ~ . . _ - - the Federal Kepublic*a second meat
iaportant export commodity in 1963. Increasing utilisation of peetioidee
in African Producing 
particularly/Countries since the 19509*. had brought the black pod dia~
eaae and Capaida under control a»d unlaaahad a production cxploaion which
the relatively lea* spectacular riae ia world daaend ha* bcea unable to
■ • .
absorb. Consequently, Cocoa prioee have been lew especially in the 1960** . 
In March 1965, tha London paries of raw Coooa fall balow £120 par ton ~
% k
12. £.0. The K.S.O.9* Con*on Internal Tariff wee $* for edible
Pain Oil and %  on Industrial Pain Oil.
the lowest for about twenty years after an abortive attempt by the 
Coooa Producers* Alliance1*5 to raise prices through an organised em­
bargo on supplies. In the circumstances Markets have not been parti­
cularly easy to come by. The following Table indicates Nigeria's 
reliance on the U.K. Cocoa Market.
TABLE 16
HIOi.HU - P^K. TRAPS P. HAW COCOA 1956-1966
Col (1) i (2) (5) (4) (5) (6)
Y.ar Total UK- 
Iaporta
OK Im­
ports 
ths
Common
Ywealth
UK &  
ports 
from 
Nigeria
Nigerii^i 
Total Ex­
ports
Col 3 as 
% of Col 
1
Col 3 *C
% of Col 
4
1956 78 75 >8 117 48.4 32.4
1957 101 99 51 135 50.4 37.7
1958 91 86 43 88 47.2 47.5
1959 86 94 44 143 51*1 30.7
1960 97 94 42 154 43.3 27.3
1961 92 86 42 184 45.6 22.8
1962 113 K)7 49 195 43.3 25.6
1963 114 1 1 1 1 52 175 45.6 29.7
1964 77 76 *♦7 197 6 1 .1 23.8
1965 81 79 44 330 54.3 14.5
1966 106 100 59 190 55.6 37.0
Motet (a) Shipments of raw Cocoa beans from Waatern Cameroon*
(formerly British Couth Cameroon*) were included in the Nigerian 
Figures until September 1960 
Sourcet Cols. 1-4 from Commonwealth Economic Committee"Plantation Crops" 
1962, 1*64 and 1968
13. For Membership of the Alliance See Footnote 10? Chapter 3
MlC.tt.Afi
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The proportion of U.K's total import# of Cocoa beano coming from 
Nigeria displayed a stagnating trend as revealed by Column 3 of Table
16. In terms of volume however . j  Nigeria's sxports to the U.K. as 
a percentage of her total Cocoa beans exports had a downward trend. This 
was mainly dua to tha stagnating nature of the U.K. market for raw Cocoa 
as seen in Column 1. On the other hand, Nigeria's total Cocoa exports 
displayed an upward trend during the decade 1956-1966 as increasing 
market divers!floatifto was resorted to. By 1964, Nigeria's Cocoa Ship­
ments to "the Netherlands had in value terms exceeded those to the U.K.
The U.K. thus lost its position as Nigeria's most important Cocoa cust­
omer. The 3% Commonwealth preference margin on Nigerian exports to the 
U.K. was however of significance. This is svidenosd by the fact that the 
U.K. drew an overwhelming proportion of its raw Cocoa imports from 
♦ Commonwealth Aouross (Col. 2, Table 16).
NATURAL RUBBER 
Nigeria is Africa's largest producer of and the sixth world 
biggest exporters of Natural Rubber vhieh in 1963 yielded 6.3^ of the 
Federation's total export earnings* Between 1956 and 1965 NigerieA 
Rubber exports rose by 107.4% while global exports increased only 26.2?. 
The following Table gives details of Nigeria's dependence on the U.K. 
Natural Rubber Market.
1*7
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TABLE 17
(0 ... flu. .- - (to te)
Tear Total BK 
Inports
to)
BK Im­
ports 
froa 
Nigeria
Nigeria*a 
Total ex­
ports
(2) -is % of
(!)
(2) aa % of (3)
1956 287 9 38 3*1 23.6
1957 286 23 " 40 8*0 57.5
1958 295 20 41 6.8 48.7
1959 208 21 53 10.0 39.6
1960 210 22 57 10.4 38.5
1961 272 21 55 7.7 38.1
1962 251 22 60 9.5 36.6
1963 199 19 63 9.5 30.1
1964 198 25 72 12.6 34.7
1965 196 24 67 12.2 35.8
1966 184 25 70 13.5 35.7
Not*t (a) Includes 4hlp— nts from West Ceeeroons (ex-British South 
Ceueroons) until September 1960* .
Sources! Cols 1-3 from Co— onesslth Keanonio C— It tee 
"Plantation Crops” 1962, 1964 and 1968.
U / & L  g j U £ & £ A
s m m
ToTftL
\rnfXJT&
fWX&frTt
XXfogTS
Ukknfioers 
f^O/n/U/ftuk
Nigeria* a chare of the U.K. Market appears to hare A slightly 
rising trend from 51% in 1956 to 13*9% in 1966* Exports to the U.K. 
as a percentage of total exports however declined from the peak of 
57.5% in 1957 to 35«<^ in 1966. The decline was due mainly to contrac­
tion of the U.K. Market associated with an increased consumption of 
synthetic rubber. With average imports in 1955-1959 * 100, U.K. Import 
of Natural rubber in 1966 was 66. West Germany 115; Italy 1**9» Nether­
lands 121. On the other hand, with 1958-59 * 100, U.K. consumption of 
synthetic Rubber in 1#66 was 358*
Nigeria*9 dependence on the U.K. for about a third of her Natural
Rubber exports was moderate. The degree of reliance was nevertheless
likely to diminish with time. Nigerian exports enjoyed no Commonwealth
preferential treatment in the U.K. market which was gradually falling off.
They did however have duty free aooesa to other important West European
Markets where they also had transport cost advantages over shipments from *
South East Asia. Moreover, since 1953 inspite of overwhelming competition
from Synthetic Rubber and occasional releases from strategic stockpiles of
Natural Rubber by the Governments of the U.K. and the United States,
World demand for natural Rubber has outstripped supply. Given Nigeria*s
small share of global exports (about %) therefore, the view of G.A.T.T.
that "--any feasible increase in Nigerian production (of Natural Rubber)
1*tcam be absorbed by the World Market at the going price— " appears to be 
reasonable. This underlines the diminishing importance of the U.K. to 
Nigeria's Rubber exports.
With Nigeria's general dependence on the U.K. Market falling all 
the time, the importance of Anglo-Nigerian trade relationship as a factor 
in Nigeria's foreign policy determination correspondingly receded.
1*f. G.A.T.T. "The First Six Year Plan of Nigeria" (Geneva 1966) 1^ .156
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FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENTS 
As with trade, the Colonial relationship between Nigeria and the 
U.K. was reflected in the faet that a large proportion of private foreign 
Capital inflow into the former at independence originated in the latter. 
The position la mirrored in the following Table and Graph.
TABLE 18
NIGERIA* CUMULATIVE FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENTS OF U.K. ORIGIN 
 --------------------------
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(£N M illion)
Tsar
(D
Total UK Owned Foreign  
P rivate  Investnsnts
(2)
Aggregate Foreign  
P rivate  Investments 
in  N igeria
(3)
C o l. I as %
OfCol-2
1960 1 1 8 .9 1 7 5 .9 67.5
1961 1 3 2 .7 20 3.9 65.3
1962 1 3 5 .6 220.9 61J*
1963 15 2 .6 258.8 59 .0
1964 180.6 321.8 5 6 .1
1965 201.6 37 7 .0 5 3 .5
1966 2 2 7 .2 *♦26. * 5 3 .3
Sourcet Central Bank of Nigeria "Economic and Financial Review" 
Deo. 1968
Notet Figures relate to Companies wholly or largely owned by foreign 
Companies or non-residents but without distribution between 
residents and non-residents. In view of the prevalence of 
enterprises jointly financed by indigenous and foreign Capital 
with the latter being dominant, the figures overstate the 
volume of foreign private Investments in Nigeria.
m s i s n
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The proportion of total foreign private investments in Nigeria
which was of U.K. origin thus dwindled steadily from 67-5 in 1960 to
53*3^ in 1966. This could not be attributed to any Shortfall in net
inflow of private investments from the U.K. Between i960 and 1966, I *K«-
owned private Cnvestnents in Nigeria rose by 92%* It was rather the
case that a ft e r  independence, private investment inflow s from non-U.K.
sources increased much faster* Between i960 and 1966, total foreign
private investments in Nigeria increased by This was due partly
to response to efforts by the Balewa Government to publicise Nigeria's
Commercial potentialities to the Outside World in general with a view
inter alia to attracting foreign private investments, ^5nd Government in­to foreign Investors
centives. / It was also due to the boon in the Sixties of crude petroleum 
exploration, production and export which was overwhelmingly foreign 
financed*
It ia noteworthy however that in 1966, the U*K* was still by
*far the most important single source of foreign private Investments in 
Nigeria, accounting for more than half the total*
THE QUEST FOB FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AS A FACTOR IN 
NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
Ronald S* Kay, in a survey covering 80/ of British Investments 
or about 60£ of total foreign investments in Nigeria fougdsome inter­
eating reasons why foreign firms particularly British owned, Invest
15* Tor exampls, in 1961 the Federal Minister of Finance headed
economic missions to twenty-three Countries in Asia, tha Far 
East, Europe and North America inter alia to "encourage them 
to increase the flow of Investment Capital into the private and 
public sectors of the Nigerian economy"• Federal Nigeria Vol. k 
No* 2 April/June 1961* I*.k
la Nigeria.
The most important for manufacturing concerns in descending order
17of importance were:
(1) To avoid being shut out of the Nigerian Market by tariffs and 
other restrictions.
(2) Specific invitation or encouragement from the Nigerian Government
(3) Attractive long term prospects of the Nigerian economy
(4) To take advantage of increased effective demand in Nigeria
(5) Activities of Competitors
18A later study by A.H. Hakam covering a ’’good cross section” of
industrial investors in Nigeria, confirmed Kay's findings that fear of
being excluded from what they regard as a large and expanding Market
comprising some 33 millions, with a rising National Income, weighed
heavily in decisions to Invest in Nigeria.
To attract foreign investors, the Nigerian Government erected a
system of tax concessions, tariff protection. Customs duties drawbacks
19and pioneer certificates for any enterpreneur wishing to Invest in
16
16. R.S. May - Direct Overseas Investment in Nigeria, 1953-63. Some 
aspects of it* Constitution and contribution to Nigeria's economic 
Development IN The Scottish Journal of Political Economy. Nov.1965
17. Ibid *>.252
18. A.H. Hakam - The Motivation to Invest and the locational pattern of 
Foreign Private Industrial Investments in Nigeria. IN The 
Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies. March, 1966.
19. See g.S. May Op Cit. £.2M*
Nigeria* To assure Investors their property and Capital would
be safe from arbltary interference, Chapter III, Section 30 of the
20Nigerian Constitution forbids compulsory acquisition of property or 
right over or interest in any property except by ' •* or under the 
provisions of a law thati
(a) requires the payment of adequate compensation therefore, and
(b) gives to any person claiming such compensation a right of 
access, for the determination of hia interest in the property and the 
amount of compensation, to the High Court having jurisdiction in that 
part of Nigeria*
Freedom to repatriate profits without hincLrance is also assured*
Since most economically developing States give similar tax and tariff
•  21concessions as the Nigerians did, to foreign Investors, Nigeria's 
aucceaa in attracting foreign investments on an appreeiabls seals has 
to be attributed to its market potential, and the confidence of foreign 
investors about the safety of their investments and the ability to con­
vert currency readily* As Nay atatad, "International business requires
22a certain minimum level of security and freedom of action? Other things 
being equal , so long as foreign policy did not lead to serious balance 
of payments crises which would damage confidence in the Country's finan­
cial stability, Nigeria was reasonably assured of attracting reasmable
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20* The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council ftp Cit See also
Federal Ministry of Information - Statement on Industrial Policy 
196^ (Lagos 196*0
• 21. Hakam top tit P.55
22* May Op Cit *>.2*0
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volume* of foreign Investment*. In her political relationship with 
the V.K. therefore, the need for British private Capital did not ex- 
©art a primary influence.
KREiqN AH)
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The importance of the U.K. as a source of foreign Aid to Nigeria 
ia displayed in the following Table.
TABLB 19
NIGERIAf NBT TOTAL BILATERAL AID INFLOW FROM U.K. IN 
AOQRGQATL 3ILATFRAL AID RLCGIPT3 19&-66
Tear Aid from UK 
ft U .S . Milli- 
pm) .....
Aggregate Aid received 
Od U .S. millions)
Col 1 aa % of 
Col 2
1960 29 32 90.6
1961 26 31 83.8
1962 16 29 55.2
1963 2 19 10.5 *
1961* 12 **3 27.9
1965 27 68 39.7
1966 16 72 22*2
Source* Cola 1 and 2 extracted from O.E.C.D. - Geographical distribution 
of financial flaws to leas Developed Countriaa (Disbursements)*
(O.E.C.D. PARIS) Various years.
. \ . ‘ J 
It appears that the U*K* provided almost all Nigeria*s foreign did
receipts in 1960*^  year of independence* This was only to be expected* 
According to the British Government White Paper on foreign did, it is 
"customary for the Brktiah Government to offer a financial settlement 
at the time of independence (of a Colony); and for this settlement to 
include an amount which broadly reflects the aid that territory in ques­
tion would have received from Colonial Development and VJelfare sources,
*23towards its current development programme, had it not become independent • 
On the other hand non-British did Sources did not begin to be available 
to Nigeria until after Independence* The proportion of total aid coming 
from the U*K* was therefore inevitably diminished as new sources opened* 
The fact that in 1966 the U.K. still provided 22% of Nigeria's total aid 
receipts was a measure of the significance of London as an aid provided 
to Nigeria*
Apart from Capital did, Nigeria also reoeived valuable technical 
assistance from the U*K* Between 1962 and 1966, the D*K* provided 731 or
nearly 50% of the 1559 exports received from all Sources by Nigeria* This
< 2kwas by far the largest singfee national total* In the same period the
25U*K* was also responsible for the largest number of Nigerian trainees*
In addition, she provided Nigeria with other forms of technical assitance*
THE NEED FOR BRITISH AIP AND NIGERIA'S 
FOREIGN POLICY
The degree to which Nigeria's requirement of British did was influ­
ential in the Balewa Government's foreign policy, if at all, was a
17*
23* "Aid to Developing Countries" Cmnd 214? H*M*S*0* London 19&4* P*20 
24* See A.T.8 
25. Ibid
function, other things being equal, o f N ig e ria 's  Aid bargaining power
the
v is -a -v is  the U.K. Government. And th is  derived fron/raisen d 'e tre  
o f B ritish  (Aid to N ig eria .
The motives behind B r it a in 's  d id  to N igeria were threef&iixi: 
P o lit ic a l
According to a B ritish  O ffic ia l  Pamphlet, B ritish  Aid to indepen­
dent Sta te s was designed to ''promote So cial and Economic development, 
reducing poverty, and transforming the trad itio n al S o cie tie s into modern 
ones |2^ fchus cu rta ilin g  the "dangers o f p o litio a l in s ta b ilit y "2^  This 
was p a rtic u la rly  pertinent in  the case o f N ig eria . London was fu lly  
aware that "the Nigerian problem was to build a system which would allow
organic growth and make the unity o rig in a lly  superimposed from outside
28 ■into a liv in g  th in g ". Economic development was an important route to 
the construction o f th is  system. Since B ritain  was "deeply proud" o f i t s  
Contributions towards emergence of the Nigerian S ta te , and was eager that 
the Federation should "provide a Shining example to a divided World o f  
the way in which the manifAld problems of a new emergent Country can be
tackled without bloodshed or rancour, and with', forbearance on a l l  sid es
29and brought to a triumphant conclusion" thereby con stitutin g a show­
piece o f Britain's*benevolent* Colonialism, the urge to extend economic
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26. Ministry of Overseas Development:- The work of the Ministry 
CMND 2736 H.M.S.O. (London 1965)
27• Central Office of Information - Financial and Technical Aid from 
Britain. Pamphlet Hef. No. 62 H.M.S.O. (London 196k) f>.2
28. Governor Arthur Richards. Quoted in Chapter 3.
29* Mr. Richard Thompson (British Under-Secretary of State for Common­
wealth relation) at the Second Reading of the Nigeria Independence 
Bill in July 1960. 'Hansard' 15th July i960 Col. 1846
assistance to Nigeria was relatively strong*
Besides aa Nr* Donelan has argued, Olid has "tended to become not 
an Instrument but a precondition of diplomacy* Aid did not necessarily
give an Ambassador influence with the Government of a Developing Country;
30all that it necessarily gave him was the likelihood of a hearing" •
Nigeria's human and physical resources imbued her with a potential 
foe becoming one of Africa's mesfc powerful States* It would therefore 
appear to have been in Britain's long term Interests to perpetuate the 
"likelihood of a hearing if not influence" with the Nigerian Government 
through economic did* As a Central Office of Information Pamphlet * 
declared "It is not the aim of the (British) did programme to gain some 
short term political advantage* Aid is given basically because the
raising of economic standards of less developed Countries is considered
31to be in the long term interest of Britain herself"
Moral
Britain feels a moral obligation to assist ex-Colonies like Nigeria 
in their endeavours to lift their economies* A British White Paper on 
did said in relation to aid to independent Commonwealth States - "Having 
helped those Countries to political independence it is a natural and 
fitting continuation of that earlier relationship that we should now
assist then in their efforts to achieve balanced and self-sustaining
32economies" Another official publication on British did contendMthat
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30* K • Donelon - "The Ideas of United States Economic Aid". Reprinted
from The Year Book of World Affairs 1966* Vol* 20 (London 1966) £*109
31• Central Office of Information -'Britain and the Developing Countries 
Economic Aid . A Brief Survey* Central Office of Information 
Reference Pamphlet No* 77 H.M.S.O. London (1968)* p.2*
32. H*M. Treasury -'Aid to Developing Countries C.M.N.D. 2147 H.N*S*0.
(London 1964) yP.16 “
"it la norally right to help thoaa in deepefede ncsd”*^
ECONOMIC 3SLT IHT&RKST 
^oononic development would help to traaafora Nigeria's m t  eeono- 
alo potential into a reality* Although Britain* a share of Nigeria*a 
Market waa on the decline, by 1966 she atill accounted for aa auch aa 
29»^ of aggregate Nigerian iaporta* Besides, aa has been seen, foreign 
private Investments in Nigeria were largely British-owned* British intereat 
would thua receive a fillip froa an expanding Nigerian eeonoay and vice 
varan*
Moreover* tied loans help to introduce British manufacturers to 
Nigerians thua enabling British firae establish a foothold in tha Nigerian 
Market through follow up demands for spare parts etc*
Thus in relation to Old* Nigeria* a bargaining power via a via Britain 
waa more than nlnuseule* Tha Govemaent did not therefore have to be 
profusely pro-British to ensure a reasonable volume of aid receipts froa 
Britain within tha ex-tottropolltan Centres aid giving capacity*
NIGERIA AND SThHUNQ AREA NEHBSRSHIP 
Sterling Area aeabershlp, aoan&Xng; to Guy Arnold* offers "sub­
stantial benefits; prestige; ffletflft&nh&p of a long established end loosely 
knit financial organisation that does not atteapt rigid control of indi­
vidual Countries; easier access to ths London Capital Market; and 
augsented chances of aid and financial assistance in hard tlasa (l*e* 
during Britain*# recurrent Sterling Crises)"
180
3 %  Kconoaic Aldt A Brief Purvey cit* £*2.
>4* Q* Arnold "Lcononlc Co-operation in the Comaom/salth*1 (London 1967) 
J>*69
Nigeria elected to continue membership of the Sterling Aree after
tc
independence. T h eo rectically, according to B* Thomaa th is  entailed
the obligation s!
(a) ’To maintain a fixed currency relationship with the Pound Sterling*
(b) 'To maintainIh&r reserve in Sterling and hold these in various 
instruments in London *
(c) To use Sterling as a vehicle currency*
In practice, Nigeria*s positioh judged on the three Criteria was 
continually modified in 1980-66*
With regard to (a). Under the Central Bank Act 1958, the Nigerian 
pound was linked directly with Sterlings In 1962 however the Government 
decided that the Nigerian pound should have its own parity expressed 
directly in terms of gold - £N1 » 2*^8828 grams of fine Gold* Chief 
Okotie Eboh, Federal Minister of Finance explained that the change would 
enable Nigeria, as an independent Country, to decide for herself when
necessary, what adjustments should be made in the official exchange rate
37between the Nigerian pound and any other currency* Consequently, when 
Britain <fed&Lue& the pound Sterling in November 196?, Nigeria did not 
follow suit*
In relation to (b) Nigeria had always held its Reserves exclusively
181
35* All British Colonies belonged to the Sterling Area and most, with 
the notable exception of Canada^ave -continued their membership 
after independence*
36* B* Thomas - The evolution of the Sterling Area IN N* ManeGrgh (ed) 
Cooaonwbalth Perspectives (London 1959) ^*180
37. "Mobilisation Budget” March 1962 /MO
la Sterling but in October 1961 the Government embarked on a programme 
of Reserves diversification. The policy change wan firstly a precau­
tionary move against inevitable loss in the event of a Sterling 
devaluation. Secondly, it was a response to the growing importance 
of Nigeria's trade with Kon-Sterling Area Countries.
The Central Bank of Nigeria was required to hold 10pt of its external 
Reserves in Qoldj 10? in U.S. 4ollars^? The Federal Minister of Finance 
maintained that further diversification would be effected "Whenever 
holdings of other freely convertible Currencies appear to be in our 
overall interest"
Nigeria's Sterling balances held in various instruments in London 
were gradually rundown. This move was not peculiar to Nigeria since 
several Commonwealth Countries on attaining independence, frequently felt 
the urge to repatriate their Sterling balances to finance economic develop­
ment programmes at home, irresistible. Xn Nigeria's ease, the tiUsappln- 
ting foreign <aid receipts rendered the issue more urgent. The Nigerian
Authorities also encouraged institutions; like the Insurance Bouses, Commercial
N igeria
Banks and Marketing Boards operating in /; to repatriate their funds
pveviously invested in London. The Ooverament simultaneously established
*
a Local Money and Capital Market to serve the needs of Nigerian Inventors,
1-82
3d. Central Bank of Nigeria - Sconomic and Financial Review. June, 1967
M 3
39. Mobilisation Budget Op Cit p.9.
Ao. See A.T. 19
J
Sterling and other assets previously held abroad by various con*
Centralcams have been centralised in the hands of the Nlgerian^fiank* In 
consequence of the above manures, by 196% more than 83* of Nigeria's 
external Reserves and Assets sere held in Lagos by the Central Bank* 
With regard to (e) Nigeria's Reserve diversification has meant a 
relatively leas use of sterling as a vehicle currency although it re­
mained the major international means of exchange*
Thus Nigeria* links with sterling and the Sterling Area have 
gradually weakened* Although formal membership of the Sterling Area 
continued to provide invaluable advantages sueh'as Insulating her aid 
receipts from the U*K* against Sterling Crises | and affording the 
Nigerian Government and Public Corporations valued access to loans on 
the London Capital Market* it would appear that the necessity to remain 
a member of the Area constituted no more than a Secondary influence in 
Nigeria's foreign policy* After ell* if Britain joined the European 
Economic Community the future of the Sterling Area would be in grave 
doubt* Tot* aa aeon in the Succeeding Chapter* Legos turned down the 
offer of Association with the E*E*C* in 1982 during Britain'e member­
ship negotiations with the Community*
1,83
W *  Control Bonk of Nigeria - Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 
for yonr ended 31st December 1985 (Lagoa) 19&S* ^.58
C H A P T E B 6  
HI0S8IA AKD THE OTBQTBm KOHagC
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Tffi g
Xn. 1962, u  a revolt of aa agreement reeohed la the oouree 
of Britain's negotiations to jola the SBC, Vlgerla, (along with 
other African Conaonwealth amber States) was offered 4|ssooiatlcn 
with the Comunity under Part 1J of the Treaty of Bouo 1997* The 
Lagos Government turned It down. The natter appeared to ho dead and 
hurled* "Hlgerla will la no olrounstaaoes seek (Association (with the 
EBCj" 1 Balova assured Parllanmt la September 1962* Heverfcfi«&CASs ,
in July 1966, Algeria entered lato aa Association (Agreement with the
  2
EEC at the successful conclusion of negotiations spread over two years*
Nigeria's relationship with the ^  was iTiflTvmood primarily
by two sets of factorst the oooaonlo aad the political* This chapter
*■>«■< *** the former*
1* "Mr Prime master: Speeches" op olt* p*70*
2* The Agreement never came Into foroe* See the Epilogue to next chapter* ^
Ixx tpprtiitsg tbi prohibit foamlo balance shut of 
with the KEC, ths Xlgerlan Federal Government had to m i o m  that tho 
UK* i Application would succeed. n<w nffj.uont1j , that after a ty**! tf 
period, tho UK would have to taznlaate Coapomioalth preferences on 
Inports from tho Connouwealth, and, h i«  tbi othor ■<» wwd Nader Statoo, 
abolish cuatoas dutioa on imports frun tho Cosaunlty and Associated 
States adopting tho SBC*a Omaon Xrtmal Hriff (CJST) on twd*
with third countries. It also had to taka into aooount, tho fact that tho 
ooumtxy9s overwhelmingly primary products exports had frequently to 
oonpete for KEC markets with similar products fron tho Eighteen Associated 
Afrioan States (AO?*s). If It rejected Association, any a Klgerlaa 
export to tho KEC would be subjected to the CET while those of her AOT 
Coapotltors would eventual!y hare free entry. Bio sagnituds of tha 
aoonoalo risk Involved would tend to bo a direct function of the degree 
of her reliance on SBC aad UK (hexeafte: j referred to aa tho "Balasgsd 
KEC*1) marketable 20 aad Pig 11 depict tho position.
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Ml*.rlai Ralluc# an tha ac far Snort Trade. 1966-66
(Or Million* )
Year SBC me ^  ™ -----V -----World
Thtal
Col 1 a1
% of Col 3
Col 2 as 
96 of Col. 3.
1956 28 113 132 21.2 89.6
1957 52 110 124 23.8 88.7
1958 42 117 133 31.5 88.8
1959 55 137 161 34.1 83.0
1960 50 128 161 31.0 79.5
1961 58 134 170 34.1 78.8
1962 57 127 164 34.7 77.4
1965 68 142 183 36.7 76.6
1964 77 158 210 36.6 75.2
1965 95 194 263 35.3 73.3
1966 98 203 279 35.1 72.8
Sonro*t Slgnrle FMaxal Office of Statistic!. * Annual Abatraot of Statistic." 
1963.'64 and »68

1 8 S
It appears that the proportion of Vivaria's total exporta that 
vnt to the BBC roee tram 21*296 in 1956 to 55*1# la 1966* The 
"ftalarged* BBC9a share of Nigeria's anports however fell ffcon 85*696 
to 72*896 la the eaae period* The ooaaieteat fall waa due nalnly to 
the dlnlniahlng proportion aeoounted for by the UK, already noticed 
in Table |) Chapter 5 (it ia noteworthy that while Nigeria's total 
exporta doubled between 1956 aad 1966, her exports to the BBC la 
value terns, rose by 25096 ia the saraepperiod)* The Country's overall 
dependence on the "ftklsrgsd" BBC wee nover-tho-loeo very high-in 1962 
it was 7796.
CEP rataa however varied according to tha nature of the Coenodity 
involved* far purpoaea of dataralnlng its of faots, Nigerian ezporta"C
are divisible to (a) those on which the incidence of the CRT waa 
likely to be relatively high* (b) Ccnaodities on whioh the incident 
was likely to be low or xegliglble*
CoroodltlML likely to. be aeriomlr Effected tor C B T
four eyppTt Coenod 111 ee~ "vy Coooa, Pain Oil,
Groundnut Oil and Forest Produota, whioh toother aooounted for about 
3596 of the ftderatla&b Aggregate doneatio exports in 1962,5 had the 
doubtful distinction of being relatively nore seriously inperilled 
by the CBT if Nigeria chose to rone In unsssootstsd with the 'tihlargsd' 
BBC* The prospeote faoing each oomodlty are discussed separately*
5* See A.T. 18
BW  COCO* BEAUS
>» ‘ 18 9-
Coooa henna, ee shown la Chapter 5* was of the Federations 
most important export commodities* Ths extant to whioh Vigerls 
depended on the SBC end UK for her Coooa Bales la shown below.
Table 21
” 8 0oo°» T ™ 8 w a s , )
T**r
T T 4Col 1 as 
% of Col 3
......5 -----Col 2 as 
% of Col 3Exports toBBC
Exports to Pfc
•‘’UK
Total xocporxs
1956 6 14 24 25 58.3
1957 9 20 26 34.6 76.9
1958 7 21 27 25*8 77.7
1959 18 31 38 47.3 81.5
1960 14 24 57 37.8 64.8
1961 11 20 34 52.3 58.8
1962 12 20 33 36.5 40.6
1963 13 23 32 40*6 71.8
1964 18 27 40 45.0 67.5
1965 17 24 42 40.4 57*1
1966 9 17 28 32.1 60.7
Scmroost Colsl - 3 from Ananml Abstract of Statlatlos op oit.

It appears froa the table and figure that the SBC accounted, on the 
average, for a third of Nigeria's Coooa boon exports during the deoade*
. ' 7?-
The 'ttolargod* ESC took a fluctuating proportion which varied froa a 
maximum 81*996 in 1959 to a nlnlnue of 57*1# in 1965* In 1962, it was 
60.696. The 'fetlarged9 SBC waa thus tho morfe Important market for Xigeria*s 
Coooa. It was also tho most important Coooa importing area in the world, 
accounting for 46$ ©f world total In 1962 (The proportion for SBC iteolf 
waa 3556 )• lsports of Coooa Into tho 'felarged* SBC grew more slowly than 
overall world Coooa imparts* With 1956 * 100, world Coooa imports in 
1964 was 141, while the figure for the "fetlarged" EEC was 136. For ths 
EEC alone, tha index in 1964 was 144*.
To Nigeria, the coat of Aon Association was 111 to accrue from 
tha CET of 5*4# on Coooa beans. Previously, Xlgerla's Cocoa beans entered 
the Netherlands, (its most important national market) and Italy, (the 
5th most important national market) free. In West Germany (Nigeria**
No 4 Market), Cocoa was subject to a 996 tariff irrespective of source.
Th* CET meant that Nigeria** Coooa beans wore to foce. higher tariffs 
in Netherlands and Italy but lower rates in Vest Germany. This was 
however only one side of the picture. Ths other emerges when it is realised
that two of Nigeria** most important competitors particularly in EEC Market
VW2.
were Ivory Coast and Cameroon*- both AOTs and therefore entitled ton
free aeoess to the EEC. In 1962, while the Netherlands took 2296 of its 
Cocoa been* lsports from Nigeria, it took 5796 from the Ivory Coast and 
Cameroon*•
4* Calculated froa figures derived froai Commonwealth Eooh Committee - 
Plantation Crope. (London) 1967*
1 9 f c  <
Perhaps equally aarioua waa tha fact that Vivaria would not
only loaa tha Commonwealth preference margin it had enjoyed in
UK, it would inf act hare to aoale a 5.4# taxxif wall while her
AOT Competitors, prarioualy di a criminated against, would have duty
free entry into tha UK Market.
To render hie product competitive in tha "enlarged" KEC, tha
Nigerian Coooa exporter would have to bear tha full incidence of tha
CET. There would tend to ba a reprieve to the extent that tha AOT'e
vara unable to neat tha Coooa demands of tha "enlarged" Community.
However, in view of tha glut of tha world Coooa (Market alluded to in
Chapter 5, the reprieve would tend to ba marginal. Moreover, tha EEC's
aOverseas Development Fund had aa one of ita aims, tha expansion of
productivity and production in tha AOT'e. To tha extent that it waa
successful in regard to Cocoa production in tha long term, tha fortunes
of Coooa exports from unassociated States would suffer.
.As an alternative, Nigeria could expand its sales to oon-
"felarged" SBC areas. In 1962, tha United States was Nigeria's third
most important Market and its imports were duty free. In this asrkst
Nigeria had to contend not only with other important exporters Hire
Ghana, Ivory Coast and Camsroons but alsowi-tk ths Vestarn Hemisphere
exporters like Brasil. Moreover, ths US market for Coooa was not
notable for its rats of expansion. Imports in 1964 (1956-100) was 108*
Ths Soviet Uhion which displayed a greater growth rate in Coooa d— *4
(demand in 1964 (1956-100) was 150) was another alternative. The
volume of the Soviet Union's Imports was however small. In 1962 She
imported a total of 45,000 tons of raw Coooa beans or lese thar &
quarter of Nigeria's export volume for that year7
5* To be diacudsed later
6. Calculated from figures for World Coooa trade provided in Gill end 
Duffuus "Cocoa Statletlos 1965"
7. Ibid
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Non ^ Association m i  t h m f o N  likely to do sons heavy 
damage to Nigeria'a Coooa exporta certainly in valee and probably 
in voleae taxna aa tha effeote of tha CIT began to tell*
Pit OIL •
Bain oil waa Nigeria's sixth noat inportant export itaai in 
1962® Nigeria'a Pain Oil trade with tha EEC is portrayed in the 
following table and graph*
SKM..M .
Nigeria- SBC Trade in Pain O H  1956-1966
( a  Millions)
1. 2. . 3 .  4. 5
Tears ■ 1  i r~~z r v M B Nigeria's Exportato UK d SEC
Nigeria•*
Total Rxperta
Col i a W  
of Col 3
■■■KTTHJT 
of Col 3Xxporta to XBC
1956 0*3 14.4 14.9 2.1 96.6
1957 0.1 13.5 13.8 0.7 97.8
1958 1.2 12.0 12.7 9.4 94*4
1959 0.8 13.1 13.8 5.7 94.9
1960 1.7 13.0 13.9 12.2 93*5
1961 1.5 11.0 13.2 11.3 83.3
1962 1.1 m i 8.9 12.3 79.7
1963 2.1 7 .4 9.4 22.3 78.9
1964 1.9 7*1 10.8 H.5 65.7
1965 4.2 10.0 13.4 31.3 74.6
1966 1.5 10.9 10.9 13.7 100.0
Source* Cola 1-3 extracted froa "Aaaaal Abetraot of Statlatloa" of> Cit*
8* Sea A.?. 18
in*1!
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It emerges that although tha proportion of Nigeria's Pain 
Oil exports absorbed by tha EEC States v u  small, that aooountad 
. ** for by tha "Ealdrged" EEC vae very high-reaching 100% In 1966*
This was due to Nigeria's dependence on tha UK Market already 
noticed in Chapter 5* The SBC waa however the largest Pain oil 
importing area in tha world. In 1962, it took 44% of world imports. 
Together with tha OK the proportion twas 64%?
Nigeria, the Second largest Pain Oil world exporter (after Congo 
Kinsasha) sent a preponderant proportion of its eaport to tha UK.
Most of tha rsamlnflar vent to tha EEC where it had to compete with 
Congo (Kinsasha), Dahomey and Ivory Coast,(all AOT's), Indonesia, 
Malaga end Sinmore..In 1962, Nigeria supplied only 9% of the EEC's 
total Pain oil imports^ AOT's supplied 59% (inspite of politioal 
problems whioh interfered with supplies from Congo Kinsasha) Indonesia >
The CET on Palm Oil was to be 3% on non-edible and 9% on sdibls 
in crude form. 8% end 14% on the refined variety. Previously, the 
hatio&al tariff in the Nether!end, Nigeria's most important rnahket 
in the SBC was 2.7 on crude Pain Oil. In Vest Germany- the second 
most important market- the rate was 6.2% on crude and 11.2 on rsfined 
Pain oil. If Nigeria was unassoolated, her Pain Oil exports would
therefore face higher tariff barriers whils competing shipments from
*v .
AOTa would inter free. Nigeria's share of the EEC market wee already
so small that it oonld easily be squeesed out of the market if AOTs
experienced bumper prodaotlon.
More serious for Nigeria would be the lose of the highly
significant 10% preference margin its Pain Oil exports enjoyed in
its major market- the UK. Nigeria tould then have to face the relatively
9. Calculated from data provided in Commonwealth Soonomle Committee
" " and "Tropical Products
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high CET rats* while, in a remarkable exchange of roles, the 
important AOT exporters llkeCongo (Kinsasha) which bed previously 
faced a 10% taxrlff barrier in the UK, would have Area entry.
To the extent that the AOfs were unable to neat the rtftnde of the 
"Mnged" KEC, Nigeria's exports (ether reneisiag unchanged)
would be unaffected in volume teas* Bat to be oempetitve, Nigerian 
exporters would have to absorb a large proportion of the CET* Aa 
indicated in Chapter 5, Pain oil was already ground badly to
relatively cheeper substitutes. Per Nigeria (or any tton~Aseooiated 
producer Country) to try to pass on the incidence of the CET to 
puroMsers in the "Merged" SIC would entail the risk of greater 
substitution for Palm Oil oonsueption.
Nigeria oonld alternately gales to the Uhlted States
(where entry was free for ell comers) or Japan (with a 10% tariff)* 
The markets were however relatively nail “ 4  competition — "■g the 
unaeeooiated producer states would be so intense that success would 
not be easy to achieve while prices end export values would almost 
certainly suffer.
FORESTRY PRODUCT^
This grong comprises Hardwood Legs, Seen Timber end Plywood which 
together earned Nigeria 0  7 milUsau or 4% of total domestic export 
values in 1962.11 federation had large forest reserves covering 
a third of its total land area- about 125,000 square miles. Iteoh of 
this was of low productivity, much: was still unexplored. The reserves 
of exploitable Forest was however extensive end relatively well 
supplied with navigable rivers to facilitate transportation* The 
distribution of Nigeria's exports is sheen in the following table*
11. A.T* 18
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N ig srlst m ^.rAb.utlopj.f of Logs. Sswn Timber and
TABLE 23
Yaar and ^  
Produot ( f t j ^
, EEC
( s Mil­
lion )
World Total 
( O  Million )
Col 1 as 
# of Col
3
Col 2 as 
% of Col
3
Col 4 +
Col JL
1958
Logs 1.6 2.0 4.1 39.0. 48.7 87.7
Sawn Tinbar 1.0 0.1 1.3 76.9 0.8 77.7
Plywood 0.8 0.03 0.9 88.9 0.3 89.2
1980 ,
Logs 1.7 3.9 6.4 26.5 60.9 87.4
Sawn T inbar 0.8 0.09 1.2 66.7 0.08 66.8Plywood 1.0 0.03 1.2 83.5 0.03 83.3
Logs
Sawn T inbar 1 .4 3.6 5.9 23.7 61.0 84.7
Plywood 0.9 0.1 1*4 64.2 7.1 71.31 . 1 0.02 1.5 8A.6 1.6
196?
Logs 1 .2 2.9 4.7 25.5 61.7 87.2
Sawn Tinbar 0.9 0.1 1.4 64.2 7.1 71.3Plywood 1 . 2 0.04 1.3 92.3 3.1 95.4
w sLogs
Stun Tlabsx 1.4* 3.7 5.9 23.7 62.7 86*4
Plywood 0.9 0.2 1.6 56.2 12.5 68.7
0 # 0.05 1.0 90.0 5.0 95.0
1964
Logs 1.7 4.2 6.9 24.6 60.8 85.4
Swan Tinbar 0.9 0.2 1.6 56.2 12.5 68.7Plywood 1 .0 0.07 1.1 90.9 6.4 97.3
•r
Sourcas! Cols 1 * 3  axtraotsd from "Annual Abstract o f S t a t is t ic s "  19&4 
and 1965 W lgsrla Trada Smamarlas 1961 -  5.
It would appear that Nigeria's dependence on tha BBC waa 
relatively high for exports of Logs and relatively low for Sawn
m-
Timber end Plywood* The reverse held good in relation to the UK 
Market* Both markets combined accounted for an <ew<^mhelning proportioni ,
of Nigeria's forest exports. In 1962 it waa 8696 for logs| 7196 for 
for Sawn Timber end 9996 for Plywood*
The CET on Logs was Sawn Timber 1096 and Plywood 1996* These
were higher than the previous national tariffs in Hethexdanda and 
Vast Germany, Nigeria'a most important markets inside the BBC* Non- 
<Jsaoclation would mean that Nigeria's exports would faoe a high tariff 
wall while her ACT Competitors me inly Gabon, Caneroon and and Ivory 
Coast would have free eoeese* -
The situation in relation to the UK market would be more serious 
Nigeria's heavy dependence on the UK Market for her exports of Sawn 
Timber end Plywood woe evidence of the value of the 1096 Cjmmonvel th 
preference her exports of these items enjoyed in the UK* Kon^laeoclatloa 
would not only oost her this margin of proteotlon but would infact 
render her liable to the stiff CXT while her AOT competitors would 
have free ecoess to the UK*
The magnitude of the [problem Nigeria would have to faoe due to the 
CBT was highlighted by the fact that inspite of the significant tariff 
protection she enjoyed in the UK, her share of the total UK imports of 
Plywood in 1962 was only 4*796 - and the UK was by far her moat 
Important market • This appeared to indicate that Nigerian Forest Product 
exports were of relatively low quality/ and uaoonpetittvely priced—  
characteristics that would render breaking into new markets or scaling 
the CBT wall quite difficult* World AmrnnA for Forest products wee 
Strongly Influenced by the necessity to provide living accomodation to 
cater for increasing urbanisation*
12. In January 1964 tariff protection against tropioal hardwoods imported 
into the BBC end the UK were suspended* GATT "first Six Tear Plan 
of Nigeria"* £ .1 3 3
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It therefore had a tendency to expand. Howver tha Scandinavian Far 
Eastern and Latin American Plywood prodncars war# tor far nor* affloant 
than thair Afriasn counterparts and oonld deliver shipaenta acre 
cheaply in important Beat European (Markets. Among African producers* 
Nigeria's ooapetitiveneee was low* According to tha report of tha Niferien- 
Anarioan Trada Seninar held in New York In September 1964 "— In tha 
very selective United States log and Lunber Market* the wood products from 
Ivory Coast and Ghana enjoy a cosqpetive advantage (over Nigeria's) .This 
is dna to thair higher original quality* batter handling (which reduces 
ths possibility of staining)* and ths sass with which export orders and 
ehipBMnts are processed".1^
Conpetitidn could compel ths Nigsrisn producers to bo more effidhnt 
but tho "low original quality1* could bo a formidable handicap.
M i H  ttk
Groundnut oil waa Nigeria's 9th aost important export in 1962.
There existed however vast potential to expand its export. Nigeria waa tho
j
world's largest exporter of Groundnuts and in 1962* her groundnut oil 
represented only 26% of her Groundnut exports. ^
13. Reproduced in GATT dp oit £.143
14. See AT 18.
2 0 0  -
HIGERIii Dlatxlbutlon of Qroundaat 0}1 Bnort»
1 2 3 4 5
TA BLE 24
Tear •mtn
(«f Million*)
UK and K M  
(£N Million*)
World Total 
(CV Million*)
Col 1 aa
% of Col 5
Col 2 aa
% of Col 3
1956 1.7 3.5 4.1 41.4 85.3
1957 1.5 4.2 4.6 32.6 91.3
1958 1.0 3.6 3.7 27.0 97.2
1959 0.5 4.5 4.6 10.8 97.8
1960 0.08 5.3 5.3 1.6 100
1961 1.5 4.5 4.9 26.5 91.8
1962 0.6 4.3 6.2 9.6 69-5
3?63 0.7 4.0 6.5 10.7 61.5
1964 1.7 5.4 8 .1 20.9 66.6
1965 1.9 7.7 9.5 20.0 *1.0
1966 0.5 8.3 9.7 5.1 85.5
'foames " Annual Abstract of Statiatloa" Op Cit 1963, 4 and *66
•mm-

Nigeria's dependence on th* EEC frurkat fluctuated aa can ba aaan 
in Coluan 4 hut oa average it waa small • Combined with tha UK however
r '
the degree of reliance waa high* Hi* EEC waa tha largest Groundnut Oil 
importer*. In 1962 it took 51# of world iaporta. Together with tha UK, 
it accounted for 65#*
CSS waa 10# for crude and 15# for rafinad groundnut oil for food 
uaaa and %  and 8# for non-food usee. Non - Association by Nigeria 
would put her at a competitve disadvantage* Bar most iaportant National 
markets in tha EEC vara Netherland and Vast Germany. Previously Iaporta 
of groundnut oil froa all Sources vere subject to a tariff of 5# on 
crude and 10# on edible groundnut oil in either Country. Hot only vere 
the tariff rates to go up for Nigeria; her nost iaportant ACT 
Competitor- Senegal, tha largest world exporter of Groundnut Oil, 
would have free access* m  Trance9 tha largest national importer of 
Groundnut Oil, Nigeria's shipments would face lover tariffs due to tha 
CET. Previously Crude Groundnut Oil had a tariff of 15*6# and refined 
16*2#* This however night not ba much of an advantage because of non­
tariff restrictions* taadeni i'-11 -*«»**
In tha UK, tha Federation's nost important national market,
Nigeria stood to lose tha hefty 15# Commonwealth tariff preference 
oargln while Senegalese shipments would enter duty free.
To tha extent that tha AOTs vara unable to meat tha dasiands of 
tha "enlarged” ;V3Cf Nigeria's export volume like those of Other 
Unassooiated states would ba relatively unaffected. But export values 
were likely to fall* To ba competitive Nigeria would have do absorb mosd* 
of tha CET incidence. As seen in Chapter 5* Groundnut Oil waa also 
losing ground to cheaper substitutes like -oya been oil. Passing on 
the CET incidence would render Groundnut oil even lees competitive 
end encourage a demand switch to substitutes. The competition from 
substitutes would also reduce the chances of successfully diversifying 
Nigeria's markets to circumvent the ill effects her groundnut oil 
export was likely to suffer due to the CET*
C o a n o d ltle a  v l t h  Io w r  o r  Z e e  W . .cm****
Some Nigerian exports vers l ik e ly  to be r e la t iv e ly  unaffected by 
the CET. Among these the most Important vers Groundnat -  N ig e ria 's  
second most important export in  1962. Exportsto Francs (the Ho 1 
Customer); Nether  lends and Vast Germany, -  N ig e ria 's  most important
EEC Markets, mere free. Italy - the third largest customer had a tariff
Dwl . ’ ' ' f '* ffij J- ■'* ’ l Iof 3*696. CET rate, on groundnut mas aero. On balance therefore Nigeria‘sA
would be better off as far as the EEC was concerned. In the NX,
Nigeria's Second most important marketj Che stood to lose the 10% 
Commonwealth preference Che had enjoyed over Senegal and other AOT 
Competitors. This loss was however inevitable whether or not Nigeria 
chose (tssooiation given the assumption that the UK would become a member 
of the EEC.
Palm KerrAls menu Nigeria's third most important export in 1962. Again 
the CET was sero as was the previous national tariffs in the EEC.
Again Nigeria would forfeit her 10% preference in the UK.
Natural Rubber Nigeria's fifth most important export had previously 
entered the EEC member states free. CET was sero. Nigeria had not 
enjoyed any preferential treatment in the UK so that there would be no 
loss here.
Raw Cotton was Nigeria's 10th most important export in 1962. Its 
circumstances were identical with those of Natural Rubber. 
tB.OOi.tVjE and POB»|.t<»
Domestic Industrialisation can take three forms Jointly or 
separately 1 (a) Upgrading of domestic raw materials (b) Import 
Substitution sad (o) Manufacturing for export. Each of these was likely 
to be affected by (Association with EEC.
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Aa shown abort, the EEC imports several basic raw materials 
free of Coitoai duty while imposing high CET rates on proosssod 
products, For instance, while ths CET on Groundnuts was Zsro 
that on Groundnut Oil rangod bstvssn %  and 2096 depending on tha 
dagrss of refinement* Ths nominal tariff ratss on ths flirt shod 
products did not however rsprsssnt ths trus protsotion 
aooordsd proosasing plants in ths EEC9 Ths trus or effective 
protective ratss havs in addition to taks into eonsldsration ths 
protsotion given to ths upgrading stags in ths SEC; this dsgrss 
of protsotion is determined by ths nominal tariff on ths inportsd 
input and ths rslsvant Input output coeffeoients* In a Simple 
procss sing system, ths effective protective rats on ths proosssing ~ 
of Commodity j can be computed using ths fomulas
tj
pj - Pi
Share t
Tj • Effsotivs protective rats for ths J oos—odity 
Pi - C.I.F. Talus of commodity j 
PI ■ C.I.F. Talus of input 1 
*fcj » Nominal tariff on tanodity j 
ti « Nominal tariff on input 1 
CSlng a similar formula,_ end actual inport values of both 
Qroundnuta sad Groundnut oil# GIST has caloulatsd that ths 10% GST 
on cruds Groundnut oil yislds an effsotivs protective rats of 256% 
in the Common Market1 .^ Admittedly, TJ In this example is so high 
because ths value added in groundnut proosssing is relatively 
mall* Moreover since prices of groundnuts tend to fluctuate more 
oil prioeo, ths computation of value added is 
rsndsrsd Wnpreoias* Whan due allowance ia mads for inaccuracies in
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Other processed, materials like Cocoa products; Rubber products etc
are similarly accorded very high effective protection by the
oascaded nature of the CBT*
While (Associated States would be unaffected, rnon Associated
Countries exports of processed materials into the EEC would tend to
be Seriously hampered* The Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-
Eboh had Stated in 1962 that the Industrial policy of the Federal
Government was "----- - - increasingly geared to the processing of our
raw materials, not only for local consumption, but also for exports
all over the world"• ^  From the above, it is clear that this policy
was likely to encounter crippling disabilities if Nigeria rejected
Association; ftpre so if the UK became a member of the EEC* A
Government Report declared that "— — — — if Nigeria remains outside
the BBC------  Indsutrialisation of ra% materials, the upgrading of
them to bring higher returns per ton will be seriously discouraged.
Ve regard this as a major threat to the Nigerian Industrial development
(since] the upgrading of Nigeria's traditional raw materials exports
constitutes one of the most promising areas for industrial growth and
17for improving the country's foreign exchange position"* *
16. H.R.3). 6p Cit. 29 March 1962 Col. 522.
17. "The European Common Market and the Nigerian Economy. A report to
the Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Commerce and industry 
from the Boonomic and Statistics Division of the Federal Ministry 
of Connneroe and Industry (Arthur D. Little Inc. Adviser) " 
(Unpublished Lagos, July 1962) p.26. —
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
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A.O.T.s are generally treaty bound to grant free aooese to
10 # imports from EEC Member States, Import replacement Industrialisation
policies are generally backed by inflnt industry protectionism.
Association and Import Substitution industrialisation would thus
appear to be incompatible. However, Article 133 (3) of the Treaty of
Rone allowed A,0,T,s to "levy Customs duties whioh correspond to the
requirements of their development and to the requirements of the
industrialisationcrvhioh, being o f a fiscal nature, have the object
o f contributing to their budget". This appeared to meet the requirements
o f infant industry protection. There was however some doubt as to what
extent powers under this subnotion were meant to be used.
The first principle of the attitude of the Six towards the ^
Associated States was not necessarily altruism. Clearly they wanted 
tangible quid pro quo for the tariff concessions and aid extended to the 
A.O.T.s, The fbpe^aomdM to the Markets of the A,0,T,s was one of the 
most significant immediate returns they could expect. In the circumstances, 
the opinion of the Eoonomio Commission for Africa that the Six mvfrt not 
continue to offer the same advantages for the primary product exports 
of the A.O.T.s if the latter resorted to widespread protection against 
imports from the former19 appear (^logically valid. Moreover, by 1962 
no A.O.T, had invoked Article 133 (3), There thnsufere some suspicion^ 
that powers under Article 133 (3) <uftre not unfettered end therefore that 
Association could prove an obstacle against industrialisation through 
Import Substitution in tha Cong run.
18. Artlols i32 (2) of Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
and Connected Documents 1938. (Hereafter Referred to as the Treaty of Rome) 
Rigllsh Translation published by the Publishing Services of the European 
Communties. 8012/5/X11/1962/5.
19* UH.ECA "The impact of European Integration on African trade and 
development” E/cir/i4/72 (Hew York 7-12-60.) tags
«
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It was such fears that provoked the charge that Association was 
devised to keep Africa a constant source of raw materials* This 
argument ignores the fact, seen in the previous Chapter, that 
Association arrangements encouraged industrialisation through ths 
upgrading of local ram materials and that import replacement 
industrialisation was not without its pitfalls*
As far as the public was Concerned, Association was thus an 
embodiment of French Euro-Africani am - the theory of the complemen­
tarity of African and European economies* In pursuance of its 
Euro-African ideal, France had Created the Franc Zone embracing 
Metropolitan France and its Colonies* Within this zone, there was 
free movements of goods and factors while commercial intrusion by 
by third countries was kept at bay by a complex system of tariff
barriers, quotHia and exchange control* To encourage the Colonies
of
in ths p&odaetios/agricultural raw materials, France had operated 
various price support (Surprix) and income stabilisation Schemes for 
their benefit* These Simultaneously discouraged geographic 
diversification of markets and tended to perpetuate as Theresa Hayter
described it " A situation in which the Overseas Territories
produce goods which are not Competitive in world markets and depend 
on France for their ability to sell them at remunerative prices and 
their survival"1** France also granted generous financial assistance 
to the Territories* The outcome was that the Colonies, an attainment 
of political independence, found themselves heavily dependent on 
France economically and generally had to toe the French line in 
their foreign policies*
16* T* Hayter- French Aid (ODI London 1966) £.83
neo-oolonial motives and the intention behind its <U 
merely to advance African econoiBies then, as Malaa J 
the Nigerian TV Delegation wanted to know in 1961, ' 
these Same funds from being made available to the si 
through bilateral or multilateral arrangements not i 
contingent upon belonging to a particular trading gj
^con<M«c
therefore feared that Algeria's heavy Adependence on 
aa shown in tha previous Chapter, would render her i 
political manipulation.
Besides, Association was open only to those Sti
  1 8Metropolitan powers ware EEC Members.
■it. 2nd Committee. TOT General Assembly 18th Oct.
18. Article 58 (2) of the "Convention of Assooiatioi 
the AfTioaa and Malagasy States associated with 
(The Yaounde Convention)" Stipulated that Aasooi 
terms as contained in the Convention would be ai 
with "an economic structure and production compi 
Associated States" The Condition that a pro spec- 
must be a Colony or ex-Colony of an SBC Member :
2 0  7 '
But industrialisation based on Import substitution has its Arses
backs* As Raul Prebieoh put it "- -Ths protection of Industries
of every kind ia a closed Market (due to Import replacement
industrialisation] has deprived Latin American Countries of the
advantages of Specialisation and economies of seals, snd owing to
the protection afforded by excessive tariff duties sad restrictions,
a healthy form of internal competition has failed to develop to the
detrement of efficient production**20
Besides, Import replacement industrialisation is, in Albert
21Hlrschman's terminology, "highly sequential" in nature, adopting 
known processes, inported inputs snd machines in the naauf&cture 
of {predominantly Consumer goods* This h&B robbed the Industrialisation 
process of nuoh of its knowledge imparting unemployment reducing, 
foreign earchsnge saving sad balance of payments etremghtenln# potentials. 
Moreover, the dynamic industrialisation iapulses generated by the nadd 
to supply locally the input requirements of original iaport 
replacing aanufacturing or Hlrscfcnen's "backward Linkage effects" are 
frequently f©ce.cloaed or seriously retarded by economic and 
socio-political obstacles* Peer that the domestically produced inputs 
would be deficient in quality* would render the location of the user 
industries previously reliant on imported inputs inappropriate f would 
be relatively highly priced, since their production would he tariff 
protected while users forfeit the previously enjoyed tariff concessions 
on imports, would tend to induce resistance against their being 
produced locally* On the other hand ths ability of Government to break
down this resistance nay be circumscribed by socio-political
22considerations ss he* been the oase in Tr^ tl" America * If therefore, 
(Association wes likely to impair Import Substituting industrialisation, 
it would net constitute aa entirely unmitigated defect-On this paint
20. D»— lo Policy to *  l*tl» i*wlo« (Bw TfcrkiUtalW
21* "The Political Boonoey of Import Substitution Industrialisation in
Latin America" |a the Quarterly Journal of Bocncnics" Tol Lxxx11 Bo 1 February 1966 £6* -- ;--
22. Albert 0. Hirschman Ibid.
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ths Nigerian Government Report wee “not at all sure that the
derelopnent of the Nigerian economy would he harmed by an influence ***
which night discourage the creation of high permanent tariff* It haa
been demonstrated in many countries, that excessive protection, thpugh
apparently the easiest way to foster industrial developawnt, inevitably
results in the creation of uneconomic industries which reduce rather
n2Sthan increase the National Income .
W«naf>ottt£lag for Export 
Because her technology was rudinentxy, Nigeria had tha comparative 
advantage in the production of simple manufactures whioh would find 
a market in the technologically advanced EEC* The $cope was likely to 
expand as the NEC's Comparative advantage shifted towards greater 
technology-intensive production* The Nigerian Government appears to 
have missed this crucial point for in 1962 the Prime Minister told 
Parliament " Industrialisation (j[n Nigeria) would hardly succeed
if it has to rely on a market (the EEC] already saturated by the
24products of Europe— "
▲ formidable obstacle Confronting Nigeria and other developing 
Countries desijrcous of manufacturing for expart to Developed Countries 
a *2. the tariff barrier* in the latter whioh often render uncompetitive, 
the manufactures of the naeoent industrialising economies* Association 
with its Conoommitant right of free entry into the expansive EEC 
Warkct would thus have been a boon to export-geared manufactory in 
Nigeria*
25* The EEC and tha Nigerian Economy 6p Cit* £.28
24. Reproduced in  "Nigeria Speaks" Op tit. £.147.
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An allied consideration was tha Inflow of foreign private 
Investments. To the extent that Association would promote manufacturing 
and processing of raw materials for export, it was likely to attract 
into Nigeria, foreign private capital to exploit the opportunities 
revealed*
M t m a  M
Under Axmexies A and B of the implementing convention of the 
Treaty of Ro m , an Overseas Development Fund was set up and endowned 
with 561*25 millions units of Aooount for the Social and floonomio 
advancement of A*O.T*s for the period 195B-1962.2'* V '1
The amount was to be disbursed as grants* TJtader Article 16 of the
26 ’Yaounde Convention, a second Fund waa established with 750 million
units of Accounts - $666 millions of vhioh was oontributed by BBC Member
States ($620 of which were to be disbursed as grants and $46 million $
as loans) and $6 4 millions by the European Investment Bank to be
disbursed as loans* Ths $7}0 millions was to be divided between projects
for Social and aoonoalo development and technical cooperation (#00
million) and diversification and production schemes 0*230 millions)*
# 0  million of the Fund's liquid assets was to ba devoted to price. 'sefemKisewi
Stabilisation of A.0.T* export Commodities*
Every A.0.T* waa entitled to receive something from the Fund-its 
actual receipts varying with its else and tha magnitude of its neids*
25* At the expiration of this period the provisional commitment made 
by the Fund aamounted to a total of #12*3 millions* The balance 
was fully committed by August 1965*
26* Convention of Association between the BBC and the Afrioan and
Malagasy States associated with that Community and Annexed Documsnte- 
(Library Copy of the EEC information Centre, Cheaham Street, London, 
S*V*1.)
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The major characteristics of disbursements from tha Fond mas that 
thagr oould cover both tha onshore and offshore costs of projects.
upla drawing their Development Plans, A.O.Ts had prior knowledge of tha 
terms and volume of did and tha kind of projects for which thagr mould 
be received. There mas also tha certainty that committed funds wftuld be 
disbursed promptly at ths appropriate tines*
These mere fundamentally in contradistinction to Xigerla's foreign 
Olid experiences as seen in Chapter 1* Dhdsr ths 1962-68 national Development 
Plan, The Federation hoped for foreign did to the tune of £527 million 
(almost 50# of ths proposed aggregate public Capital expenditure during ' 
the Plan period)* There mas total uncertainty about the amount of did 
that mould inf act materialise and on what terms. By 1964, although
Higeria had reoaived firm did offers of £H216 million* jnly 036 million*
s>7was infact received as disbursements • The Federal Finance Minister
had often to complain about " delays in executing new project# and
28in drawing down offers of external (did already made". The did received 
mere to cover only the offshore costs of projects leaving Higeria with 
the burden of providing the sometimes relatively much larger domestic 
cost components.
Association mould thus open to Higeria, opportunities for increased 
foreign did on relatively easy tarns* Having a population about ths 
same as ths 18 A.O.T.s put together, She mas likely to receive a 
relatively large Share of the Funds disbursements.
27* "Federation of Higeria Matismal Development Plan Progress leport
1964" (Federal Ministry cf Economic Derrelopmsnt-Lsgps) See A.T. 21
28. House of Reps Debates 2-4-65 Col 557*
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Moreover Contributions to the Oversea Development Fund 
by the EEC Member States was also partly based on size.
France and Germany both contributed jfeOO million4 or 34.496
each of the First fund. If the UK became a Member of the EEC
uhe was likely to bear a relatively large proportion of the
Contributions to the Fund. Such a responsibility would place serious
constraint on her ability to maintain bilateral did disbursements
on the levels attained before EEC Membership. If Nigeria refused ***
Association, she was therefore likely to suffer a reduction^Aid 'A
from the UK Source.
It would thus appear that on a purely economic standpoint 
Nigeria had very much to gain and relatively little to lose from 
Association with the EEC. >
C H A f T K B  7
ranaiA un> the s .s .c .  11
' PKI, Sr1.
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That the Government v u  seriously concerned shout the possible
adverse consequences of the CBT on Nigeria1! export performance mas
evident ae long ago as 1950 when ths Minister of Cowweroe end Industry,
Dr. Mbadlwe informed the Federal House of Representatives it was feared
that "In future, gradually as the Treaty of Borne comes into effect-
some Nigeria produce may be difficult to sell?1
In early 1959* letters of protest against CBT were sent to some
2member Governments of the Six.
At the 15th Session of GATT in Tokyo in October 1959* the new 
Minister of Comnaree and Industry* Zasma ths Bon.Bukar Dipcharima drew 
attention to the fact that in 1956* a third of Nigeria*! ssforts went 
to ths Community States and declared 1 "We are concerned at the future 
prospects for tha greater pert of this trade whioh is being endangered 
by the possibility of higher tariffs* new preferences and managed 
markets* Quite candidly it seems unfair to us that these six countries 
should be considering Increased discrimination against us in favonr 
of other African Terrirtories when we in Nigeria do not discriminate 
against their exports to us"^
By early 1961 it bad beoome clear to the Federal Government it 
could not blow down the walls of ths CET by mere words or letters of 
protest.
1. HRD Vol. 1, 1956/9 Session Col. 594
2. HRD 12th Feb. 1959 Col. 570
5. Federal Nigeria Vol 2 No 11 Bov. 1959 P»7«
A
In a debate cm tha iasua in tha Fadaral Parliament in August* 1962 * •
XJ* vara unanimous in condoning Association. Why waa tha fseling . >4 j  .
against Association so intansa?
Iwt  o f » .o -C o la n U ll.*
In tha first flush of indapandanoa and at a period whan
radical national lan was riding high in Africa* tha haliaf waa
ccaaonplaca that Africa was aanaoad hy what Balaam has dascribad as
"a supremo danger which could shake tha Continent to its foundations -
9tha danger of economic exploitation by outside powers"' This waa 
"Hso^Coloalall«"* Ths motive force was tha deaire by Coltmial *
Powers to sake good tha loess they had sustained by relinquishing 
Colonial Control over thair Afrioan Colonies* World Powers which had 
not oolanlsed Africa were also thought to have neo-colonial daaigna on 
tha Continent* Africa* a rich natural resources ware an attraction*
Added to these was the inpuls# by either aide of tha Cold Ufcr 
to sake ideological Conquests among Afrioan States* Such recruits would 
inter alia* afford valuable support at the T&ilted Nations where newly 
independent States were growing In inner!sal strength*
Ths means of fostering this nev-styla Colonialism were foreign 
trade^ did end foreign private investments, the strategy was to rmader 
an Afrioan Stats so dependent on ths economic goodwill of a foreign 
power that it becomes wide open to political manipulation by its 
eoonomlo "benefactors". On trade and foreign investments Balewa had 
said that "— — So long aa ths trade C d  industry of Africa arc 
conducted with only one area of the world* so long will the feeling 
of dependency persist ($o undermine political independence) f10
9* &ir Abubakar in an m^CeTrlJiimer bpeeoh to delegates to th© 1^2 
v Afrioan Summit held in Logos* *Hr Prime Minister* Op Cit P.92.
10. Sir Abubakar Tafava Balewa "Nigeria Looks Ahead" Foreign Affairs 
(law York) Oothbber, 1962* p. 136.
% \ 4  *
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Foreign did v u  b o v m r  the nost effective tad deadly weapon. Sir 
itatetar told tho African Summit at Addis Ababa,In 1963 «—  I do 
not believe that any kind of Aid, no matter from where it oomee, is 
without strings attachod to it"1.1 Foreign powers frequently put 
Afrioan States "under aa obligation" througfadld and were oapabls of 
" sore insidious infiltration through technical assistance”?2It was 
frequently the ease of 'he who pays the piper trying to call the tune!
So serious was this danger of noo-Colonialias that ------Just as we
(Afrioan States) haws fought political domination (Colonialism], it is 
also iaportant that we fight against economic domination (nee- Qolonlallan) 
tgr otter Statoa"1?
The popular view in ffigsrla was that Association was designed to 
perpetuate dependence by the Associated Overseas Territories (AOTs) 
on the EEC Member States* In other words, Association was a patent 
instrument of neo-Coloniallan* Sustaining this suspioion wss ths fear 
that free trade between the highly industrialised Sir and ths 
economically developing AOTs ss envisaged under the Treaty of Hone 
would encourage the AOTs to specialise in Agricultural production 
while simultaneously discouraging donsstio industrialisation 
particularly of ths Imports replacement variety.1* Provisions under 
Article 135 (3) of the Home Treaty for Infant industry protsotion 
by AOTs wavs seen ss a ruse. The conclusion^ of a OT 8GA Report that 
"there is a danger that the Treaty of Bobmi may tempt Associated States 
to prefer ths Abort run advantages of tariff concessions to tho 
long run gains of industrial development1*1 ^were accepted ss valid.
11. 'Hlreria^Speaks' op pit P . 1^ 1 .....  ..
1 3! Ibid PI62
14. Sas Chapter 6.
15. "The impact of Vest European Xntorgratlon an Afrioan Trade end
development** p  d t  p . & 7 ^-----
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It was such fears that provoked the charge that Association was 
devised to keep Afrioa a constant source of raw materials. This 
argument Ignores the fact, seen in the previous Chapter, that 
Association arrangements encouraged industrialisation through the 
upgrading of local raw materials and that import replacement 
industrialisation was not without its pitfalls.
As far aa the public was concerned, Association was thus an 
embodiment of French Euro-Africanitm - the theory of the complemen­
tarity of African end European economies. In pursuance of its 
Euro-African ideal, France had Created the Franc Zone embracing 
Metropolitan France and its Colonies. Within this sane, there was
free movements of goods and factors while commercial intrusion by
* *
by third countries was kept at bay by a complex System of tariff
barriers, quote8 ': and exchange control. To encourage the Colonies
of
in the production/agricultural raw materials, France had operated 
various price support (Surprix) and income stabilisation Schemes for 
their benefit. These Simultaneously discouraged geographic 
diversification of markets and tended to perpetuate as Theresa Eayter
described it " A situation in whioh the Overseas Territories
produce goods whioh are not Competitive in world markets end depend 
on France for their ability to sell them at remunerative prices and 
their survival"1^  France also granted generous financial assistance 
to the Territories. The outcome was that the Colonies, an attainment 
of political independence, found themselves heavily dependant on 
France economically and generally had to toe the French line in 
their foreign policies.
16. T. Hayter- Frsnoh Aid (ODI London 1966) £.83
i
The Involvement of Franoe In the EEC was enough to generate 
Strident opposition by the Nigerian public against Association* The 
Sahara Atomic test series* the Algerian War, and Bizerta had not 
made France the most popular European power among Nigerians. It was 
generally accepted in Yigeria that the Support for France by the Franco­
phone African States on such vexed issues as the Sahara tests and
Algeria was due* in no little measure* to the ability of France toits
manipulate them through/ strangleHoUi on their economies* When
Cognisance was taken of the fact that like Franoe in Francophone
Africa* the EEC also operated prioe support and Stabilsation
schemes and established a Development Fund to Channel Aid exclusively '***
to the AOTs, Higerlan Suspicions deepened. Sir Abubakar had often
insisted that all foreign Aid had gtrings* If the EEC had no ulte&g^
neo-colonial motives and the intention behind its Aid Schemes was
merely to advance African economies than* as Malan Amlnu Kano of
the Higeriea TJH Delegation wanted to know in 1961, " What prevents
these Same funds from being made available to the same countries
through bilateral or multilateral arrangements not In anyway
17contingent upon belonging to a particular trading group?” It was
economic
therefore feared that Nigeria* s heavyAdependence on the EEC and Britain
aa shown in the previous Chapter* would render her susceptible to
political manipulation.
Besides, Association was open only to those States whose ex-
18Metropolitan powers were EEC Members*
f^* 2nd Committee. TIN General Assembly 18tii Oct. 1&H*
18. Article 38 (2) of the "Convention of Association between the EEC and - 
the Afrioan and Malagasy States associated with that Community 
(The Yaounde Convention)” Stipulated that Association on Similar 
terms as oont&lned in the Convention would be available to countries 
with "an economic structure and production comparable to those of the 
Associated States" The Condition that a prospective Associated State 
must be a Colony or ax-Colcoy of an EEC Member State was thus relaxed*
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The offer of Association under Pert 1Y of the Rome Treaty to 
independent Nigeria had not resulted from 'negotiations in vhioh her 
Government had actively participated but from negotiations between 
her ex-Colonial Overlord and the Community. In Parliament a Mr Oronsaye 
contended that the word "Associate" was derogatory* Being an 
Independent Country "We are in a position to bargain with anybody* Why 
should we be tied to the apron strings of somebody who is bent on going
into the Market?"1^  It was therefore felt that accepting Association
»would be tantamount to Conceding that the Country's Independence was 
hollow and that defacto Sovereignty Continued to reside in London* *
Association
The SBC was conceived as an economic step to the eventual political 
union of Western Europe* As Mr Macmillan told the House of Commons in
July 1961* "----- although the Treaty of Borne ie concerned with eocnomio
matters, it has an iaportant political objective, namely to promote the 
Unity and Stability of Europe which le b o  essential to the struggle
pAfor freedom and progress throughout the world"* since Western Europe is 
an iaportant arm of the Western Alliance which confronts the Warsaw Pact 
Countries In the Cold u*r, the EEC was therefore involved in the Celd War* 
Aa has been demonstrated, the Nigerian public believed that AOTs vere 
Susceptible to politioal manipulation by EEC States* In 1962 Bonn 
threatened it would refuse to ratify the new Association Convention if
any of the 18 AOTs accorded diplomatic recognition to the German
21Democratic Republic. The AOTs could therefore be meneouvered into towing
ithe EEC States, and by implication, the Western line in international 
politioal matters thus rendering futile their professed non-alignment 
foreign policies*
19* H*R*D. 21st August 1962 Col* 2472* 
20* Hansard (London) c 51-7-61* 
21* West Africa (London) 15-12-62
♦
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Even if no diroot attempt at political manipulation of AOTs 
waa attempted, the argument that Aaaooiation and hon-Qlignaent were 
inoonpatihle was Sustained in the Nigeria* vieg%Balewa had said
that the objectives of the EEC were three folds Economic, political
22and military advancement of Vestezn Europe. The three were far Aram 
being mutually exclusive.Decisions in the eoonomio field are often 
Coloured by political and military considerations. Establishing 
intimate economio relations with the Community by means of Association 
almost automatically involved the Country in the politieal and 
military aspects of the Community. Strenghtening this view was 
Professor Hallsteia's (EEC President) insistence in 1961 that "the 
k  ultimate motive and the most important effeots of our (EEC)
Association (with the 16 AOTs) axe political"25
In this regard it may be pointed out that Nigeria's heavy eoonomio 
dependence on Western Powers depicted in Chapter 8, can equally be said 
to be inconsistent with non- oil grown t • The Strong economic links with
the Vest had however been forged before independence. Hhile some
' 2Aeffort was being made to reduce the degree of reliance on the Vest
the position at independence had to be taken as given in drawing up a 
foreign policy. Accepting Association would on the other hand, be 
a voluntary act by the Government of a Sovereign Nigeria with the full 
knowledge that it might well be incompatible with non-alignment. 
Rejecting Association would, in the Context of non-alignment, actually 
tend to make up in part for the economic dependence on the West and 
so sharpen the Government's non-alignment posture.
22. "Mr Prime Minister" Op Cit P.66
25. Reproduced in "VoBt Afrioa" (London) 6-6-61.
24* For instance t the Signing of Trade Pacts with several East European 
States after Independence as shown in Chapter S.
Besides, there was the question of participating in the new 
institutions of Association? Association Council, Parliamentry Conference 
and a Court of Arbitration Comprising Ministers and represents tires of 
the EEC Council, Commission and the AO? Governments* Although Articles 
44t 30 and 51 of the Taoundo Convention, which brought the institutions 
into being, imbued them with powers relating only to natters concerning 
the Association, Balewa expressed a widely held belief when he told 
Parliament in 1962, "participating in these institutions, which constitute
part of the Structure of the Community, would be incompatible with
25Nigeria *s policy of non-alignment" • These institutions would tend 
to formalise the relationship between the AOTs and EEC which . vae 
already considered as being inconsistent with hon-hlignment.
ASSOCIATION AND AFRICAN UNITY 
The Nigerian public was equally convinced that Association was 
not only an obstacle to Pan African Unity but also to Nigeria's 
potential role in the attainment of Such Unity* Since as it believed, 
Association would induce African States to specialise in (Agricultural 
production, Africa's tradeable products would Continue to be overwhelm, v 
mingly competitive to the detriment of inter-African trade. But trade 
is an important means of fashioning intimacy between States*
Furthermore, the Competitiveness of Afrioan economies would render 
an African Common Market route to Continental Unity extremely difficult*
It was also feared that Association per se, might impede the 
formation of Customs Unions among African States* Although Part 17 of the 
Treaty of Home was Bilent on the issue of AOTs forming Customs Unions with 
third Countries,2**
25* "Mr* Prime Minister" 4 , 'a r f r a :---------------------------------
26* Article 9 of the Yaounde Convention granted AOTs the right to form 
Customs Union's or Tree trade Areas with third Countries as long as 
such arrangements were not L/vcompatible with the principles and 
provisions of the Yaounde Convention* Much uncertainty however 
attached to the way the proviso would be interpreted in practise*
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there waa no guarantee that any future attempts by Associated and 
Non~Assooiated African States to form such a union would not be 
frustrated by obligations of Association. Circumventing any problems 
arising in this regard by having all Afrioan States become AOTs would 
be impossible. Hot all Afrioan States could become (Associated under 
Part 17. Some had strong ideological objections. Some like Liberia, 
cmuld not qualify for Association (until the Signing of the Yaounde 
Convention) because they had no ex-colonial ruler who was an ESC 
Member.
ASSOCIATION AKP HICERIA»S ROLE IK PRQMOTHTO 01UTY 
In order to lay claims to Afrioan leadership and play a significant
role in promoting Continental unity, the Governments foreign policy
had generally to be K_ y reasonably appealing to "Moderate" and
"Militant" Afriasn States alike. The Nigerian Public was satisfied
that the Country's accession to Association under Part 17 could infact
alienate either group of States.
THE HMOTyKrRArfrR* STATES 
Most of the 18 Associated African States were non-militant in theirA
foreign policies. Nigeria could provoke their disaffection because its 
Association would dilute the economic advantages they derived from 
Association. As indicated in the previous Chapter, Nigeria and the 18 
AOTs were Competitors in the export of many products* While the 14 
Franoophone AOTs, for instance, had been weaned with subsidised export 
prices and heavily sheltered Market* in Metropolitan France, Nigeria 
had enjoyed only relatively small Commonwealth preferential margins 
in the UK. Thus the AOTs would not have'welcomed the entry of Nigerian 
exports into the Community on similar terms as their own.
Moreover, by reason of fact that her population was about the same 
as that of the 18 states put together, it was likely that Nigeria would 
receive the lion's share of the EEC's Overseas Development FundMid
2 2  t
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The CocsEunity was therefore likely to beoome aa increasingly 
isportant market for Nlgerla~~type exports out of whioh Higeria 
could hardly afford to he shat out. On the other hsndthe 
Government see fully aware it could not ride rough shod over publlo 
opinion on the issue of Association. The protests against the 
Anglo- Nigerian Defence Agreement had underlined the extent to whioh 
some sections of the public could parry their opposition.
In tferoh 1962, the Federal Minister of Finance, In his budget 
speech confirmed that In relation to question of whether or not to 
associate, the Federal Government wee having pzohlsne. Nigeria, be 
declared "Cannot and will not contemplate any form of agreement 
or Association with ths Cooanmlty whioh savours of a Colonial or 
neo-Colonial relationship. Squally we Insist that our vital Interests 
cp fully protected In a manner commensurate with our Ballons! Sovereipity 
With these vital Reservations, we approach the whole Complex 
question (pf Association) with a completely open wind Hsnj detailed 
Studies ere being made, both in Nigeria and elsewhere, but until 
a very much clearer picture emerges, Higeria cannot fully determine 
where her true Interests 11s"?2
hr September 1962, the Government had reached the Conclusion 
that on purely eoonomio grounds, Association was desirable but It was 
equally certain, it could not carry the public with itj^ Sj&ed for 
Association. As a way out, it proposed a Commonwealth Solution. At 
the September 1962 Commonwealth Parliamentry Association Conference 
In London, the Nigerian Federal Minister of Katabllaments (Advocated 
the formation of a "Commonwealth Eoonomio Community" as a counter 
to the £BC. Such a Commonwealth Community would eschew ths unacceptable 
political Implications of Aaeoolation for it "would tsiioto any 
semblance of dependency or neo—Colonialism"^1
32. Meroh 29tk», 1962 Pf ?§-3^     —
33. 7th^CommonwealthParliamentry Conference- Renort of Pi^oeedi^
1962 (Commonwealth Parliamentry Association 1962) J». 64. -
*
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The proposals oca# to nothing* Th# Government than saw It had to 
go it alon#.
On Jiis arrival for th# Co— ionwselth Prlnc Minister*# Conference 
In September, 19^ 2, Prime Minister Bale—  nad# it ol#ar hi# Government 
oould not aooept Association bat hopod "It is posslbl# not to 
Assooiat# bat to negotiate th# Ban# t— i as th# Associated Members"?4 
Shortly aft—  his return hone, h# idlormed Parliament that although 
Nigeria" wilf^mo Circumstances" geek Association 9 his Government had 
deoided "to open negotiations with th# BBC to Secure a guarantee of 
access to itt markets and to a reasonable Share in the expansion of 
that market for those commodities that would b# particularly 
affected by Unport tariffs and quotas"^
,%9m. a l i a m m t e .
Available
La 1965# the BBC Counoil declared its readiness to "negotiate 
in a sympathetic spirit 9 agreement a with any non member Countries 
who so requested end whose economic structure and production were
mCComparable to thos of the Associated States" • The agreement would 
take the form of one of the followings
(a) Adoption of Association under Article 56 of the Yaounde Convention*
(b) Association (Agreements under Article 238 of the treaty of Borne 
involving mutual rights and obligations particularly in the field 
of trade*
(o) Commercial agreements to facilitate and expend trade between the
*7Community and those Countries*
The Nigerian Authorities had to choose one of the three. Alternative 
(d) was ruled out ab initio because it was tantamount to accepting the
Association the Government had just rejected on political grounds*
34* The Time# (London) 3th September 1962*
35* Wlgarla Speaks Op fii J\14B
36. BBC Commission- 7th General Report on the activities of ths C o m i t y  
1st. April, 1963~to 5 ^ st "Ksrchl 964 (Br— ieTs W )  #.»5.-------
37. Ibid.
■s
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Alteraative (c) was also unsuitabls. To asst Nigeria's needs a 
commercial agreement would hays entailed ths mutual granting of
i
tariff concessions on certain oommondlties by Nigeria and EEC* 
buch concessions would hare had to bo extended to all Countries 
with which the parties hays a Most Favoured Nation Agreement.
Under Article XXXV of the General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade*
(GATT), the Concessions would here had to ba axtandad to all GATT
Members. Consequentlyt such s Commercial agreement would yield
substantial advantages only to tha extant that the Country involved
held e monopoly or near-monopoly position in tha world export of
the Commoditise covered by the agreement. If in negotiating a
Commercial AgresMtot, Nigeria meant to ensure that her exports
vis-a-vis those from competing AOTs did not suffer discrimination
in the EEC-the logical raison d *etre of any such negotiations*
ths trade advantages of Association to the AOTs* would in ths circumstances*,
be attenuated to e degree unacceptable to the 16 AOTs and the SBC.
Only Association under Article 258 of the Treaty of Borne remained 
open. This differed from Association under Part 1? in the lxportant 
respect that Nigeria would have to negotiate the terms of the 
Agreement ae an independent Country. No longer waa aha bslng asked 
to becoma Associated by the grace of her former colonial Overlord.
Besides* Certain events had rendered Association loss politically 
repugnant. In 1962* Certain European Countries like Austria* Sweden 
and Switasrland Bought Association with ths EEC. ^ Austria had 
“permanent neutrality1* written into its constitution and ths Soviet 
Uhlon is one of ths guarantors of its Independence treaty*
36* “European Community- The Facts” 0p Clt £.24.
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Switzerland would not even join the TV for free of Compromising 
its traditional neutrality. Sweden also had long standing traditions 
of neutrality. If Association would not impugn their neutrality 
then it appeared that Association need not necessarily undermine a 
Country* s non-alignment foreign policy. Moreover, Association did 
not appear to deflect Governments of AOTs like Mali from leftist foreign 
policy orientation. Association thus appeared in a new light and some 
of the emotional opposition it had aroused in Africa evaporated.
Moreover, in January 1963* General De Gaulle effectively blocked 
Britain’s EEC Membership bid. With Nigeria's most Important national 
Ctistomer excluded, the degree of Nigeria's dependence on EEC Market 
fell considerably from the level it would had attained had the British 
application succeeded* Consequently, the fear that Association would 
Subject Nigeria to political manipulation beoause of her excessive 
trade reliance on the EEC Correspondingly Subsided.
Of great laportanoe was ths slide of radical opinion in Africa.
The 1963 Addis Ababa African Summit had seen the 'Moderates* triumph
over the 'ftadioals* ia African polities. Ths OATJ Charter had
the principle that each African State wee Master of its own destiny*
Aa African State could therefore seek ESC Association without 
necessarily loosing arueh faoe*
In addition, by this tin# ths AO, the focus of Opposition 
to Association in Nigeria,was in utter disarray while the Country 
itself had commenced the period of 'Crisis in Series' Spotlighted 
ia Chapter 5* Public opinion waa therefore relatively leea ooncerned 
with Issues of external relations* Consquently, the Lagos Government 
had a free-hand in pursing its policy towards ths BEG.
Nigeria GonmmDoed formal negotiations with ths EEC in October, 1964 
sad Signed sa Association Agreement ia July 1966. Eoonomio Calculations 
had obviously triumphed over political factors.
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. Th* KUmrian M o c k U m  M  ^ , a V «  (flections to
Association
Cy/Certain aspects of the Higerlan Association Agreement were designed . 
to meet Nigeria's Odginal objections to Association*
Dn— tln
It had been feared that Association would impede domestic 
Industrialisation by throwing the donestle market open to relatively 
cheap duty free lsports from the KEC and granting only restricted 
powers for Infant Industry protection* under the Nigerian Agreement, 
the Stipulations relating to infant Industry protection were Stellar 
to those in the Yaounde Convention. ^^Uhlle the Yaounde Convention 
(and the Original Association under Fart 1Y of the Treaty of Bone) 
provided that AOTs eventually reduce virtually to aero, Import duties 
on all lsports from ths SBC States, ths Nigerian Agreement granted 
preferential duty margins ranging between 2% end %  on only 26 
I t a u ^ W o h  in 1964 had a Tain* of about 14.9# of Klgorla's total 
Imports In value terns* Local production of most of the 26 Items would 
be difficult due to non-avail*A4Mty of requisite materials* Thus,
Import Substitution Industrialisation was likely to be lees hampered 
under the Nigerian Agreement than ths Yaounde Convention* On the
other hand while under the Yaounde Convention, all AP^hnperts will 
eventually enter the Community Area, under the Nigerian Agreement, 
eventual free access was sounded to all but four major items i Coosa, 
Groundnut Oil, Plywood and Palm Oil!1 These products were subject to 
tariff j quota, arrangements to Safeguard the 18 AOT export positions*
39* Articles 5 and 6 of the "Agreement establishing an Association 
between the EEC and the Republic of Nigeria and Annexed documents" 
(Referred to as the "Nigerian Agreement") Library Copy.EEC 
Information Centre, London, S.V.tj And Articles 3 and Protocol 
Ho 1 Article 4 of the Yaounde Convention.
40* Proto ool No 2 of the Nigerian Agreement* See AT 20*
41* Article 3 and Proto ool No 1 of the Nigerian Agreement.
Neo-Colonialismi iTi i imim
As perceived by Nigeria, economic aid was ths foremost means of
s .establishing nso-Colonial relationship between States* The Nigerian
• Ml
Agreement did not include any provisions for multilateral aid from the z 
EEC's Bverseass Development Fund.
African Unity
Stipulations about conditions for establishing Customs Ttaions and 
Free Trade Areas between an Associated State and third Countries were 
similar in tha Nigerian and Yaounde Conventions. The Nigerian objections 
vere apparently not mat in this sphere*
NeverUvalxiss: the oonoem that Nigeria would alienate the 18 AOT'e
by becomming Associated was modified by two considerations.
(a) Non-competition with the 18 for EEC multilateral <lid*
(b) Restricted competdtion between Nigeria and the 18 in four important 
export items* Cocoa Beans, Groundnut Oil, Plywood and Palm Oil* Zh ^ 
the Nigerian Agreement, these items wars subjected to a tariff/quota 
arrangements* VIthin tha limits of tha quota, Nigerian exports were 
to enter the EEC on identical terms as shipments from the 18*
Outside the quopa, Nigerian exports were to attract terms similar
to those applicable to exports from third Countries. The four 
commodities were those in which monpetitian between Nigeria and 
tha 18 was likely to ba most severe* The economic interests of the 
18 were thua reasonably well protected by the terms of the Nigerian 
Agreement*
EPILOGUE
The Nigerian Association Agreement never became operational*
Articles 30 and 31 of tha Agreement stipulated ratification by the 
signatory States (i.e.Nigeria and the Six) as a condition precedent to . 
its ooming into force. By October, 1968, Prance and Luxenberg had not 
ratified. ^ Sinoe the AgreemMt was valid until 31st May 1969,^it "Simply 
lapsed" .^Thna in the final analysis, whether or not terms of the 
Nigerian Agreement met Nigerian object ions to Assooiation turns out to 
ba academic.
42. Librarian,EEC Information Centre,Cheaham Street,London S.V.1.
(Personal Interview)
43* Article 32 of the Nigerian Association Agreement.
44* Personal letter Ref No 6OO/1/5 Vol. 11 of 8th March 1971 from the 
Nigerian High Commission,London to the Writer.
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NIGERIAN CONCEPT OF NON-ALIGNMENT
- Outlining the fundamental principles to underpin his 
Governments foreign policy, the Prime Minister told the UH General 
Assembly in October 1960 "We shall not forget our old friends and 
we are proud to have been accepted as a member of the Commonwealth . ■
r- but never-fchaaLiiss we do not intend to align ourselves as a matter
1of routine with any of the power blocs— " In her relationship with 
the big powers, Lagos clearly meant to adopt a pragmatic approach, 
the intention being to maintain adequate manoeuvrability to enable
her take some heat out of the cold war. Balewa contended that "---
there should be at least some people who could tell either side
Jin the Cold UarJ that they are wrong or they are right, and that we shall
2do it fearlessly?
To be able to play this role effectively, Higeria had to be accepted 
by both sides as being genuinely non-aligned* Given her relatively 
smooth path to independence, her long historical, cultural and 
economic attachments to the Western bloc and her own professed 
inclinations never to forget her old friends, there was a presumption 
She would tend to be biased in favour of the West in her foreign policy* 
Most significant in this regard was the Nigerian Defence Agreement with 
the UK which remained in force from November 1960 to January 1962*
The Agreement was dealt with extensively in Chapter 4* A pact for 
mutual defence entered into with a leading member of one of the Cold 
War blocs was invariably tantamount to alignment with What bloc* The 
Nigeriin Defence Minister had however maintained that the Agreement" 
in no way derogates from the full Sovereignty and independence of 
action of Nigeria". The onus was squarely on the Government to prove
1. "Mr Prime HinisteroSpeeches" Cit f*5j. ..
2j. Ibid p, 80. .H.R.D. Op cit November Session 1960 p.56-8
I
fchat this m i  Inf antt ¥ •  OIM* It K M  «p tO it tO OUltlTOtO th* 
friendship of both Eastern and VOetoxn powers and to bo oonaietantly 
impartial in all dealings with them. tho < impartiality woo not only to 
bo done bat hod to bo seen to bo done*
* h^,ir^
m s mnnm ta rn s  <g jjbbica ( p . s . a. )
During tho 1959 ore of independenoe federal Pori I— eatery eleotione, 
tho XPC Manifests adrooatod that tho Qowarr— it of a t o f m l p  Hlgerla 
should work for "Increasing friendship with tho USA"f It would appoar 
that 1m 1960-66, Lagos atronooualy avoided going out of its way to stop 
onAHSJL*s toos. the Slgerian Oorarwait woo avowvdly against racial 
discriningtioa yet whan it waa quorrlod about racial dioorinination 
against Nigerian Citizens in tho Uhlted Statesv a Junior Minister hold 
brief for tho Aaerloan Goroxmant by explaining that "It is not always 
easy for any Govensaant to eheok tho ozoossoo of oortain elaaeats of its
5national^;
w m m & .£ mis. na,.y>
In November, 1960,Sir, Abubakardasured Parliament his Govornaant 
was "going to see to it that Bod China is adaittod into tho Utolted Bations"^ 
This waa. a firm declaration that £-agoa was not only apposed to Jtuooessive 
TJS Governments policy of exolnding the peoples Republic of China froa 
the UV Manberohip but also intended to do eonething positive about it*
Whan tho iaeuo of Poking*a adaisaion case to tho vote at tho US in*1961 
however, Nigeria abstained.
4* S.P.C. Election Manifesto Op Cit Uailt Tinea (Lagoa) 8*9*99*
5. H*B*D* 12*4*62 p.JO
6* Ibid November 24 and 29, 1960 Col*74*
Th* Foreign Minister explained that his Government ves opposed
to the idee of expelling on TJH Msnber (yxanMan) in order to ednit
another (Peking)* As e ooeprosd.se he advocated instead that both
Chinas be members.^ In view of Peking's total rejection of a two
China Policyv this wee equivalent to booking the status quo. In faot9
the foreign Minister later olalaed th t there was no indication that
Bed China either wanted admission into the UH or was prepared to
8abide bf its Charter. Obviously, Lagos ought to have been aware of 
these reservations before the November 1960 declaration on Chinese
UN Membership. The fact that the Prime Minister'g Statement was so
Jr
unequivocal suggests that the Issues subsequently raised by the 
Foreign Minister * r. were considered inaignilioant at the tins.
Advancing then later aa excuses for not Supporting Peking's admission 
thus signified a policy switch out of deference to TJS Susceptibilities.
Significantly, the Higerlan Goveramsnt was at this tine engaged 
in tddeou* negotiations with Washington on osrtain issues directly 
related to ITS Aid to Higeria. Just before independence, Nigeria had 
applied to the US for <tld and waa assured of a favourable reaponae.
The US however requested inter alia that the Higerlan Government 
enter into an agreement to it for any US owned assets
which night be rendered useless as a result of any actions by Legos. 
This was to insure against nationalisation. The Higerlan Government 
felt that the issue was fully covered by Chapter 3 S.JO of the 
Higerlan Constitution end therefore thato Hepehate dgresnsnt of the 
type sought by Waahixgon would tg Superfluous. In consequence, 
protraoted negations snsued. It waa not until July 1962 that a draft 
agreeannt was ready. Lsgos delayed slgaing it until December.
7. Moadj. fcrt (Uaa.)19th Jwmxj, 196?.
8. TlJW ifclMlM (H«w Tork.USA) 15.12.61 fr.J2.
2 3.2*4
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In the DM8 time, Sir Abubakar payed an offloal visit to 
Washington la July, 1961. Ha waa aoat favourably impressed by President
Kennedy whoa ha found "to ba a a n  of understanding Sympathetic and
, owilling to aaaiat us ia pursuit of our atms and objectives".
Just how willing Washington waa to assist Higeria was dnonstratad
when in December 1961, tha US Government announced it would provide
#225 millions did to support Higeria'a 1962-68 Developnnrt Plan*10
Tha polioy modification on Peking's XXV admission was thus meant
in part at least, as a goodwill gesture towards tha US whioh was
Higeria's Single most important <fid doner* Higeria persistently
abstained from voting on mainland China's UH admission until 1965
when She voted ia favour* Ths haw foreign Minister designate* HUhu
Banal i explained that "Higeria does not think that a opuntzy whose
people constitute about a fifth of mankind and who, whether we
approve or not, now possesses atomic weapons, should ba keptc , out of
tha mainstream and deliberations of this body (I*e* tha TJH)"]1
Proposals to asst Rad China in tha TJH hadl been gaining increasing
aoosptanoa yearly* hr 1965, many countries including important US
Olliaa like Britain, were voting for Peking's admission* Ths Hlgerlan
Government oould,in the oiroumstaneee, vote for the proposal without
neoesaarily incurring much US displeasure*
9* Sir Abubakar in a broadcast to ths nation on his return from the 
US visit* "Mr Price Minister" Cii. 62.
10.K*— lag* ArohlT»B op Cit F»bruaiy 3rd-10th 1962. 18583.
11.D*lly(Tl— ) lagoii 6.10.65
Tha Nigari&n Government * a response to tho Boy of Pi*9*
Invasion, tho TO economic blockade of Cuba, and tho 1962 Sopor Powers 
tflisaila Confrontation ovar tho Island van muted. Nigeria did 
hovovor in 1962 ,vote against tho TO on tho Cuban Invasion iasoo 
at tho TO1t "|he Foreign Minister in hia TO dddraaa merely atatod 
that "Cuba should not bo a ohooa pawn on tho board of power polities"1?
It is significant7 , that no offidal Nigerian delegation ovar 
viaitod Cube,
m r n m w  o f w m m j s m  m  m  w o s n m .
In December 1960, Nigeria had Cosponsored a TO GetiCpil Assembly 
Resolution which insisted that an <3greanant to stop all naoloar 
tests was "not only iaporative but urgent" and urged all States 
"to refrain from further t e s t s " 1962, following Soviet violation 
of tho voluntaiy moratorium on tests, the TO Qovarnnmt dooided to 
resume atmoophorio nuclear tests. This decision was sanctioned by 
tho Nigerian Government which maintained that Washington was justified 
in view of tho Soviet breach1^ . Thda response Contrasts Strongly with the 
Government's motions when Franco exploded an aton bomb in tho 
^Ahara in Deoeafcer 1960. As will bo soon preoantly,Lagos broke off 
diplomatic relations with Burls snd barred French aircrafts snd ships 
fron using Slgerian ports. The fact that Xlgerla had grave fears 
that the Sahara testa night endanger life in AfTiea while no such 
fears arose fron tho TO toots conducted outside Afrloa wee 
influential in Government policy. But Lagos' Objections*t to the Branch 
testa arose fron its condemnation of all atonio tests in general, as
4S. Ttaited Nation^*" General Assembly a/fu/995. ..  .
15* Federal Nigeria (Lagoa) 961.5 So.11 Sbvenber,1962.
14* Dailjtr2iass (Lagos) 29.12.60.
15* Morning Post (Lagoa) 6.3*62.
evidenced by its Co-sponsorship of ths XU Resolution referred to abftve,-
end ths oonduot of sueh tests in Africa In particular. It had nnnrta— art 
Russian tests in 1961. to sal n tain consistency it oould at least hare 
Tme Inert silent on ths US decision* Sfedorslng it inevitably gave 
impression that it was anxious to please ths Super Power which apart fron 
beta* ths head of ths Western All lance, was ths nost important single 
bilateral aid donor to Xlgerla.. .
OTHKR ISSTJK3
On other international Issues in whioh the US was involved, Lagos 
either taoitlj agreed with the US stand or refrained fron taking a 
dafiasd position, m  ths Congo, the Oovenwient favoured the UV line which 
often oorrssponded with official Washington policy. As was sssn in Chapter 
2, Lagos speedily endorsed Mobutu*s 1965 Coup whioh appeared subsequently 
to have received Washington's approval. Sir Abubakar waa a naabsr of tha 
still bom Co— onwealth Tiatnan Pesos Mission but he would pass no 
Judgment on US*s involvement in ths Indo-Ghin* War.
Besides, diplomatic oonSaot between legos and Washington was close.
The US had a Consulate in Higerla prior to October 1960. This waa
subsequently transformed into an ihbasay with fall diplomatic rights
*
when Ilgerla became independent. Aa alraady seen, in Jtily 1961, leu than 
ten months after indspendsnoe, tha Prims Minister paid an official visit 
to Washington.
m j m m j s m s M
Aa shown in Chapter 4, ths affinity between Lagos sad London was 
dasp although so—  of tho formal ties wars diasantlsd during ths 1960-66 
period. Ilgerla even ligud a Defence Agreement with the UK in 1960 
but had it rescinded in 1962.
m xcs
France had a Consul General in Lagoa bafora October, 1960 but ths 
relationship between iLagos and Paris was cool for nut of ths
2 3  5 *
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1960-66 period* On January 5" «» 1961 , angered by the 3rd French 
atonic test In the Sahara, the Nigerian Government ordered the French 
Ambassador and his Jttaff to quit the country within forty eight hours* 
French ■ a irc ra ft*  and Ships were forbidden to use Nigerian airports 
and ports*
The ban on . aircraft and shipping was lifted with effect from
/18th May 1961 in  response, aocording to a Government Statement to 
"representations from Dahomey, Niger; , and Chad whose developsmnt 
plans are being retarded by the denial of Nigerian port facilities 
to French Shipping on whioh these countries largely depend for their 
imports of Capital goods"^Xt was however, not until Ootober 1965 
that an agreement to resume diplomatic relations was reached between 
the two Governments* Xn the meantime, as seen in Chapter 2, Lagos 
openly declared support for ths Algerian Provisional Government in 
its fight for independence but refrained from granting it diplomatic
recognition* In 1961, Legos severely reprimanded Paris for the "Massacre"
17of Tunisians during the Biserta dispute •
The Stem reaction to the 3rd French tests was designed to 
bring home to France Nigeria "was a force to be reckoned with 
within ths Continent of Africa".8 The Nigerian ^ ibllc was genuinely 
alarmed that the tests would pollute Nigeria's and Africa's 
atmosphere with radlo-aotive fall-out. Some say the tests as a wioked 
plot against Africa* Jaja Vaohuku, later to be Foreign Minister, 
regarded the teste as indicating "a desire to tripe out the black race 
and to make it impossible for us {Africans] to fullfil our destiny"^
16* "gassings Contemporary Archives" Qp Cit 15-22 July 1961.1* 18217 
17* Daily Times (Legos) 26*8*61*
18* This was the main reason advanced by Dr.Aziklwe in advocating severs 
reprisals against Francs Should it persist with the tests after 
Nigeria became independent* Daily Times (Lagos) 13th* October, 1959*
19. H*R*D. Session 1959/60 Col* 1713-1722*
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'  20Another KP i w  D »  Ufti as a declaration of joar on Ufnto.
D m  ^ ttbllo w «  m t w ffd )gr vtet It considered itaoeU oontnytooa 
diRregurd fpr tht Ktgsrlnn pro test r* agal’iat the 5i»w—  test MrlM 
•van porter to the Fadtntltn bocorsiiig i ndepfflV*inrnt«
Ii|t« soon realised however that it ngr have ever reacted. So 
African finrtnrnmont, ‘Ittl t tout * (faMa fiwlnllKl. had nrrli ooctxsns
— w bp—  against Franco* She ham on French taireraft and Shipping hart 
**£ AfYf^tn states tbs rupture of dJLpXonatlc xaXatlans
out to bo dioadventayzacmo to Misnseinr» General fit nonpar
forgave Tj*g**** n d  this uns In peuft ryqiKmvlbls fyr, Othsr things,
Hence** tactics which madanrad protracted sad difficult, 91gsrla*s 
negotiations to hooons Itsaiti^ with ths VtrK0 In 1964*66^! Consequently, 
subsequent French tests In tbs f^lifTT slid tad no further punlttia 
ATMiitai notion Ikoi tha w< g*r  ^^  Gsvsnnsnt*
2
As Indlostsd In Qu^tar 2§ ths Riparian OovsrasMnt was a d F tnfl1 
Crltdo of Portuguese Chliaitallaiii in A£rloa and playad an active re la , 
in tha Q19*> dlnlonatlo offoaalte aeniaat t<awiT t% nooiissil XiSO of 
riding m t apl "to waa deadly woapocno ag&inst defenceless AAdosns In 
Angola*1* tha Qovmnnt turrifr Western powers to task far allegedly 
supporting tbs South Afrloaa Qoaeoent oosnonloally^nlHtarlly and 
politically* She dgaeisn Foreign Minister told a 9V Special 0— ilttss 
that fketoda paid Uttla head to tfll Basoltttlona because It was assuaed
that " t a t a m  It dees, it o n  always find Monda anoaig tha twatasm
■ ' Tr Jjjjn . '.'-' v ,. . __ ^  _ _ -,_i .»•:•< --.'a. j a \ , •»•'._l t w n N * Iagn flawed with disfavour Hal gate *e rels In ths range tragedy
20* ZbdLd Col. 1789
21* Sss bast Africa (London) 51st October,1964 ^.i?l8|27th February 1965 
?.223i 1st May 1965 P.474 and Oth Ihy 1965* p.503
22* Feral** Minister Jfcja Maohtrirae at the 9V Oaner&l Asssnbly* Federal 
Higeria (Tagae) Vol.5 9o*11 boranbsr 1962 £.4.
25. Meaning Fast (Lagoa) 1*4*61*
but relationship with Bonn was saleable. In 1962 the Foreignn
Minister suggested at tha UK General Assembly that East Germany should 
withdraw froa East Berlin whioh should then be united with West Berlin
to form a free City under UN Control2f In 3963 Nigeria entered into
the
an (Agreement with/West German Government for assistance in setting up 
an Au*< force and even accepted an implied condition not to accord
21diplomatic recognition to ths Democratic Republic of East Germany.^
Ho official Higerlan delegation visited East Germany.
m a a s H K
She Lagoa Government's relationship with Eastern (Communist) 
powers waa perpetually cool. •
m m  si. m  w m w  w w l & M m i
At independence, Nigeria had virtually no contacts with the USSR 
and the Government was in no hurry to modify ths position. The USSR was 
invited to Nigeria'a independence celebrations in 1960 but her application 
to open an Sabas ay in Lagos elicited no immediate response. A 1955 
Colonial Order banning the import of Communist literature remained
in force. Travel to the USSR and other Communist States waa highly
Scholarshipsrestricted while Students were forbidden to accept v— *'• — * 
awards tenable in these Countries. ■
Many of these restrictions were eventually lifted progressively 
but hesitantly. In April 1961, Lagos sad Moscow reached accord on the
exchange of diplomatic missions at Ambassadorial level but Soviet
26Embassy Staff were limited to ten persons. It took Soviet 
representatives another twelve months to find suitable office and 
residential accomodation.
24. ‘Federal Nigeria" Yol 5 <Ste Cit ■«£. * “
25. See Chapter 4.
26. Ksesing's Archives sb Cit 1.3.61. £• 18019.■ ■■ — ‘ * f ■
(Other East European Countries like Poland formally established 
diplomatic relations with Nigeria in 1962)* On her part Nigeria did 
not open an Kmbassy in Moscow until March 1963* In November 1961, 
the ban on importation of Communist literature was lifted. The Prime 
Minister however warned that lifting the ban was an "expression of 
faith by the Government in the Common’'sense of the Nigerian People".
It would be reimposed if it was found that "our filth has been .
misplaced and that this sort of literature directly threatens the
27the Security of the State or the Sovereignty of our Country? 1
. EasternRestrictions on travsl to a* Europe were relaxed in 1962 while the 
acceptance of Scholarships tenable in Communist Countries was not 
finally sanctioned until 1964* In July 1963, Nigeria signed a trade 
agreement with the USSR. While official Nigerian dalegatlona visited 
the USSR, the Federal Prime Minister never personally went to Moscow.
In the political sphere, Lagos was rarely in agreement with Moscow.
The Government condemned the Kremlin*s Congo policies and 
regarded aa intolerable any Russian /Military involvement in the 
crisis. In July 1960, Sir Ahmadn Bello, on a visit to the US, told 
a press conference at Knoxville, Tennessee his Country "Could not
2Q • -­Just look on and do nothing if Russian troops intervened in the Congo?
This Contrasts sharply with Nigerian Governments approval which
greeted the use of U3 Air force planes to fly Belgian Paratroopers
into rebel held Stanleyville to rescue mainly foreign Civilian
hostages in November 1964.^ Although conceived as a humanitarian
exercise, it constituted nevertheless, intervention of foreign troops
in the crisis. It would thus appear that the Government waa demonstrating a
basic pro-Western attitude. X, v
2 3 9*
27. H.R.P. 22.11.61 P.8.
28. Daily Times (Legos) 23.7*60.
29. Ibidl8.ia.64.
Legos* reaction to the Soviet Troika proposals for the UN*a
Secretary Generalship was alee unfavourable. It would net go along
with this plan which was tantamount to "introducing the right of
«50
veto into tho Administrative realm (of the Ul}9 (And was designed to get 
rid of Secretary General Dog Hammer ekjold. The Slgerian Cover— t 
was concerned that allowing the Cold Mar antagonists direct veto powers 
in the Executive wing ef the UN would gravely damage the arguleatiem. 
Balewa was therfore convinced that "there should be only one (Secretary 
General} a first class man who le able, honest end sincere and whs 
will have other assistants widely representative of the nations as 
as much as possible".1 The government disapproved of Rossis*s 
resumption of nualsar tests in the atmosphere in 1961. A member ef 
the 16 Nation;: r,K Disarm— ant Cosmdttee, Nigeria also flatly rejected 
Chairmen Khrushchev *a proposals for a Summit Conference to discuss
Only —  issues relating to Colonial!— , minority rule — d 
racial discrimination in Afrloa was there sens measure of accord 
nrswssn the two Governments, Even here there existed differences
of opinion. While Moscow demanded —  immediate end to Colonlall— ,
Legos as has been seen advocated a gradualist approach to decolonlsatl—
Contact between the Nigerian government and thy Peoples Republic 
of China was even more tenuous end the relationship, lees amicable.
30. This was ths Ttalted State's view (which gained wide acceptance) of 
the Troika Proposals. UN Dec T  i/4797 7th. July 1961 P.8.
31, Daily Times (logos) 22nd Sept. 1961,
32* Sunday Express (Legos) 23*2*62.
.35* See Chapters 2 A 3*
2<n •
Peking was not imrlted to the 1960 IndepenAenoe Celebrations sad 
as seen above, Lagos Continuously abstained frost voting on the issue 
of Peking's admission into ths XIV until 1965* There was no question
of ths Balewa Government extending diplomatic recognition to
aChairman Mao's Government although Jligerlsn Economic Mission headed 
by the Finance Minister visited Red China in 1961.
During tha 1962 Indo-Chinese War, Sir Abubakar sent a massage 
of Support to Nehru sad castigated Peking for its "aggressive 
tendencies”. He maintained that "tha Chinese theory of 'might is 
right' cannot be tenable and say Country that embraces it should
XAstand condemned" • The blunt reprimand to Peking about a year after
the Lagos Government had shown relative indifference to the Bay of 
Piga Invasion demonstrates s tendency by ths Government to operete 
on double Standard* in its relationship with ths Eastern and Western 
Powers respectively.
fhsSUME
It would appear that Nigeria's ^ on-ailgnmant was initially 
Characterised by the maintenance and strsnghtening of formal ties 
with Western Powers while Simultaneously keeping Communist States 
at arms length. This State of affairs was gradually modified aa Lagos 
expanded contact with Eastern Powers while some of the formal 
attachments to tha Wast were dismantled. This had its counterpart 
In the political sphere where for instance thetu>o China policy was 
abandoned in 1965*
Generally however, ths Lagos Government was Strongly attracted 
towards ths Wast in its foreign policy orientation. It waa amicably 
disposed towards most Western Powers while at best, it was cool 
towards Eastern Powers.
34* "Federal Nigeria"(Legos) Vol.5 No. 11 1962 M .
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Encouraging the Higerlan Government not to align itself 
formally with Hther power hloc waa the fact that it did not perceive 
any Immediate threat to the Federation*a Security whioh it could not 
contain without ext endive external military support* Nigeria* s 
immediate neighbours - Chad, Dahomey, Niger and the Caaeroons were 
relatively email and weak States hardly capable of posing serious 
threats to Nigeria* The first three depended heavily on Nigerian jkort 
facilities and were highly susceptible to economic Sanctions Imposed 
by Nigeria* Hie 1961 Lakes embargo on French Slipping had serious 
Consequences on their economies*
Internally, although the situation waa unstable and there were 
often disturbances like the 1960 Tiv riots, there was no Subversion 
with foreign power complicity. There was thus no overriding 
Security- iidnced Compulsion for Nigeria to align itself to a Power 
Bloc to ensure adequate military Aid* As was argued in Chapter 4, 
Lagos did not necessarily have to enter into the 1960 Anglo-Nlgerlan 
Defence Agreement in order to enjoy the benefits stipulated therein* 
While Lagos sew fit not to align liself with either of the power 
blocs, it was propelled towards being Strongly pro-Western by two 
main Considerations*
Lays issofipzi'.m. y m
Nigeria bad been Colonised for over half a century by a Western 
Power* She had attained independence largly through negotiation and 
a of rancour and the Colonial Power had done much to pnpare
her to Shoulder the burdens of independence* In the process, Nigerian 
Leaders had had intimats Contacts with the UN*
At 1 mlt  i<1 n r  >. as tht Uftriin Government v u  convinced 
that tha UK v u  a proven genuine friend with whom Sovereign Algeria
t tshould have very oloee relationship. ^
Beoause of the UK*e position in the Western Alliance, Colonial 
Algeria had also had contacts with other important Western posers like 
the Uhlted States of inerica and as far as the Lagos Government was 
concerned, they too were good friends*
In Contrast, by 1960, Federal Algeria had had little or no ocntaots 
with Aaetem Powers* In the normal oonrse of Cold Whr politics, these 
powers had been represm t ed by their antagonist! as posing dangerons 
threats to the freedon of new and week States* At independence, ‘die 
Balova Administration felt that prudence dictated extreme caution if 
not suspicion in any dealings with Communist States* Explaining why 
Western Embassies in Lagos enjoged certain privileges denied their 
Eastern Counterparts, that ^foreign Minister told Parliament in 1963 
"People have to go from the known to the unknown fhay (the Western 
Wbasies), were here end tiny have had certain privileges* In the Case 
of the n&AsComers (Communist Embassies), it will he suicidal if this
Country could open its front gates snd allow Aa^Coaer* to flood us
■ ■ "'■■■ ' eghere and after one year we find that we have been destroyed* M ,
The M a e  Minister had made an Udentioal point whan ha hoped that
X*P*»s "-— — — will appreciate that some of these Countries that
are opming [embassies) are completely new to ua but others we have
*7been in association with for a very long time" .
3#* See Chapter 4«
36. £.H*I?* 2nd April 1963 Col. 1753*
57. n>ld H*roh/Aj«rll Samian 1961 P- 171.
1Of great import w a  Nigeria *e ideological affinity with tha 
Vast* Nigeria oparatad a Weatarn-Style Parliamentary democracy 
baaed, ia theory, on tha Bala of Lav; Fundamental Human Bights and 
free and fair secret ballot parliamentary elections, in practise* 
tha system functioned with many imperfactions • Elections were rarely* 
if aver* free and fairj tha ohaaoes of successfully dislodging aa 
incumbent Government at tha polls were so slim as to be virtually 
aom-exlstant while life was not always easy for many aa opposition 
politician, nevertheless, most Nigerian* and their Governments 
prefered tha System they had become relatively familiar with to the 
unknown Comnunlst Governmental System, is Dr Qkeke argued ia Parliaamnt 
”ve oannot ia a day or two or oven ia a matter of years dispel the 
principles which we have imbibed from a democratic Country like 
Britain and America, Certainly we ere a daaocracay— Ve bare bean 
under democratic principles and institutions for over s hundred years* 
Russia has not been here st all-— — -Wa do not know the Ideology of 
Communism or  ^ yet* or any other ideology, one
we have had is democratic principles whioh ia pro-Vast and there is
aano harm ia our pro-»Vest#xa attitude" .
<t|he northern Region occupied a dominant position ia tha
Federations polities M  strong arlstrocratic governmental traditions. 
Its ruling party* tha MFC whioh waa also tha Senior partner in tha 
Federal Coalition Government would clearly not relish a dictatorship 
of tha proletariat. Besides, there wee the religions question. The 
Muslim religion and Vfcs fundamental beliefs in was s most powerful
all-pervading influence in tha Berth,
38. H.E.I. 14th April 1962 P. 18.
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It v m  totally irreconcilable with the atheism explicit in 
Cosmunlst Ideology. To aaay Northerner* and their leadersv 
Collaboration vith Communists bordered dangerously on the heretical.
Besides, private enterprise was deeply entrenched in Hlgsria whose 
Social traditions appeared lncoapetible vith Coaanunism. The s 
Government was therefore strongly basically anti-Coomunist In orientation.
Xigeria1 a non-alignment waa thoa a oass of being attracted ‘
towards a group whose policies were believed to be oondficire to the 
preservation of her religious, political}economic and Social 
dystema. Significantly, dux.ti*j,the 1959 Federal Elections, two of ths 
three major political parties - the XPC and the AG advocated 
alignment with the West. The third party- the HCSTC, whioh 
speoifioally mecocraended a non-aligned Foreign policy, Insisted 
on "very intimate and cordial relationship" with the tihited States.^
The XPC election Manifesto underscored the importance of ideology.
It argued that "Xlgsria must mot fail to protect the principles whioh 
She beldeves to be right— — It le td those Countries whose policies 
are animated by the Same beliefs as her own that Xlgsria must look for 
real frimdship and Support"^?
It waa on the basis of this line of thought that the A.G in 
1958 forthrightly advocated that Independent Xigeria align Itself vith 
the Vest * because — — —it would be suicidal for Xigeria to m a i n  
neutral whan the forces of danoeraey are threatened as they are today"*!
So degp rooted was the influence of ideological preference that 
it ove^r skilled into the Sphere of foreign Old. As will be denonetrated 
presently, the Hgsrlaa Government was at beet, extremely unaittnisl netf n 
about receiving did from Communist States. In 1960, Sir Afaoadu Bello 
flatly rejected the idea of Xigeria receiving low interest loans froa 
ths Sovist Uhlon.
u: wss zszsr& n s& i w g-mar i yzx. Hrrcnsr-------
40."HPC U m U ib ItelfMto" «p Cit.
41. Th. (London) 22nd S^t. 1996.
Ba told a j M M  Confer— —  "— that it la mat oar policy. Vs have ■ 
to voxk with tboaa wa are accustomed to. If they wear# to baring 
Soviet technicians, they de net knew how they will get on with 
the Algerian people."*2 Xh sharp Contrast, the Federal Minister of 
Aoononie Develop— nt Vu ItI Ibrahim said of US <Aid w ask 
ayeelf what will A— rioa want in Algeria if they gave us a loan os 
so—  Aid? Apart free getting a fair return ft—  the Invest— nta of 
Amarlcan businessman, A— sloe wonld want to aee that dnsocrasy waa 
Attained in Algeria. This le a damoesatio Country and ny feeling la 
that no Uo*ir Msmbar oan quarreA with this if A— rioa*■ lut—itt nwi 
la net to interfere but to s— oursga ue to prove that the private 
enterporlee system end democracy axe maintained. — We all do 
favours with an ays to its being returned, either from the paint 
of view of politioal Ideologies or monetary return"?^
■ B t t H U i
Soon after todspandan—  however, domestic pressures began to 
up for a le—  overtly pro Western end more g— ulnaly aonsll— sd 
foreign policy* FI— had with newly gained Independence, many Algerians
objected strongly to any actions which appeared to suggest that ths
wonCountry hadyonly emasculated freedom* There was a papular feeling 
that Algeria*s prestige on the International plan*in cj— erml and 
oa ths Afrioan Continent In particular was hnlng wndssaladsd by the 
Clovm— t*e excessive ldsntifioatian with the West in its foreign 
policy* FT—  left, right — d centre ease too— sent demands that ths 
Government demonstrate its Independence of the Western Bloc not anlv 
by the $eve— e of formal ties with the member States of that bloc but 
also by a Contemporaneous establishment of Contacts with Oosmunist 
8tat—  •
a :  t*iir '(L i w 1) -------------------------
43. 4th April 1962 P.46.
Tha ban on Importation of Cooanmiat literature, tha restriction 
on travels to Communist Countries, the non-aoeeptiftfllty of Ncholarahip 
awards tenable In these States, the failure to exchange diplomatic 
representations with East European States. 5 all cane under heavy 
fire. The Governor Geher&l, hr. Aziliwe? in a speech which had 
obviously not been cleared with the Federal Cabinet, delivered at the
University of Higeria, Nsukka in November 1961, said " It is felt
that to deny Nigerian^ employment because thdy lived or studied in 
Countries whose Ideology is Capitalist or Socialist, or to prohibitt 
Nigerian* from importing literature in the abaense of any positive 
act whioh can conceivably violate our laws ia not conductive to the
practise of democracy"?^ The All Nigerian People9 s Conference
la)recommended inter allia that” the Soviet Union should ba granted equal
diplomatic facilities to those acoorded other diplomatic missions\
partlcualarly tha Uhited States and the United K i n g d o m T h e
Government should desist from Communist witch hunting as exemplified --
by the denial of passport8 to Nigerian nationals wishing to travel to 
Eastern European Countries and China} the ban on importation of literature 
from East Eueopean Countries and China^c) The Government should establish 
diplomatic relations with East Germany.^ ;
The Shadow Foreign Minister maintained in Parliament that "as far 
as the East is concerned our policy is also disappointing} they think 
that we are still tied to the apron strings of the Old Colonial power.
Ve say we are neutral} we refuse to accept.Jkxholarsfcips. from Moscow 
in an age jjhen ve are abort of trained personnel.
44. Tull text of the Speech was published in the Daily Times (Lagoa) 18th 
20th and 21st November, 1961.
45. Vest Africa (London) 26th August 1961. P947*
46. Ibid.
Vb do not open diplomatic missions in some of these Countries in 
spite of repeated promises by the [Foreign]Minister to do so"f^
As public pressure mounted there were signs of impatience with 
many aspects of the Governments foreign policy even within the ranks of the 
HPC hierarchy. In Hovember 1961» -the HPC Chief Whip in the Federal* -’pi •
Hoaee of Representatives Malam Sarkin Bai accused the Foreign Minister
of having been manoeuvred into tabling his 1970 end-to-Colonialism 
46motion at the TUT. He charged that "Nigeria in the eyes of all 
African independent States is regarded today as a Stooge of Britain.
There is a Strong Allegation that Britain and the US have manoeuvred 
and succeeded in getting the (Foreign) Minister to stick to this datef^
The Government got increasingly concerned that unless it took 
at least token Steps to meet public demands, the erosion of the 
tenuous national cohesion would be inevitable. Moreover by fflLd 4962, in 
the aftermath of the A .S. Crisis, the domestic political situation 
was in general deteriorating and it became increasingly urgent for 
the Government to take action to promote national unity. Bowing to 
public pressure to strike a more genuinely non-aligned posture in 
world affairs was recognised as essential in the interest of domestic 
unity* The increased contacts with Communist States wen. the main 
outcome although this policy was executed with Chaxateristic caution*
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47* BED 1Jth April 1962 Col 1047. 
48* See Chapter 2*
49. HRD 20th November 1961 £.32.
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Th* degree ef Nigeria* b dependence on Western and Eastern 
powers respectively as sources of isports and markets for her exports 
la demonstrated in the following two tables and graphs.
TABLE 25
Nl«axi*» R a l a t l v  U ro o rfn o . o f W «»t«p and Eastern powers SB 
♦ourcea o f Inports 1960- 1965
Tear Import* from
Vaster^ Countries
( O  Millions)
Iaporta froa Aggregate Col(l)as
Eastern Europe IaporjtB %ot Col(3)
Col 2 as % 
of Col*5*
1960 160 4 213 75.1 1.8
1961 155 5 220 70.4 2.3
1962 144 6 201 71.6 2.9
1963 149 7 205 72.6 3.4
1964 183 6 252 72.5 3.1
1965 205 8 275 75.0 2.9
1966 202 7 254 79.5 2.7 ~ -
Rotes f (a) Western Countries Comprise Wee tern Europe (incl.Brltain)and 
Berth America.
Source; Central Bank of Rigsrla "Economic and Tol.6
Bo 1 June 1968 (Graph 0)
\V*J£ II
4
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TABUS 26 ,
(or KHlions)
Tear
------- m  . .......
Exports to Western 
Countries (a)
■ w .... ..........Exports to Eastern 
Europe i$s)
“ T5 T "Total
World
(4)
Col 1 as 
tfof Col 3
(5)
0oA J  as
% of Col 3
1960 155 0.6 161 95.0
1961 154 0.6 170 95.8 0.4
1962 152 t.O 164 92.7 1.2
1965 167 2.0 185 90.2 1.1
1964 181 5.0 210 86.1 2.4
1965 257 9.0 265 90.1 3.4
1966 241 4.0 279 86.0 1.4
Note: (a) Sana aa in Table Ttt>
Source: "Annual Abstract of Statistics" op cit 1967*
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Aa the tables indicate, Nigeria depended heavily on Western 
Countries for her Imports and the Sale of her export Commodities*
Between 1960 and 1966, Vestezn Countries consistently supplied nose 
than 7096 of her Iaporta and on the average took 90$ of Nigeria's
total exports yearly* In Sharp contrast the Eastern bloc accounted --
for hxtrenely snail proporatlons of Nigeria's Imports and exports-* 
the highest in either ease being 3*4$ (in value terns however Nigeria's 
trade with Eastern Europe was rising all the tinethis was due partly 
to the fact that for political reasons, Commercial relations 
between Nigeria and Communist States was disoourged during the Colonial 
era*
The Higezisn Authorities were however anxious to diversify their 
export markets after independence in an endeavour not oily to heat 
the relative Saturation of her traditional markets end the threat 
to sons of the markets by the protectionist policies of the EEC, but 
also to attain eoononie lndandanoe* Outlining the measures M s  
Government would take to soften the deaage that ml&it result from 
non-Assoelatlon with the SEC, the Prime Minister told Parliament in
1962 "..— —  At this Stage Our future policy will be diverted towards
' 50a search outside the EEC for Supplementry friarketa", Obviously,
Eastern Europe waa a major target area*
Nigeria Signed trade dgreemets with Poland (September 1961) f 
Cseohoslova&a (Much 1962)} Bulgaria (Septsnber 1962) and Hungary 
(June 1963)* In July 1963 the Federal Government signed a trade 
Ogreemttt with the USSR specifying that Columblte - a Strategic
c.
mineral used In specs and ftuelsor deviate - ae one of the Commodities 
She could export* This carried the risk of forfeiting Aid from 
Nigeria's meet Important Sid dbanor- the USA in view of the letter's 1951 
Battle Act which empowered its Government to terminate Sid to Gauntries
m . m u r i .  8pa»» a  m v v : w .  -----  "..
exporting such Strategic materials to the USSR* Actual Shipments
of Colunbite did not infaot take place Since the USSR vae Self-Sufficient
In its production."^1
The capacity for expanding exports to Eastern Europe did not
however appear to he very great. The Soviet Uhlan for instance was a -
major producer of Sunflour Seed and Oil which provided very .stiff
competition for Chroundnuts and ite oil in world markets. As had been
seen, although her Cocoa Consumption was expanding, her total yearly
purchases were snail relative to Nigeria's exports. Column five of
table 26 underlines the fact that during the Balewa period Nigeria
♦did not manage to aohddve very substantial increases in export* to 
Eastern Europe.
51. See D.G. Algin- Nigeriai Politioal non^allgonent and eoononio 
alignment (Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research. 
Reprint Series No 4 1966^ )
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TABLE 27
Hlgarlat Vaatfjm ^ Wmrphlf? («) fffr’gWjJ&t. - - - - -  -
(or miiuoc )
Tear h t  — "— ....Western Owned Cdkulatira 
Private Imrestaenta
Total Cumulative Forei®t 
Private HxvestmentB
WCol 1 as % ef , 
Col 2.
1960 162.4 175.9 92.5
1961 188.0 205.9 92.1
1962 201.8 220.9 91.5
1965 257.6 256,8 91.8
1964 295.9 521.8 91.9
1965 546.4 577.0 91.9
1966 592.8 426.4 92.1
Ho#tat (a) Definition of Vestezn Countries Similar to that In Table '4£
(b) Figures fox foreign private investments relate to Companies 
largely foreign-owned but without distribution between 
residents and non-residents.
Sourest Central Bank of Higeria "Economic and Financial Bsvisw" 1967*
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It would appear from tho table and accompanying graph that Nigeria
' "7was over ujHelaingly depeodmit on Western Countries for It* foreign
- . •’ . * . ■ .. ' • ’ -
private investment* • Consistently war 90# of foreign private 
investments la tho Federation between 1960-66 woo Western-owned*
The Coacramlst Countries do not ofocurse own investments privately
at home or abroad.
Tho Influence of Trade and Foreign Private Investments on
Neither Nigeria's deeire for increased trade and inflow of 
private investments from abroad i nor har heavy dependence or 
Western Countries for trade end Investments had nose then a peripheral 
bearing on Nigeria's brand of non iHfrmant. The Federation could 
net hope to expand trade with the Vest by reason only of pursuing 
a pro-Wfeatem course in £fee foreign policy* It has been seen in 
Chapter 7 that its attempt** to fight the GET by protesting through 
friendly goveaaaante of Vast Germany and Italy came to nothing*
Cn tho other handf merely by being leas overtly pro-Western could 
not have hurt har trade* The foreign policy of Dr Nkruaah's Ghana 
was Militant and generally not patently pro Western* Yet, for 
instance, the £ale of her Major export-oocoa to the ttaited Btatee 
of America rose from 61,000 tons in 1959 to 124,000 tons in 1964*^
An increase of about 105# while Ghana's total Cocoa exports rose 
by gfejgr 53/6 that la from 250,000 tone to 302,000 tone* In the earns 
period, Nigeria's Cocoa Shipments to the Tfelted States rose from
25.000 tons to 28,000 tone an increase of about 12# while har 
aggregate Cocoa exports were up 26# from 143,000 tome 1m 1959 to
197.000 t-w la 1964.55 •
For reasons similar to those discussed in Chapter 5 la relation 
to Brlthflfei Investment* in Nigeria, the deeire far foreign private
Inveetaents from the West was no more than a Secondary determinant
of
of the Qowzmedf policy /don-"alignment* .
tVymresVft t^r1Hr"*«-TFT^ pdceLl PTCH&cVi
Yarlous years*
53* Ibid*
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Nigeria's foreign aid receipts by source ia shown in tha 
following table.
i -
TABLE 28 " *
Nigeria: Official Bilateral Foreign Aid Reoaipte by Source I960-66 (4)
(#75 Millions)
Tear From Vestezn 
Countries (b)
Total material Aid 
*"•* Receipts
Aid from the Vest as 
% of total bilateral 
Receipts.
1960 32 32 100
1961 51 31 100
1962 29 29 • 100
1963 19 19 100
1964 41 43 97
1965 68 68 100
1966 72 72 100
Botes: (a) A, Shown in AT 25 tha nearest Nigeria came to receiving 
Capital did from Communist Sources In 1960-66 was the 
Commitment by Czechoslovakia in 1965 to lend the Federal 
Government £5,000,000 '
(b) Definition of Vestezn Countries same as in Tablets of this 
Chapter.
Sources Cols 1 & 2 OECD Op. Cit.
• It dose appear that virtually all tha bilateral capital alA 
received by Vivaria ia 1960-66 waa from Western Sourcaa^MBltilataaal 
aid free the World Saak Group - financed predominantly by Vestezn
f  ■ a  *1 J «r I Vfif X  1& X a  «aV>'«kWhM J a a *)countries — waa aiaa oenaioerapie. wixn regard to vecnaicax 
aaaiateoce reoaivad by Xtgerls, tha Vaat uns again overwhelmingly 
predominant aa Appendix Table 8 demonstrates*
i H  1  B A l l ' l
The potency of Xlgerla*s need for foreign aid dWka factor
determining ita non-alignment policiaa oan ba gleaned fro® tha
major motives behind . 3 Western Aid efforts in Hgeerla. The Uhlted
theStates was/most important single aid donor to Klgarla. In 1966,
Washington provided ft,50 Million of tho total /f]f2 Millions of bilateral 
Capital did received by tha Federal Republic. The US motives 
(together with those ef the UK- Xigerla's Second moat important bilateral 
donoxt-dlscttssed in Chapter 9) wove fairly representatives of tho 
general objectives of Western did efforts in Xigarla.
Foremost of the U3#s objectives was the meed to prevent Xlgerla 
fppm gtrayimg what it regards aa the "perilous paths* of 
Cossmmdin la her searcih for economic salvation. The Clay Conssdttee 
reporting to the US President in 1969 had no doubts that "— If Countries* r, ■ ' " *w
(like Xlgerla} with a will to bo free are to beoone or m a i n  so and 
if their governments are to prove to their people that the denoevatie 
route to politioal eoonomlv well le the better one, eons
focm of external assistance to their internal effort is necessary"* ^
54* See A.T. 29
95* Dept* of State, Committee to Strengthten the Security of the Free 
World# Report to the President, "The Scope eadJHstrlbntlon of US 
Military and Koonomie Assistance Programs" (1965) F»4« Quoted 
in "Xdeaa of tit Economic Aid'* df> fit ~f>. 116*
To ensure progress and insure against Covnmlst Subversion, N 
Nigeria needed domestic Stability. This was hardly aahiev&ble unless,
in the opinion of the US Aid Mission in Nigeria," Nigeria is
able to advance the well being of its Citizens create an even 
better world for their Children" US Aid to Nigeria was thus designed 
first and foremost to "Strsnglhten the freedom and of
Nigeria within the World Community" ^  Other Subsidiary motivations 
like altruism or bumanitarianism, and eoonomio self interest abound.
With reggrd to the dlajor one in  p a rtic u la r, i t  would appear that the 
US (Aid e ffo r t  would have been a d ire ct function o f the degree o f r isk  
that N igeria was •going* Communist subject to the proviso that a l l  
was not lo st  and i t  was s t i l l  paten tly possible to drag N igeria back 
from the brink into the Community o f the free  world. The Nigerian  
Government was not unaware o f th is  truism. In 1958, the Federal M inister 
o f Finance, Chief Okotle Eboh to ld  Parliament, " I t  i s  our impression 
that a Country has only to appear to be f l i r t i n g  with the Communist 
bloc and substan tial fin a n cia l assistan ce i s  immediately forthcoming 
from the Western Bemooraoies. Ve in  N igeria have — — la stin g  
attachments to the Western Democracies and find i t  d i f f ic u lt  to under­
stand such an attitu d e whereby staunch friends are ignored and vaverers
58are given every assistan ce" . Consquently, the desire fo r  foreign aid  
did not feature very prominently in  the calcu latio n s which determined 
N igeria*s t\\on-alignment p o lic ie s .
56. US Information Service Program for Brogress-The Story of Cooperation 
with Nigeria*s Development Plan. (USA $3 Lagos nd np)
57* Ibid nd.np.
58. H.R.D. 22nd. February 1958.
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The almost total non-existence of aid from Socialist States 
to Nigeria in 1960*66 already alluded to, was due in part to the
59relatively snail magnitude of the Communist aid effort in general,
Ob the other hand Nigerian Government * s lack of enthusiasm for aid
from the East was mainly »esponsible. In TTuly 1960, the Federal
Minister of Information Mr. T.O.S. Benson said he did not think
" Nigeria is looking forward to deceiving foreign aid from Communist
Countries however, enticing that may be* I think we shall be able to
" 60get the aid we want from the US and the British Commonwealth •
Also in 1960, as hal been seen, Sir Ahmadu Bello declared that 
Soliciting c|id from Communist Countries was not "Our [Nigeria's] policy? 
The GoVemment had reluctantly included Eastern Europe among the 
Countries of Call for the World Economic Mission led by the Federal 
Finance Minister in 1961* One of the alms of the Mission was to find 
out to what extent these Countries visited "were prepared to help in 
mpney and In teachers with the massive educational development programmes'* 
of Nigeria.^1 Tet, when Moscow intimated to the Mission it was ready
to award a number of Soolarships tenable in Soviet institutions to
62Nigerian* , Lagos was unenthusiastio •
59* In 1960 for instance all communist Countries together accounted for 
only 496 oA all did and investments Funds reosived by economically 
developing States* While the US provided 68# and Western Europe 28# 
"Is Moscow cutting down on foreign aid"? Eastern Europe (New Tork)
Yol* 11 No. 12 December, 1962 ft 25*26*
60* Daily Times (Lagos) 9th July 1960*
61* Federal Nigeria (Lagos) Yol 4 Ho*2 April/June 1961 fc*4
62* Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Finance HRD 26th 
March 1962 Col's* 106-7*
Ths reluctance to accept C^ ld from Cosnuaist Countries 
m i  bitml on tho fnr that fy*h aid vtf always extended only with 
a Tinr to oealng tho path to tho ultlnato Connunlaatlon of tho u>orld*
After all, had not J* Popov olalnod that "A Solentlfie analysis 
of Capitalists and its junto soprani o consequences Shows that it 
cannot solve tho urgent problems of tho paoplas that have just won 
political independence"?^
3h 1961, following a report in a Iondon nswspapsr that a 
ligetrlam Student on Scholarship at the Friendship University 
in Moscow had boon recruited by the Kraal In to m r t o n w  the 
Algerian Qoremnent through Subversion ty 19^4^» the Federal Minister 
of Tlnaaoe declared In Fsrlianant "We have a responsibility to keep 
this Country peaceful and quiet and any person cannot #0 out of
Xlgeria to gat money fToa Ghana, txarn East Germany or Hussia to
65cause a resolution in Xlgsrla" *
However, pressure noun ted on AGovainn*sn t to open aid and
trade relationships with Eastern Europe on ground* sinllar to those
discussed above in relation to Blgsrla'a dlploaatlo contacts with
Cr— sin 1st States* Typical waa the Statement by the Vest *frioe
Pilot, a Hgerlaa national daily newspaper that the refusal of
Russian Scholarship was just another example “that we have not
outgrown one of the prejudices we inherited fron the old era
(sanely that) Studanta trained in Eastern Europe -— Cannot be
66anything but economist agitators"
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69* J* Popov-Felltlcal 4coaom; sad AfTiosn Reality (Pfosocw ) £.68. 
64* fbdidsy telegraph (London) 16th Jhly 1961*
65* H.R.S* 16th Sovenber 1961 Cols 3017-6
66. East African Pilot (Lagos) 3rd Septenber,1963.
Bendsring tha pressure Increasingly irresistible m&hl Higeria *s 
disappointing <tid rooaipts from tha Vast. Baleva Said ia a lecture 
at tha Qvereeaa Development Inatltuta ia Tendon ia# lata 1962 
"-■— ■at tha Chprese request of oar friends ia tha Vast, we have 
gone to a graat daal of trouble ia drawing up this £xatiooal 
Developaent) Plan and axa ready to pzooaad with its execution-—
@at} vt find ourselves paralysad by look of positive Indications of
67aasiatanea fron thosa M o d i ' 4 Where positive of
aasistaaoa axiotad9 actual disburswaants , aa already no tad, vara aran 
oora <11 sappolntilng. Xt was not surprising tharafora that tha 1964 
national Dsvslopnsnt Plan Progress Report intineted that "— “the Federal 
Government is now asking Stranaass attempts to attzaot external 
aid free all Sources Including tha "Eastern Bloc1 Countries vhich have not 
financed Nigeria's Development Plan so far?^®
This signified a new era is Higeria* s aid relationship with 
Eastern Europe. In 1964 and 1965# tha Coaamnist bloc States aada 153 
Scholarship guards to Higeria* The only capital (Hid however was tha 
praised €5 Millions loan ikon Csechoslovakia shortly after on offlelal 
Higarian delegation had visited Moscow ia February 1964 in ooomeetlon 
with did.
Thus by 1965# tha Higarian Qovaxnaantfa political objections to 
Coemunlst bloc (Hid was only just beginning to orunbls. The need for 
Soviet bloo (Hid tharafora hardly entered into reckoning in fashioning 
Its foreign policy towards Consunlst States ia 1960-66*
67/ Higeria Speaks*op elt P.139*
66. Hational Development Plan Progress Report dfr Cit j^ .34*
264
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
Considerations of possible economic rewards or fear of econoeic deprivations 
consequent on policy had iaportant bearing on Nigerian external relations 
froa 1960-66* The Federal Government was deeply cooaitted to raising the 
aaterisl wellbeing of its people and its strategy for the country's eco­
nomic advancement was based heavily on foreign aid, foreign trade and the 
inflow of private investments froa abroad* Under the 1962-68 National Flan 
half of the proposed gross public capital programme was expected to be 
financed by foreign aid) about 51# of estinated private capital formation 
was to consist of foreign private investments*
Thus, the all-party endorsement of Nigerian accession to Commonwealth 
membership was motivated, among other things, by expectations of economic 
benefits that would accrue* Commonwealth membership meant continued inclu­
sion in the Commonwealth Preference Area and the Sterling Area* The former 
entitled several Nigerian exports particularly to the UK - the Federation's 
most important national market - to significant unrequited tariff conces­
sions* Sterling Area membership was expected to influence favourably her 
receipt of aid from the UK by largely insulating aid relationship with 
the UK against recurrent UK balance of payments crises* It also facili­
tated access to the London capital market for the Nigerian government and 
public corporations*
The consideration of economic aid from the U.S. was a significant 
factor in Nigeria's adoption of a Two-China policy in 1961, and the aid 
agreement with Bonn in 1963 influenced Nigeria's officially unfavourable 
attitude to relations with the Ulbricht regime in East Germany* The 
Balewa government's volte face on the issue of association with the EEC
in 1963 w i  certainly impelled by economic calculations. The Community 
was turning out to be one of the fastest growing markets for Nigeria's 
type of exports. The Nigerian Federal government realised that it would 
be economically hasardous if Nigerian exports to the Six had to scale the 
Common External Tariffs, while shipments from most of her major African 
competitors had duty free access by reason of their association with the DC.
It would, however, be patently incorrect to assign to economic fac­
tors more than a secondary detemining role in Nigeria's foreign policy in 
the years 1960-66. Commonwealth membership is not a necessary condition 
for inclusion in the Commonwealth Preference and Sterling Areas. Non­
Commonwealth member countries like Burma, the Irish Bepublic, the Bepublic 
of South Africa, South Vest Africa and Samoa are in the Commonwealth 
Preference Area. The Irish Bepublic, Iceland, Jordan etc. are in the 
Sterling Area without being Commonwealth members. In any case, in relative 
terms, the significance of Commonwealth tariff preferences on Nigeria's 
export trade declined progressively as the proportion of her aggregate 
exports accounted for by the UK fell consistently from 64.*t£ in 1936 to 
37*6# in 1966. Membership of the Sterling Area was a valuable economic 
asset but Nigeria continuously eroded her position in the Area by a 
variety of policy measures such as the freeing of the Nigerian pound froa 
its statutory links with the pound sterling in 19621 by diversifying her 
reserves as froa October 1961 (and thereby terminating the holding of the 
Federation's foreign exchange reserves exclusively in sterling)) and the 
repatriation to Nigeria of sterling balances held in London. If Britain 
had become a member of the SBC in 1962-3, both the Commonwealth Preference 
and the Sterling Areas would eventually have been jettisoned. Nevertheless, 
Nigeria rejected associate status while Britain was negotiating EBC member­
ship in 1962. The UK was also an important source of aid and private 
investments to Nigeria t but less concord between Lagos and Whitehall would
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not in itself necessarily have lad to a significant curtailment in the flow 
of resources from the former to the latter. African Commonwealth member 
governments which carried their disagreement with the Wilson Government 
over its handling of the Rhodesian GDI in 1965$ to the point of rupturing 
diplomatic relations with London were not penalised economically in spite 
of warnings by Whitehall of possible economic retributions.
Nigerian trade links with other African states were minute| aid and 
investment relationships were virtually nonexistent. All the same* Africa 
was one of the central foci of Nigerian foreign policy. In 1961, the 
Federal Government banned all trade with the Republic of South Africa in 
protest against Pretoria's apartheid policies. She volume of trade at the 
time of the ban was small but it had the latent capacity for considerable 
expansion. Moreover, Lagos' anti-apartheid stand involved forfeiture of 
possible economic aid and private investments from South Africa. In 1965, 
Lagoa placed a complete embargo on all commercial connections with 
Rhodesia in the aftermath of Smith's GDI.
The Nigerian Government's decision to negotiate an association agree­
ment with the SBC in 1963 was demonstration of the primacy of economic 
considerations but in actuality, by that time, several of Nigeria's non­
economic reservations about association had mellowed. Austria, Sweden and 
Switserland's attempts to negotiate association with the ESC largely nulli­
fied Nigerian fears that association was inconsistent with a non-aligned 
foreign policy. General De Gaulle's effective veto of Britain's EEC member­
ship application in January 1963 defused the potency of the argument that 
association would render Nigeria excessively economically dependent on the 
enlarged Community and so lay her government open to political manipulation. 
Besides, association was negotiated under Article 23(8 of the Treaty of Rome 
as an independent state rather than under Part IV of the Treaty, as a
1. The Times (London) 8th December 1965.
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de facto dependent of the ex-colonial overlord. Significantly, although 
Nigeria was badly in need of economic aid, the Nigerian association agree­
ment eschewed provisions for multilateral aid from the EEC's Overseas 
Development Fund because of the Baleva government's conviction that the 
Community's aid had unacceptable political implications.
Nigeria's brand of non-alignment reflected her pattern of external 
economic ties, which were overwhelmingly with Western powers. In 1966, 
Western countries absorbed 86$ of the Federation's exports compared to 
by Eastern Europe. In the same year. Western states supplied 79*5# of the 
country's iaqports, against 2.7% from Eastern Europe. Nigeria drew consis­
tently over 9 1% of her foreign private investments and virtually all her 
foreign aid in 1960-66 from Western sources. Nevertheless, the Lagos 
Government was under no illusions that merely by espousing a strongly pro­
Western foreign policy her trade with or inflow of aid and private invest­
ments from Western countries would be enhanced. To put the same point 
negatively, merely striking a less overtly pro-Western foreign policy 
posture could not have hurt her economically. Ghana's trade with the West 
was not injured by Accra‘s policies. Actually, the sale by Ghana of her 
most important export crop, cocoa, to the U.S. had an upward trend far 
exceeding Nigeria's in 1959-6^ period. ’ Ghana's per capita net bilateral 
aid receipts from QBCD member Governments was JfOS 7| and jtfJB 11 in 1965 
and 1966 respectively. Comparable figures for Nigeria were $OS 1.2 and 
fSOS 1.3 respectively.^ The Baleva Government was in realty aware it could 
succeed in enlarging the inflow of aid particularly from the U.S. by indulg­
ing in a degree of flirtation with Communist states. Moreover, as seen in 
Chapter 8, Lagos rejected aid from Communist states until 1963 in spite of 
short-falls in anticipated aid from Western powers.
2. See Chapter 8 p. 257 supra.
3. Calculated from data published in OECD - Geographical distribution 
of Financial flow, op. cit.
It therefore appears absolutely necessary to look outside the 
economic sphere for the decisive factors which determined the foreign 
policy of Nigeria's First Bepublic.
Nigeria's colonial history was particularly pertinent in this context. 
Having experienced colonialism at first hand, Nigeria's leaders had formed 
the view that the imposition of foreign rule on Africans or their subjugation 
to minority governments dominated by immigrant Europeans was at variance with 
African racial dignity. Added to the unanimity with which independent 
African states condemned colonialism, minority rule and racial discrimination 
in Africa, the federal government had little option but to relegate economic 
considerations to an obscure background in its adoption of anti-colonialism, 
anti-apartheid and anti-minority rule policies if it was to establish and 
maintain goodwill at home, on the African continent in particular and in 
the Afro-Asian world in general.
The trauma of colonialism experienced by Nigeria as a whole and the 
Northern legion in particular was relatively diluted. The Nigerian elites, 
familiarised with the cultures and values of a friendly colonial power, 
accepted British standards as ideal. The Northern legion was admirably 
suited to Indirect Buie, and its religion, traditions and elders were res­
pected by the colonial administrators, and in turn the leaders developed a 
particularly close attachment to the British.
Moreover, in the struggle for independence, emphasis had centered 
largely on negotiations with a far from intransigent colonial ruler.
Nigerian leaders were thus carefully groomed to take over the responsibil­
ities of government.
Nigeria's colonial relationship with Britain significantly coloured 
her view of the world - her perceptions and expectations, which had import­
ant bearings on her foreign policy. In the first place, it led to the 
assuaptlon that all colonial powers would emulate the British and gently 
ease their colonies towards "responsible'* independence, if they were not
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excessively pressured into precipitately relinquishing their hold on their 
overseas territories. The Nigerian government consequently favoured a 
gradualist approach to decolonisation in Africa.
Secondly, most of the members of Nigeria's immediate post-independence 
government were convinced that Britain was a genuine friend whose goodwill 
should be cultivated by the new state as it now assumed the status of 
independent nationhood i amity in Lagos-London relations was a major and 
mutual theme in Anglo-Nigerlan relations.
Thirdly, reared in the British governmental traditions, most of the 
Nigerian elites had come to regard Western ideology as being admirably 
geared to the preservation of their religion, governmental, social and eco­
nomic systems. Contacts with communism on the other hand had been extremely 
perfunctory but the elites had been schooled in the belief that it was a 
perilous ideology whose practitioners should be regarded with extreme cau­
tion. Consequently, after independence, the Lagos government chose to lean 
towards the western bloc, whose ideology it preferred and which had Britain 
as a member. Keeping the Communist states at arms length and even rejecting 
their proffered economic assistance was a natural consequence of the 
government's suspicions of communism.
Other considerations, however, served to modify some of the govern­
ment's early post-independence policy. Foremost was the search for domestic 
stability. The concentration of pre-independence nationalist activities in 
Southern Nigeria while the North remained largely quiescent was vividly mir­
rored in the inclinations of the latter to favour a conservative approach to 
foreign policy - for instance, advocacy of close identification with Britain 
and the Western bloc, while the former prescribed a more nationalist and 
independent approach. Blending these two viewpoints was not easy. The fact 
that Nigeria was governed by a coalition government consisting of the 
'conservative' NFC (the senior partner) and the 'progressive' NCNC which had 
important differences in foreign as well as domestic policy platforms and
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that there waa deep-rooted intertribal, interparty and inter-Begional rivalry 
meant that internal political management in tha Federation was an even more 
intractable problem* The situation was aggravated by ths wide-spread belief 
among Southerners that having spearheaded the drive for independence, they 
should 'by right' have a dominant role in ruling independent Nigeria* The 
attainment by one of their political parties - the NCNC, of s status merely 
of junior partner in the Federal Coalition Government was regarded with 
strong disfavour* Many felt they had been cheated of the prise they had 
struggled for* Hopes that the aspirations of Southern political parties to 
form the Federal Government alone or as senior coalition partners could be 
advanced through the ballot box were still-born* Ths allocation of parlia­
mentary seats ensured that the NFC had only to hold Northern constituencies 
in a general election to be assured of s major role in any future Federal 
government* by 1962 the NFC in fact had an absolute majority in the Federal 
House of Representatives* Consequently, frustration sat in. The main result 
was ths succession of domestic crises from 1962 onward* While the southern- 
based political parties and various pressure groups like the 'young radicals' 
located mainly in the South had genuine grounds for disagreement with the 
Government's external policy, in tha prevalent political atmosphere in 
Nigeria, southern frustrations increasingly found expression in and were fed 
by trenchant opposition to ths Government's foreign policy* Most significant 
was public opposition to ths Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement which culmina­
ted in the violent demonstration by University students in November 1961*
This made a deep impression on the Government* It drove home the extent to 
which sections of the public were prepared to carry their opposition to the 
Government's foreign policy measures. On the other hand, the hero's welcome 
accorded fialewa by Nigerians of all political leanings on his return home 
from the 1961 Commonwealth Prims Ministers' conference at which he, among 
others, had been instrumental in getting South Africa to withdraw from ths 
Commonwealth because of its apartheid policies was s pointer to the unifying
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potential of measures indicative of a shift by the Government towards a 
relatively radical foreign policy approach* The conclusion was then 
arrived at that accomodating the views of radicals or at least appearing to 
do so was a means of forging national cohesion for it tended to steal the 
thunder of the radicals' opposition and so reduced their disenchantment with 
the Nigerian political system and the threat to the survival of the Federa­
tion as one unit* Any sop to radical opinion had however to be cautious and 
sometime superficial not only because of the innate conservatism of the NPC 
dominated Government but also in deference to Northern susceptibilities*
The Government had continuously to indulge in a political balancing aet and 
to a greater degree than in many states, had to be cognisant of domestic 
reactions to its foreign policy measures* Thus, the domestic political 
situation in Nigeria in 1960-66 was basically unstable* To claim otherwise 
or to maintain that its foreign policy waa 'h reflection of that pattern of 
peaceful change•• that had characterised Nigerian political evolution. 
is to propagate a myth born largely of superficial analysis.
It was the need to placate radical opinion that partly decided the 
government tot give material as well as moral support to African freedom 
fighters in 1963! dismantle many of the formal links between Nigeria and 
the UK) demonstrate the country's independence and sovereign equality with 
other states including the ex-metropolitan country) establish diplomatic 
and economic contacts with Communist states) generally endeavour to be more 
genuinely non-aligned rendering its credentials as a non-aligned state more 
readily acceptable to the Cairo Conference in 196** than to the 1961 Belgrade 
Conference of non-aligned states) turn down associate status under Part IV 
of the Borne Treaty and subsequently reject SBC aid in the Nigerian „ 
association agreement.
The difficulties of domestic political management were linked to 
another factor influential in Nigerian foreign policy, - the issue of the 
leadership of Africa. The government's initial indifference on the matter
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was ended by the pressure of domestic opinion. Once it decided to take 
the issue seriously, the government felt obliged to weigh more carefully 
the likely consequences of its foreign policy actions on its image in 
Africa. Abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement, less overt 
identification with the Vest, increased contact with Communist states, 
Nigeria's major role in bringing the Organisation of African Unity into 
being and in the diplomatic offensives against Pretoria and Lisbon were 
influenced in part by her African leadership aspirations. Nigeria's 
domestic political problems however placed constraints on legos' approach 
to the leadership issue. Forced into a position where it had to devote 
most of its energies to domestic crisis management, the Nigerian Government 
therefore had relatively little capacity to apare for external affairs. The 
outcome was that in Africa, it had to promote policies, such as the func­
tional cooperation route to continental unity, likely to entail minimal 
costs in terms of resources. This partly explains the fundamental differ­
ences in the approaches to the African leadership question of Lagos and 
Accra. President Nkrumah, in spite of domestic problems culminating in the 
preventive detention of several opposition party members and the bomb 
attempt on his life at Kulugugu, encountered no difficulties from his 
unitary government comparable in magnitude to Prime Minister Balewa's 
headaches from the federal system of government in Nigeria.
Thus, in 1960-66, extra-economic considerations deriving from 
Nigeria's colonial history, her African leadership aspirations and above 
all her potential domestic political instability wielded preeminent 
deterministic influences in the foreign policy of Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa and hie Federal Government.
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ktctirta. C o m w m at PrlTOt. C apital PorMitlon. 1962-5 to 1967-e
Cod 1 lions■ ■ iJ m i T ii
1 .  Federal Statutory Corporations -
2. Government Capital Programmes
3. Capital Formation out of Recurrent Expenditures
173.3 
471.1
149.4
4. Total Government Capital Formation 793.8
9. Private Capital Formation ^ 389.9
£. Total Gross Fixed Capital Formation 1183.3
Notes t 1. No underspending assumed
2* After deduction of Defence expenditure assumes underspending 
of 9*6 in Federal and 10$ in Regional Capital Expenditures.
3. Bov 6 less Bov 4
4. Assuadng that private oapital formation will average no 
less than £72 millions yearly over the Plan period* public 
capital formation required to meet the Plans total Gross 
Capital Formation target of £1183.3 millions would fall
to £79 1.3 millions.
Sources National Plan fr.3*
274
A.i.Et ?
iflffigMA.1. ,ffl£ J3ML
#a<lliqyiq
souses Eastern
Govt.
Western
Govt.
Srth
.Sort...
1. Recurrent Budget Surpluses 27.0 6.0 11.5 16.1 28.4
2. Domestic Borrowing and 
Central Bank 63.7
— 12.0 75.7
3* External Reserves and other 
accumulated Funds
30.0 1.7 3.5 — 55.2
4* Internal Resources of the 
Statutory Corporations
80.0 — — —■ 80.0
5. Marketing Boards — 14.1 10.0 15.0 39.1
6. Foreign Aid 203.5 33.9 45.2 44.5 i27.1
7* Other — — 0.2 4.4 4.6
8. Uncovered Gap 2.7 12.0 19.9 29.1 63.7
Total Capital Prograsne 
(less underspending)
406.9 67.7 90.3 88.9 i5518
Sources national Developnent Plus Progress Report 1964 OP cit 27
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HTflBBTA, rvnrrxultloa of I«Dort. 1960-65
Imports 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Consumer Goods 61 61 56 55 46 45
Capital Goods 22 21 22 23 28 31
Raw Materials 17 18 20 22 24 24
Capital Goods end 
Raw Materials 39 39 42 45
52 55
Totals--------------- T O TO TO TO ■ w n TO
Source t Central Bank of Kigeria. Annual Beport for year ended 
51et Deoenber.1965*
lfTTTi f H i l l i T  ntn l m  Tmrirtnmfr
( OdLLIORf)
Tjp* of 
AotiTity
Paid up 
CapitalTfwmA<w|
Haaartraa
Othar
Liabilities
Total Kdiatr- 
butlan 
of total
Itttraatnant In 
fizad Aaaata
Actual U i
Mining k 1962 15.2 65.8 81.0 56.7 65.0 41.5Quarrying 5 23.1 70.4 95.5 56.1 75.6 45.0
4 43.2 85.8 129.0 40.1 146.2 52.2
5 76*3 86.4 164.7 43.7 144.1 50.9 ^6 106.5 106.0 212.5 50.8 223.9 68.8
Muxufaotarl962 20.3 18.0 58.3 17.3 59.0 2 J »  ^tiring and 3 24.2 25.1 49.3 19.1 46.5 26.4Procaaalng 4 20.2 50.4 58.6 18.2 65.5 22.7
5 44*1 25.4 69.5 18.5 81.9 26.4 m6 46.9 274 74.5 17.5 85.7 26.3
Agricultural 962 3*6 0.7 4.5 2.0 6.1 5.9Foraatry 63 5.6 1.5 4.9 1.9 5.0 2.8 ^and Vlahlng 64 3.9 1.5 5.4 1.7 5.9 2.1
65 5.1 0.5 5.6 1.5 5.8 2.1~^»66 5.6 1.2 4.8 1.1 8.7 2.7
Transport 1962 0.5 1.9 2.4 1.1 1.5 1.0and Conn- 3 1.5 1.1 2.6 1.0 2.6 1.5 ^unloations 4 2.1 1.4 5.5 1.1 5.0 1.1
5 4.0 / 1.8 5.8 1.5 5.7 2.16 4.1 2.4 6.5 1.5 4.9 1.5
Building A 1962 5.7 4.8 8.5 5.8 4.9 5.1
Oonatxuetloa 3 4.9 6.0 10.9 4.2 7.5. 4.5
4 5.2 7.1 12.5 5.8 8.2 2*9**«w»«*
5 4.4 15.7 20.1 5.5 5.1 1.866 4.0 5.5 9.5 2.2 4.9 1.5
TTa4tag A 19& S4.V t 6 . i 58 . i 59.* 25.4Business 3 55.0 61.4 96.4 57.2 57.0 21.0 -»Sarvioae 4 40.5 60.7 101.2 51.4 47.5 16.9
5 59.7 55.1 92.8 24.6 45.4 15.06 40.0 65.8 105.8 24.8 42.2 15.0
Spare* i C*ntr*l Bank ot Ilg*riai Eoaaenie Brlur 0^> Clt 1968 0,1}.
2 77
m m t i  *>— —  1 1 **• — — — > «ww-a>
 * 3- r  ■ .....- ..... -
Sm Io t Bukmsd t.iwv> ^  Fomazd Linkage
1* Aftioaltna 0 7
2. Liveetook,ftahlng tiWtitiy 1 14
3* Agricultural Proceoelng 58 19
4« tatllao 42 99
5. Clothing 55 1
4* nod ffottMW^cr 6 0
7. Food 54 0
8# Matal Mining 10 2
9« Son Matal Mining 8 64
10 Clwtoal a 57 24
11 Szanaport 12 21
12 Utilitioa 28 45
19 Trade 7 20
1# Coaaetruotion 55 5
19 Service • 7 10
16 Treaeport Bquipnant 14 76
17 Tfcoi Matallto Mineral 54 98
16 Matal Musufacturing' ? 18 25
19 Vood, Leather,Etc. 57 25
20 MLaoallaaaoua Manufacturing 17 65
Hoi# i Backward linkage if Aefinel aa the xaiio of iapeta froai oikcr 
iBAutcUf to tottl ontfiit of tin looter* Tfnmril linkage Is tin ratio 
of fialea to othor industzlee to total £alea.
Souroot I.G.Carter - in Input-Output Aaafyaia of tin Higarian Econony 
1959-10 ilk V.T. Stolpar- Pinning Mltb»u.t fnof . U w w  InB— ouroe 
Alloeatiao ftoa llgortaU^freolopaaat. (Maaaaehuaatta 1966) y»357«
-
- 2 7 8
BIUIBH t hjMrtt to OoTommont tgr tho oil •xploxmtloan and 
. CBOOO'a
au&io 1958/? •59/60 •60/61 •61/62 *62/63 *63/64 *64/65 *65/66
14*1 675.5 873.2 1691.5 2294.5 3020.0 3861.1 4355.7
Royalty 45.0 222.1 357.7 1185.7 1768.2 1997.5 5545.6 7245.9
Pranira oa 770.7 Tir^tl *' **- 5656.6 4404.1 - 65^.9 120.5^
Profits Tax - - - - - - 199.4 2861.2
Othor TOoo 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.1 4.4
Total 79.1 1667.6 1211.0 8554.5 8467.4 5018.2 8042.1 14587*5
Sot« (a) Xu 19^4 Shall BP paid la advanoo O ’ 5Htllloao for tax radar tho 
Potxolooa Profits fox Ordinance.
Souroos Adoptod froa L«X« Bohatal - Potrolooa In MUwria (Ibadan 1969) 
TOblo S.2. n.p*
A . T .  7
Lender Borrower Purpose Angfunt Tanaa <
O.K.
m b  T|pitar A 
Wlthan Rlahaxd- 
oon Ltd Spl. 
Bar.1961
ltttexiaa Purchase of 76,000 
Ships by HHSL 
Shipping (Jwan Hunter v/ightn 
Llne(i3.S.L) Riahardaon Ltd)
Sgd. Hbnr.1961.
<r .
Repayable 1967-68 
Intaraat ratetj# 
above G.K. Ink „  
Rata. ,
Cneeely Paeier 
Sgd. Much 1965 X.C.K.
Purchase of 502,000 
aqtiljpant for 
Kadima Povar Station 
(Sar)ScA.HuMh *6J
Repayment period 
7 yre omnanrlng 
1965 at &  Intaraat" 
p.a. '*
ttigiidh Electric 
Co. Sfd. Marchf63 B.C.V.
Purchase of
Gaa. Turbina 200,000
Guaraataa iaauad In 1962. Pinal 
repayment In 1968.^ ; 
interest rata
■*vai
Colonial Develop— Jigtria 
nant Corporation Hotala Ltd
Sgd. 20/12/65
Radavalqpaut of 1019000 
Kitaria Hotala Ltd
(C.D.O. Sgd.ZO/12/63
Repayable ovar 
20 yra at 7J# ■ p.a. intaraat.
Messro Gcuaaozx 
Oeaarooae Ltd. 
Deo'65
1 T_____J .waax
Rational
Govt.
Sapala Bridge 
Cooatruotion
(Gannon Overseas) 728,000
Repayable in 5
rn •*5J# p intaraat rate.
/  ’ , 5if' '•*•*•$■<1
Barclays Oeareeae Horth 
Development Corp. Rational 
SpL. Lao. *65 Govt.
Kano Uttar 140,000 
Supply Repayablebetween 1968-77 ^  
at 7$fc» int.
Colonial Develop- Hiferia Hedavelopnmt 125,000 Repayable error 
aant oorpoxatlan Hotala Ltd* of Mtaria Hotala 20 yra at 7&6
Sgd. 5.1.64. Ltd. Sgd 20.12.65 p.a. int.
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MTgERXA. TlfflftTtffTl fTfflltfffm fit— *** 1962-6
EXPERTS TRAIWKS Coat of Total
£Donor
Country 1laaber Cost £ Ifuaber Coat £
Australia 8 "fSSSS 88 \ W X r 1 U 26
Brasil - 6 9000 r - 9000
Bulgaria - m 1 1000 - 1000
Canada 255 1575140 150 607270 4917 2025827
Denmark 6 50555 50 87500 24560 142193
India 1 724 44 26589 «o* 27315
Israel 50 203831 569 896000 - 1099851
Italy 1 5100 58 114000 - 119100
Japan 15 75000 50 148575 7107 230482
Lebanon an - 6 8000 - 8000
Hetherland 17 117249 55 165000 171000 455249
Pakistan am me 55 89625 • 89625
U.K. 751 1#495,060 947 1857558 451,400 3,825,618
V.SJL. 527 2,615,067 915 5,651,997 2,442,823 8,707,887
c m  tad 152 969,779 500 2,415.500 623,928 4,003.727Rations
Vast 18 112,884 205 615,125 55,000 783,009Gemsay
1,559
OBARD TOTAL 22,057,521
Key To Evaluation
Australia £3,000 £2,000
tTte1 £5,000 £2,000
India £5,000 £1.500
Japan £6,000 * *--- £5,000
Retbarlanda £7,000 £3,000
U.K. £6,000 £2,000
U.S.A. £8,000 £4,000
U.K. ££0,000 £5,000
W. Germany £7,000 £3,000
oouroet Unpublished Federal M inistry of Economics Development, Logos dataT
K a a a m  txu* with awnbiio of awth ai*iq» « » - 6 s
2 0 6
Tsar Iaporte £000*» Iporta £000*8
1958 751 171
1959 996 216
1960 1019 115
1961 98 18
1962 45 .20
1965 5 15
1964 5 19
1965 16 59
Sourest United Ration* - International Trade Statiatioe (Various Tsars)
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2 8?
PAJRTT
D*oa*b*r 1999 
(89.2# Polling)
*KT 1941 
(66# Polling)
TO— bar 1964 (a) 
(97# Polling) (b)
Tot** #8**t* #¥*t*o &«*t* lAfoto* #boat*
® C  60.8 77 
AG 17.3 14.3 Hepu-HCHC 16.1 4.6 
Others 5*7 4
69.2 94.1 
14.6 9.9)
14.2 6.0) 
1.8 -
82 97 
11 2.9
7 0.9
wear# declared returned uaopposed. *■ - .
v, (b) This id the percentage poll 1a  tho Boots contested*
Sources Adopted from J.P. Fholrlntoohafc at -Rtgorio Govt. and Politico 
(London 1966) *.539.
A.T.12
m g —  suction* in th* B»«t 1959-65
PARR D*o«nber 1999 Bov.1961 Kurob 1969 (•)
(74.4# Polling) (97# Polling) (41# Polling)
# Tot— tfBaets ^Totos #S**t* #Toto* ;©**t*-
I.C.I.C. 64.6
A . 0 . h A l U ^ 0 
Others 12.3
79.4
19.1
1.4
79*2 fbl (97.8)(b)
19.9 /o) v 9.0 (26.4)
86.2 , . 79.4 
(72.6)^ '
10.2 (#) 6.9 
9.4 (17.0)18.0
91.0
6.0
9.0
RotMl (a) This m m  th* ninl *l*otion bald in Mkroh 1965 b— n—  of th* 
boycott of th* POd*r*l Election* la D*e«bb*r *64. Poor **at* wax* 
conceded to tho AG by agrn— nt with tho XCHC* Tho low poll Mgr bo due
in port to inaccuracy of tho totals in tho Begieter sad in port to tho
obsonoo of say rsol conflict.
(to) Tlguros if Independents sro Subtreetod fro* tho HCBC.
(c) Figure* if Independents ore added to others.
Smaco*' J-P- ibid Ip. 927.
2 8 9
if„J. ,13
OTCgBTi. Tr^l. with TnyiBn
Country Bata Signed Ski* of Cooing lato of foot ISSa of
Poland 23/9/61 16/7/62 16/7/67
useeboslovakla 19/3/62 18/7/62 18/7/67
Bulgaria 28/9/62 5/6/63 5/6/68
m u 6/10/62 24/1/63 24/1/67
v M 15/10/62 -
Caneroons 6/2/63 aft aft
Vast Gernany 25/3/63 1/11/63 1/11/68
if.^y 28/6/63 28/6/63 28/6/68
USSR 2/7/63 - a»
Yugoslavia 22/6/64 -
Senegal 5/9/64 - •
Togo ; 4/5/66 aft -
"-11111-111 ruiimr mmiliTT nr tim rn ii Trniir
A«X» 14
Sotxroa Region
(COOO'a) 
1959/60 1960/1 1961/2 19^2/3 1963/4 1964/5^
Import
Duty
(tobacco)
Northern 
Vestezn 
Eastern 
Mid Western
516
1142
1565
506
1067
1439
4^)
11051506
455'
972
1396
M S
649
1430
187
435
767 ...1603
255
Ifcgort Wi1lf 1. a r11norxaem y<o Iff 909 10t3 wBuV 1350 1700 1954 2402 2179 2016Baste*** 773 880 995 1555 1403 1517Hid Vestezn *• •* • “ 2277 672
Import Aoruwin 9 w t TSB w fjJSDuty Vest a m 403 611 794 1033 694 931(Masai Eastern 411 526 722 1096 1077 1321Oil") MldVeatem *• *» «. • 310 310
Continued
2 9 0
«000'.)
Source Region 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 (•) 1
Exolee North 1449 1525 1676 1807 2047 2322
Duty Vast 1619 1709 1931 2013 2030 1975
(Tobacco) Eaat 501 389 525 545 733 712Mid-Vast — - - *“ mm 371 658
Export North 4451 4078 5474 4647 6014 4696Duties Vast 8447 7489 5744 5334 5139 4064East 26G5 2457 1949 1672 1977 1864Mid-Vast — — — — 878 1355
Dietrlbutahls..
Paa I  * * * * * * 283 1185 1105 649 923 r \v
(BlnJx*) *•** - 170 711 635 309 415\rsuungy - 219 918 818 5°2(\) 714MidVast mm ' — — — 662' ' 138
Mining North 
Royalties ; w $
A&h r 1OT9 M H
& Rent 416 492 3162 2800 1966 2264* MidVest - - - - 491 669
Distrib- North 3655 5277 5304 5592 5597 * 6579utabla Pool Vast 2193 3169 3187 3361 3022 2963(General) East 2832 4087 4107 4330 4644(b) 968Mid Vaat — - - • —
Income Tax North 331 527Vast 186 291 • mm -East 231 367 - - - •Midwest ■ ■% ■ - - — mm "SSgTpR *
Total North 12,073 14,058 16,281 16,044 17,751 18,363Vest 15,419 16,421 16,445 16,915 14,074 12,194East 9,419 10,847 13,88| 14,012 13,732 15,095MidVast — t*1 ms — • 3,176 5,045
Notts (a) Estimates only
(b) Receipts from both alnlng and general import elements la tha 
Distributable pool lumped together.
Source: 0. Terrlba-Nlasrlaa Haranua Allocation Experience 1952-65. 
la N.J.E.S.S, Nor. I96SI
2 9 1
A...T, V
A>, 1 ; ■ V':': ' ’ - A * . •' . . . .•'"V '  ^ ■ , ■ • . • X ; • ■’ f'‘ •'*
UNITED AFRICA COMPANY: SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF CROSS INVESTMENTS 1956-64
: -;r ■ ' "
£000*0
yjt— r yd«d
30th JL- •
Distribution Industry Transportstion . Plantation
1936 1186 519 296 100
* 1957 1624 552 209 172
*1958 1351 308 635 232
1959 936 563 263 334
1960 1074 1224 40 479
1961 1403 736 82 124
1962 1368 1267 48 2
1963 1293 3018 37 51
1964 742 1558 303 74
Sourest United Africa Co - Statistics and Econonic Hsrisw (Various Tsars)
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NIGERIA! Commonwealth Prsfsrsnce Margins sajoyed in the OK Harkst 
*.*> °g— _____________________Pr»f— no* Duty H«t»_________KJ.H.Duty iff
Raw Cocoa 11*8d par cwt* 14a* per ewt
Ground Nuta Fres 106
Ground Nut Oiks Frea mGround Nut Caks Free 106Pals Ksmals Free 106
Pula Ksmsl Oil Free 106Paku Oil sdibls Free 106
Pula Oil insdibls Free 106Raw Cotton Free Free
Cotton Ssad Free Free
Hidaa and skins Free Free
Sheep and Taahakina • Free Free
Goat Skin Free 106
Rsptils Skins Free Free
Fur Skins Free Free
Natural Rubber Crepe Free Frss
Timber Logs (all Species) YTaes 106Timber Sawn (all Spsoiss) Free 5-156
Plywood Vsnssr Free 106
Tin Ore Free 106Coluabits Frss 106
Iron and Steal Scrap Free 106
Non ferrous Metal Scrap Free 106
Soya beans Free 56
Banal Ssed Free 106
Shea Nuta Free 106
Castor Oil Free 7-56
Sourest Federal Ministry of Coaaeree and Indue tries (Lagoa)
A.T. 18
2 9 5
NIGERIA! EXPORTS OT MAJOR COMMODITIES 1956-66
, * IT^WUi
Cosuodlties 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Groundnuts 27.8 20.1 26.9 27.5 22. 9 32.2 32.4 36.6 34.3 37.8 40.8
Groundnut Oil 4.1 4.6 3.7 4.6 5.3 5.0 6.2 6.6 8.1 Ida* f 9.7
Groundnut Cake 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.5 2.7 4.6 5.3 4.7
Total Ground 
nut produets 33.1 25.8 31.8 33.7 29.9 39.1 41.1 45.9 47.0 53.1 55.2
Pals Oil 14.9 13.8 12.7 13.8 14.8 13.2 8.9 9.4 10.8 14.0 11.0
Pals Kernels 20.4 18.0 20.5 26.0 26.1 19.9 16.9 20.8 21.0 26.5 22.4
Total Pain Produce 
35.3 31.8 33.3 39.8 40.1 33.1 25.8 30.2 31.8 40.5 33.4
C o m 24.0 26.0 26.7 38.3 36.8 33.7 33.3 32.4 40.1 42.7 28.3
Ran Cotton 7.1 6.3 7.8 7.3 6.2 11.1 5.9 9.5 6.1 3.3 3.4
Hides and 
skins
3.0 3.1 3.3 4.2 4.5 4.1 3.8 4.2 4.6 4.7 5.8
Rubber 6.4 7.0 7.6 11.6 14.2 11.0 11.4 11.8 11.0 11.0 11.5
Tlaber Plywood 4.8 5.0 6.3 8.1 7.9 7.0 7.8 9.1 7.7 6.8
Tin Ore 7.2 7.6 3.9 %.2 6.0 6.6 0.2 0.1 - - -
Tin Metal - - - sa , - 0.5 6.7 8.9 12.5 14.9 15.4
Other
Connodlties
11.4 11.6 11.2 11.7 15.4 11.5 12.1 13.8 16.1 17 .3 26.9
Total Traditio^^ 
nal Exports
124.2 13 1 .8 157.8 16 1.2 158.6 147.3 164.6 178.3 195.2 186.7
Crude Oil m e» 1.0 2.7 4.4 11.5 16.7 20.2 32.1 68.1 92.0
Total donsetic 
Exports 132.3 124.2 132.8 160.5 165.6 170.1 164.0 184.8 210.4 263.3 278.7
Re exports
HflHPSP %
2.3 3.4 2.8 3.0 4.1 3.6 4.5 4.8 4.2 5.0 5.4
V
Total 134.6 127*6 135.6 163.5 169.7 173.7 168.5 189.6 214.6 268.3 284.1
Sources: Annual Abstract of Statistics op eit various issues. 
Federal Office ef Stat 1stics-Ecoaonic Indicators (Lagoa) May 1967
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A.T. 20
Nl<U£giA‘ IMPORTS OF THS TWENTY SIX OOHMODITLS J2gt
Commodity
From 
Brit- 
a±S_ _
From
SEC
(£000)
Total
World
SBC aa 
%
World
Tariff 
Margin 
for ESC
(1) Butter 47.2 18.1 130.9 13.8 1d per lb
(2) Maoaroal 6*1 18.0 28.2 63.8 5.0
(3) Potatoes 3.1 61.9 72.5 85.4 4.0
(4) Sparkling Wines 2*1* 19.3 " 21.9 88.1 1s per Gal
(5) . Vermouth 0.4 5.5 6.7 82.1 4s per Qal
(6) Brandy 2.4 101.1 105.0 96.3 5e per Gal
(7) Bitters & Liqueurs 4.4 9.0 15.8 57.0 5e per Gal
(8) Building & Monumental stones 4.3 148.4 161.2 92.1 2.0
(9) Beads 2.8 24.3 150.6 16.1 5.0
(10) Other Household equipments 30.0 6.2 56.4 11.0 2.0
(11) Other Internal Combustion Engines 6.5 11.1 17.6 63.1 2.0
(12) Parts It accessories of Internal 
Combustion Engines
96.3 49.5 894.0 5.6 2.0
(13) Automatic Vending Machines 0.1 0.2 0.3 66.7 2.0
(14) Parts t accessories of Machinery 1858.0 1341.3 4431.4 30.2 2.0
(13) Floating Structures other 29.9 1.0 64.1 1.6 5.0
(16) Headgear Plaited 0.8 0.5 2.3 21.7 5.0
(17) Parte It accessories of Mueieal 
Instruments 5.2
1 .2 7.7 15.6 2.0
(18) Imitation Jesifclery 0.2 66. \ 207.4 32.2 5.0
(19) Smoking Pipes 1.6 61.3 100.0 61.9 2.0
(2d) Sardines 1.5 3.* 282.9 1.3 7.5
(21) Other Prepared Fish 6.6 41.S 188.Q 21.9 7.5
(22) Tomato Past# It Puree 1.5 474.7 622.0 76.3 9.0
(23) Beer 20.0 562.C 700.4 75.1 7a per Gel
(24) Pile It Chenille Fabrics of Silk 2.6 4.< 18.2 26.9 2.5
(23) Domestic Radiograms 7.1 148.’ 164.8 90.0 2.5
(26) Watches Other 2,0 18. . 2*5 _
Total 2142.7 3189. 8774.2 36.3
Not*i Total Imports of ths Z(\ commodities iron ths S.E.C. constltutsd only 1.3 % 
of Nigeria's aggregate Imports from all souross la 196k. Total imports of 
ths 2o Conmodltlss from all Souross uas only 3*5 % of aggregate Nigerian 
imports In 1964. .
Sourest oksgbo P.C.N .-Africa and ths Common Market (London 1967) ^.135
AilSitn %ll 2 9 £
m b b m m  nmJssaAm^tu, fiffm isfei
l p §
Niger Dt» 29.3
electricity Cooperation of Nigeria (ECU) Transmission Tines 10.7
Nigeria. Tort Authority ( Apaps Extension) 4.81
s b l
Nigeria Industrial Development Bank 0.5
JEBL
Education Projects 7.5
Northern Nigeria Heads 5.5
The Chi ted States 45.0
The Chi ted Kingdom 25.19 (1)
Vest Germany 8.5
Svltaerlsnd 1.7
Netherlands 4.0
Poland 15.0
Israel 1.17
Italy 9.00
TaiA mi Monev Market
Bonay Bur Sterling Loan Stock (Nigerian Torts Authority) 4.25
Total 171.72
Bote i (1) Includes £1.5 ailliou spsoial export credits sad £15 million 
(Im h t i I D c v t l o p m t
Sourest Hatioaal Development Tlan 'Progem Report op oit P. 31.
AitXi, fflft
> ^ M M  71— 11 nf i^intirTl Trmlllirt
1962-d
(Eg Million*)
2 9 9
Capital (1) 
Expenditure
Forelga Aid (2) 
Component
Col 2 ae # oi 
Col 1. (3)
Federal Oavemaent 95.3 15.9 16.7
Eastern Regional Oort* 20.2 0.6 2.7
Veetem Regional Oort* 15.5 0.9 6.3
Korth Regional Oort* 19.1 1.0
Total 150.3 18.5 12.3
Sot* I Vbmfaohnloal aaalstaao* t m i w i ia tha period (aatlaatad at
019.9 Million*)!* takaa into account, tha parapactloa* of foreign
t
did la total Oiwanf.it Capital aipaaditara rlaa* froa 12 to
20.99t
I
Sourcet »Progreee Beyort* op cit ^ .33.
M J L 3 0 6
Lender Borrower Purpose Angunt Tams
International Financial 
Jhstfttttlone
E8H1 Sgd. Xlgerlan Apapa Vdharf 4,822,000 
10/12/62 Ports Rrtanaion 
Authority
Repayable orer I6yra 
at 5#fea int. half ^ 
yearly period Payments 
Coarienoe 1/2/67
IBRD Sgd.
7A/«4
tfigai* pajpf
Hger Dens Project 29*286,000 
Authority Repayable orer 55 yrs at 5b# P*a. 5yra grass 
period. BepayaMnta to 
ocaaanoe 15/B/69
IBRD Sgde
12/5/64
Kleotricity BCR transmission
Cooperatian Lines 10.7 nlillone Repayable over 20 yrs 
of lifnit with 2j yrs graos
period. Rspaynanta 
coDUMnoe 5ept'66 at 
5j96 p.a. intaraat.
nam sgd.
26/9/65
Western Bigeria 
Vast Beglodal Boad Project 5*179*000 
Oort. Bapayabla ofrer 25 yrd incl 5 yr. grace period 
5j# p.a. interest. .
26/9/65 federal Oort Apapa Approach
Boad 6,250,000
*uera
Repayable orer 25 yrs 
«*■»* period 5J* 
grace period at 5i% 
P*a. intaraat.
InA Much *6$ Federal Oort. E*A Education- 4J, ^Project ft143*000 Repayable over 5 yrs inel.lOyre or Oraea 
int.rate at Jof 1#
mi
1/V65
Barth Regional Credit for $,$56,666
fLMsA ■ flaaAVjMMsore. sorcnaxn
fid.
Repayable in $0 yrs 
incl. 10 yrs grace 
credit oharge fofl#
S«pt.'63 IFC ShareBlgsrlan Subscription 499*827 
Derelopmnt Bank ,, - " - ■ - ■ '■* ■
Mareh 1964 ftZSi. n n .  m  inrMtaJi?*000
TO
August *61
Bailway fl ,070,000 
Bigsrla Ballway Track Relay 
Corporation
Repayable orer 20 yrs 
at 5fl# P*a. Interest.
A.T. 22 Cootlrowd \ 3 o"i
Lander Borrower Purpose Amount Terms
National Cknrts.
U.S. Aid Western Region 
4/12/63 Govt.
Ibadan Water 
Supply
4,300,000 Repayable over 30 yrq . ^  
excl. 10 yrs grace period, 
at 3# interest rate.
U.S. Aid
4/12/63
Eastern Region 
Govt.
Calabar/Doom
Road.
3,071,000 Same as Above.
U.S. Aid lBgfy Dams 
Authority
Niger Dams 
Project.
£5 millions Repayable in 10yrs at 
3# int. rate for first 
10yrs and ^thereafter.
U.S.Aid
29/12/64
Eastern 
Region Govt.
Port Haroourt 
Comprehensive 
School.
^43,000 Repayable in 40yrs isoel.
10 yrs of grace. Interest 
at for 1st 10yrs and 
2# thereafter.
U..S.Aid 
Deo*64
Federal Govt. Telecomms
Project
M4i,6&0 Repayable over 46 yrs lnol.
10 yrs grace • Interest atr 
1% for 1st 10 year and 
2j# for 30 years.
a • CO • 6 p. East RogiftnAi 
Govt.
Agriculture! 1,000.000 " 
Centre at Umudifcd
U.S. Aid
31/8/65
East Regional 
Govt.
r~i n-» i-niJrOTb narcourx 
Utaumealat Road
Project.
2,700,000 Same as Above.
U.S. Aid
31/8/65 North Regional 
Govt.
S T  1 .400,000 B . W . U .  m i  40 m .nsuniBg bonoox lnol. 10 yrs grace Int. 
Pro;),0t ' at 1# p.a. for fir.t
10 yrs and 2j9fc.a.for 
30years.
U.S. Aid 
11/2/66
Federal Govt. Telephone
Instruments 538,000 »
U.S. Aid
11/2/66 N
Agege Motor Rd. 1,100.000 •
UK Govt.
1960
Federal Govt.
U.K.
UK Exchequer 
Loan
£3 millions Repayable over 25 yrs 
O 6J96 p.a. interest. -
Commonwealth
Development
Cooperation
1960
'U Commonwealth
Assistance
£12,000,000 Repayable in 20 yrs
Variable interest fate.
CDC L3DB Apapa Industrial £1,250,000 Interest only first 
Estate lOyrs.Then repayable
in 30 equal annual 
instalments.
Urtmr Baxrotrar Purpo.. Aapmt S o .
A .T *  22 C o n tin u e d  3 0 2
Federal Oort* All Pttrpoes 10,000,000 Repayable up to 1988 ^ 
Crodit la 40 half yearly
instalments • Interest 
half yearly an J0/6 
and 50/12 v*e*f* 51^/6' 
and last ins telwant t*
of £240,000 an 51/12/87
UK dwrt. 
S«pt.*65
Hallway
Corporation
P Q  purchase 
of Steal rails 
and aoeessoxlea
^ fflfeyoble up to 1904
in 40 half yearly « 
instalments of £55»000
v*e*f* 50/6/64
UK iort
22/6/64 Klgar Bus
Authority
y4|pnr fSuMI 
Loan
aiiiian kspayable by Iby 1 
1909*Interest rate
ra8
UK Oort. 
Dm  1964
Federal Govt. Xxpansian 0^ 
Telecceme Wystan
Repayable over
£1*6 Million 25 yrs at rate
of interest fct - 
above UK Treasury 
rate*
UK dork.
3/8/65
1 W 1 Veleoanns Those 11 £2*7 K. Repayable over
25 yrs with 5yre 
interest free period ' 
Interest to vary 
between 5&* and 
p.a.
8/11/65
CAKALA
Federal Govt* Telecoms Those £1*2 H. Repayable over 25
yre lnol 5 yr* frees 
at 696 p.a, interest 
rate*
" *■ Lagos Cross Bur 
Exchange Loan 519,000 interest free* Repayable over 4Qyra 
with 10yra of grace*
Setherlands 
Oovt. Dm ’64 w4|*r Bans njt* Bans Authority Loan
£1*M Repayable over 25 yrs 
inol*7yrs of grace ** 
Interest rate le 5&4p*
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1963
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t
ITALY
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. 3 0 'S
A.T.22 Continued
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p.a. interest•
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A.T. 22b
^ 1 1  o ^ c . n .
3 0 4
T«r Aggregate bilateral Aid from OECD 
amber States / US KtUlong
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1964 19.11
1965 44.63
1966 76.50
Souroei Osogrsphtoal Distribution of ftnmoUi flews cm ait*
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